


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THE THEAETETUS OF PLATO

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Plato. Theaetetus
THE THEAETETUS
OF PLATO

A TRANSLATION WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

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PREFACE.

MORE fully than any other of Plato's dialogues the *Theaetetus* shows how Plato seeks to bring the ordinary mind to a knowledge of its own limitations. It has, therefore, in the hands of a sympathetic teacher, special value for the one who is about to embark on the study of philosophy. With the able translations of Jowett, Kennedy, and Paley in existence, it is impossible to regard the present translation as meeting a need; but it at least makes more useful the accompanying Introduction. Wherever, in the course of the dialogue, occur philosophical terms or phrases, the translator has supplied in brackets the original Greek, and in translating these terms has particularly sought to avoid any allusion to modern metaphysics.

The Introduction has a twofold object. It seeks to give Plato's portrait, account, and criticism of Protagoras and his followers, and at the same time it serves as an outline of one large and important section of Plato's own philosophy. Indeed, owing to Plato's peculiar method, if it succeeds in the first it does the second also. In the closing pages of the Introduction reference is made to the final form of Plato's thought, with the view of indicating how far it was moulded by his long and arduous encounter with Sophistry.

In preparing this little work the translator has always had before him Jowett's monumental translation of the dialogues, and has frequently made use of it without special acknowledgement. Professor Campbell's sound and scholarly books, *The Theaetetus of Plato* and *The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato* have been of great service.

Aristotle's treatment of the topics discussed in the Introduction has been found uniformly to repay the closest study.

S. W. DYDE.

Sept. 15, 1899.

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INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

PLATO'S STYLE AND METHOD.

I. Plato's Style. The Dialogue. As no philosopher before Plato, and no philosopher since his day, has consistently chosen the dialogue as a vehicle of expression, it is natural to look for an explanation of this peculiarity in the general habits of the age. The remark of Montaigne, "*Nous ne sommes jamais chez nous*," "We are never at home" (*Essais*, chap. iii.), applied by the essayist to humanity at large, may with a change of meaning be taken to describe the ordinary social life of Athens. The street, the forum, the gymnasium were frequented by men¹; the women were indoors. When Aristotle says that the characteristic of perfect love or friendship (*φιλία*) is equality (*ἰσότης*), meaning by equality an intimacy between men of equal and lofty intellectual and social attainments, and that the friendship of brothers, when of a noble kind, comes to resemble the friendship of comrades (*Ethics*, VIII. 7, 9, and VIII. 14), he is interpreting the prevailing Greek

¹ "For the man, when at home they fret his soul,
Goes forth, and stays his loathing heart's disgust,
Unto a friend or age-mate turning him."

Euripides, *Medea* (Way's translation, Vol. I., p. 71, ll. 244-246).

sentiment. A glance at the scene of any of Plato's dialogues is enough to show how small a part was played by the "home" in the daily life of Athens. The wits of the city drew together in some public resort for the discussion of affairs or for an intellectual combat, just as regularly and frequently as the youths took their exercise and bath.

Under such circumstances it would be a matter of surprise if conversation had not developed unusual keenness of edge; it would be equally surprising if the substance of the conversation were not of a high order. Trivialities, commonplaces, scandal there were, no doubt, but the staple subject, amongst the nobler spirits at least, would be some public event or broad question of the hour. It was natural that Plato, growing up in this atmosphere, should have found the dialogue to be the most adequate instrument for the presentation of his theories, and have become a master of prose style.

Not the home only, but also the study plays an unimportant part in Greek life.² Even after Plato's time, when philosophy had become a separate training, and had assumed the form of continuous exposition, it was the debate of the school, which to some extent superseded the conversation of the gymnasium. Though the general, the statesman, the poet, in their distinctive capacities, disappear in the school, and all stand upon the level of "lovers of the sight of truth," ideas were still moulded largely through the oral interchange of opinions. Just as the ordinary philosophical treatise of to-day reflects the process by which the writer, in the solitude of his study, organizes his conceptions, so

² It is thought to be worthy of special mention, for example, that Euripides collected a library. (Cf. Way's translation of Euripides Vol. II. xii.)

Plato in his earlier dialogues reflects the sparkling variety of the gymnasium or market-place, and in the later dialogues the more uniform discussions of the incipient school.³

That the talks of Socrates not only inspired Plato with a zeal for philosophy, but suggested to him the fitting vehicle for its expression, is not open to doubt; but we still have to turn to the spirit and manners of the time in order to find out why the conversations of Socrates are his philosophy.

Conversational the dialogues of Plato certainly are, but it would be a mistake to infer from this fact that they were mere reproductions of the conversations of the street. In two ways they differ from ordinary intercourse: (a) in their substance, and (b) in their form. (a) Doubtless the conversation of the street was of an exceptionally high quality in Athens at Plato's time. If we are to judge from Aristophanes, however, the brilliancy and acuteness of mind visible in the usual street talk were limited to the objects and events of the hour, to the great war, for example, and the subsequent kaleidoscopic changes of government; but a consistent examination of a moral principle, such as justice or temperance, or the consistent exploitation of such a theme as knowledge, was as complete a departure from the daily matter of Athenian gossip as the life of Socrates was an exception to the usual civic life. The dialogue of Plato is, therefore, in its substance not a mere reproduction of the casual ebb and flow of public opinion, but an idealization of it, preserving and even refining its vivid nipping quality,

³ "We are not in the market-place, or the house of Callias, but in the groves of Academe" (Campbell, *Sophistes and Politicus of Plato*, Introduction to the *Sophist*, p. xxi).

but always concerning itself with the real problems of existence.

(b) In form the dialogue of Plato is more intimately connected with the conversation to be found in the Greek drama, than with that to be overheard in the market-place. Actual gatherings are more or less haphazard in time, place and personages; but in the drama the conversation is carried on by characters, as they are called, persons who constitute a network and, by the influence of one upon another, bring to completion the thought embodied in the action. In Plato, too, the characters have each a necessary part, and are selected because, by playing this part, they assist in chiselling into shape the definition. In fact, Plato, with a mind steeped in the drama, and captivated by the wonderful possibilities revealed in the method of Socrates, was driven towards the dialogue irresistibly, and it is in his case no more an external vehicle of expression than the form of Aristotle or Hegel is external to the matter with which he deals. Plato himself clearly understood that the dialogue, unlike casual conversation, was a work of art. He compared the true discourse to a living creature having its own body, head and feet, with a beginning, middle and end, which must be agreeable to one another and to the whole (*Phaedrus*, 264). This remark Aristotle applies to tragedy (*Poetics*, 6. 1450b, 27).

The connection of the dialogue with dramatic presentation gives us an interesting view of the digressions, freely interspersed throughout the dialogues. These interludes afford the author an opportunity to discuss a theme in easy amplitude, a habit which, as we may suppose, was more characteristic of Plato than it was of Socrates. The actual Socrates disliked long speeches,

and kept strictly to the argument. "Challenge Socrates to an argument," says Theodorus; "Invite a horseman to the open plain" (*Theaetetus*, 183 D). But Plato, with a more assured command of the subject, permitted himself to digress. To many, such as Theodorus (*Theaetetus*, 177 C), the digressions, which have no direct counterpart in ordinary conversation, were a relief from the strain of the argument, and in that respect, as well, also, as in their indirect connection with the main subject, resemble the chorus of Greek tragedy.

Dramatic is the term, therefore, which describes in general the style of Plato, or, to use his own word, his method is that of dialectic. The term dialectic in its passage from current to philosophic use itself illustrates the difference between random converse and philosophic investigation. *Διάλεκτος*, meaning at first merely a graver conversation and then a debate, discussion, argument or interchange of thought upon a definite topic, came to signify also the attainment of truth through the conflict of opinions and dispersion of inadequate conceptions. Further, it was used by Plato as the name of the science built up from the lower sciences gradually, its object being the systematic account of the supreme reality or the absolute good. Although the term thus obtained a strictly philosophic sense, its current meanings were not dropped, and a happy union of them all is required for an understanding of Plato's style.

The following particulars will illustrate Plato's dramatic and dialectic style.

(a) His delicate preservation of the general atmosphere of the dialogue is a dramatic quality of great value. This quality is recognized at once not only in

the richly comic scenes of the *Euthydemus*,⁴ where Euthydemus and his brother are not counted worthy of serious treatment, and in the tragic surroundings of the *Phaedo*, which are in keeping with the discussion contained in it upon the immortality of the soul, but also in more subtle and unobtrusive references, of which the *Theaetetus* furnishes a striking example. The closing sentences of the dialogue prove that the conversation, which it details, occurred during the trial of Socrates for heresy. This circumstance is in the course of the argument noticed so artlessly by three simple words, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν,⁵ that Jowett thought it unnecessary to translate them. It is only in works of genius that so keen a perception is expressed with such simplicity and reserve. Again in the *Symposium*, at a banquet where Agathon and Aristophanes have seats, the grave and the gay are skilfully combined. Indeed, Socrates, seated between the two poets, is made by Plato to drop the golden conception that "the genius of comedy was the same as that of tragedy" (*Symposium*, 223), words which justified Browning in putting into the mouth of Balaustion the hope that Aristophanes "re-ordinating outworn rule" would have

"Made Comedy and Tragedy combine,
Prove some new Both-yet-neither, all one bard,
Euripides with Aristophanes
Co-operant."⁶

⁴ "As regards tone and form, the *Euthydemus* might be described as the satirical farce, which accompanies the stately drama of the *Protagoras*" (*Philosophical Lectures and Remains of Richard Lewis Nettleship*, Vol. I., p. 268).

⁵ "Often indeed, at other times *as well as now*, have I noticed how likely it is that those who spend much time in philosophic study will provoke laughter when they appear at court and make a speech" (*Theaetetus*, 172c).

⁶ *Aristophanes' Apology*, 3440-3.

Browning thinks that this union was brought about by "the appointed fellow born thereto," namely, Shakespeare; but that which Shakespeare carried out in the drama, Plato carried out in the *Symposium*, not only preserving with unsurpassed fineness of feeling the general tone of the picture, but inventing, and at the same time perfecting, a literary form of a highly complex kind.

Again, where in the region of satire is anything to be found superior in delicacy and precision of thrust to the speech put by Plato into the mouth of Aristophanes, when the poet is depicted as praising the good old times (*Symposium*, 193, 194)? With astonishing reserve, Plato, by means of the speech of Socrates, hints a moment afterwards that Aristophanes in lauding the *tempus actum*, has placed emphasis upon the wrong idea, and adds that nothing but what is good should be the object of love (*Symposium*, 205). The dialogue, neither in its tragic, comic nor satiric form, is adscititious to Plato's thought.

(b) A second feature of dramatic or artistic value in Plato is his furnishing incidentally a large mass of information concerning the private and public manners of the Greeks. From his works writers on antiquities have gathered facts concerning the domestic life of women, and their place in public esteem, the amusements and education of children, the condition of slaves, the various occupations of workmen, public amusements and festivals, private and public teachers, the distinction between artizans and soldiers, general social usages, the current popular estimate of prominent citizens, and the place occupied in the feeling of the people by the heroes and writers of the past. All these and many more facts of domestic and public

life show how wide and direct was Plato's contact with the various activities of his age. These casual observations are quite different from his systematic philosophic theories of social and domestic life and education, to which, of course, no reference is here made. The common charge that he refused to consider facts, and built speculative castles in the air, falls to the ground of itself before the array of facts and even figures concerning not only Athenian life but Greek life as a whole, which can be gathered merely by way of pastime from his profound attempt to justify the ways of God to man and the world. Observers of society nestle inside of Plato as easily as historians and antiquarians nestle inside of Sir Walter Scott.

(c) Plato's perception of an individual's thought is so direct and penetrating that it includes even minute details of character and manners. The reader is interested at once in the beauty of Charmides as well as in his naïve ideas of temperance, in the personal appearance of Theaetetus, in the bearing of Alcibiades, in the Doric accent of Cebes, and so on. Plato, with the faculty of an artist, sees the thinker when he sees the thought, and presents thinker and thought as an indivisible whole. The most striking figure of the dialogue is, of course, Socrates, over whose character Plato lingers with a disciple's fondness, portraying his personal appearance, manner of dress, way of talking, quickness of hearing, physical endurance, habit of standing in silent debate oblivious to his surroundings, matchless power over wine, courage, penetration, and amazing love of discourse. A noteworthy instance of his fineness of feeling occurs in the *Theaetetus*, when Socrates discovers that Theaetetus and himself have been unwarrantably using the very

terms, which they are seeking to define. "A skilled disputant," Socrates then remarks, "would have warned us away from these expressions, and chidden me in particular for my manner of arguing" (197A), a passage not easy to equal as an illustration of scrupulous regard for another's feelings. This artistic attention to the personality and atmosphere of the individual, is another element in Plato's greatness, the lack of which has often embittered philosophic controversy.

(d) The dialogues of Plato are dramatic or dialectic in that they reproduce by means of characters the various elements or strata of thought composing the consciousness of Athens at this time. The characters are not deprived of their value as individuals, but become representative individuals or 'types,' in the sense that their thought is heightened thought at large. This is another note of the great writer, whose characters belong to the whole age, or, rather, to mankind, while the creations of minor writers, depending for their force upon oddities of expression, or exaggerations of some single emotion, have, like Hepzibah Pyncheon's chickens, an air of antiquity or unreality, as soon as they come into being.

From the varied pageant of Greek life displayed in Plato's pages come three, if not four, different files of typical characters. First of all appear men like Cephalus, whose life has almost arrived at the "last scene of all," whose thought it would, therefore, be an impiety to unsettle, and Laches, who, though holding fast to the traditional ideas, was yet a fair mark for Socrates' critical shafts. Younger men also are of this company, Lysis, Charmides, and Polemarchus, who may fairly be expected to respond to the new speculative

impulse. Behind all these, and forming one body with them, are Aristophanes, the antagonist of innovation and champion of the good old times, Anytus, who fears to speak evil of dignities, and Callicles, who, presenting the claims of the man of substance and honour who is well to do, thinks that philosophy is the recreation of children and fools. In the next main division are to be found Sophists like Protagoras and Gorgias, worthy representatives of the new spirit of research; also their well-meaning disciples, like Theodorus, eager for knowledge, and, too, the younger brood of Sophists, Polus, Thrasymachus, and the rest, showing some of the principles of the greater Sophists hardened into dogmas. In the third division are Socrates himself, and his young disciples, Simmias, Cebes, Glaucon and Adeimantus, who have been swung from their moorings by Sophistic criticism and are still grappling for some regulative principles of thought and conduct. In a fourth category must be placed Parmenides, Timaeus, Critias, the Athenian Stranger of the *Laws*, and the Eleatic Stranger of the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, all of whom are at a stage, at which Plato has not only abandoned the earlier descriptive dialogue, but has entered a field of discussion wholly beyond the scope of Socratic thought.

(e) While different theories and opinions find expression in Plato through representative personalities, he reaches his own theory not by direct criticism of any inadequate views, but by gradually passing through every-day opinion and the doctrines of the Sophists. Thus in the *Republic* there is what corresponds to the scenes or stages in a Greek drama, the philosophic idea being ushered forth with such preparation as enables us to see how truly philosophic it is. This

method has an educational value, to which Plato was not blind. Imbued with the genius of Socrates he was as far as possible from desiring to substitute for current opinion a philosophic dogma, seeking rather by a wise strategy to create a certain spirit or habit of thinking, and thus by his dramatic handling of his subject leading the undaunted wayfarer step by step out into the sun of the supreme idea from the dark cave of thoughtless custom.

II. Plato's Method. The completed method of Plato may be said to be the method of his master, amplified and deepened by the growth of philosophy in the interval. Socrates impresses us as one who is machine-like in his almost incredible energy and endurance. No Indian ever followed the trail of his foe with more unerring and unrelaxed purpose than Socrates follows the argument. What serves to take the edge off and even exhaust the analytic capacity of Protagoras merely whets his appetite. Three times in one day he will repeat a long discussion and go away hoping that the next day will bring a similar diversion.

Socrates sought to expose by means of questioning the contradictions and inconsistencies involved in common opinion, and to prepare the way for true knowledge. He was wiser, he said, than other men, as the oracle had declared, only because he knew that he knew nothing, while all others, though equally ignorant, believed that they had knowledge. His mission was to instil into every one he met the blessed consciousness of ignorance, that they might hereafter have a desire for knowledge, and, even if they could not be said to know, at least be free from delusions. The deference, which he paid, or with

veiled irony seemed to pay, to the opinion of the unwary respondent, had the effect of drawing him into a conversation, but he, like the silly fly of the nursery rhyme, is quickly entangled in the web of dialectic. This unexpected exposure of incapacity had different effects upon different temperaments. The timid inquirer, deprived of his usual habits of thought and coming suddenly to the brink of a void inane, fell back upon some less exacting discipline; the bolder advocate of the established ideas conceived a bitter aversion to the new-fangled teaching, and called to his assistance all the forces of religious and political conservatism; only the resolute inquirer allowed himself to feel the full torture of the gad-fly of wonder or doubt, and, like the wandering Io, plunged forward sustained by the hope of reaching at the last some solid conception.

It is not to be wondered at that so large a portion of the Athenian public, following the lead of Aristophanes, should have classed Socrates with the Sophists. Insisting all his life long that on knowledge and not on authority must be built law and morality, he, more than all the Sophists combined, woke men out of the sleep of custom. Nevertheless he differs from them profoundly in the very quality of his genius. While they, doubtful of the powers of reason, halted and gave way before the phalanxes of customary beliefs, he never accepted a truce. Probing his own soul and convinced that truth was attainable, he, avoiding the easy compromise of the Sophists, determined to solve the riddle, if not of all existence, at least of morality and the state. It is true that his actual work was largely a clearing of the way, and that he left behind no system of thought or morality; but he held on to

knowledge to the end. Accordingly not he but the indifferent public was the real enemy of truth. Like the unskilled bird-catchers, who "captured the ring-dove when they wanted the pigeon," the Athenian judges, in condemning Socrates to drink the cup of hemlock, had, through lack of insight into their true needs, failed to punish the real culprit.

The best excuse for Aristophanes and the Athenian people is that to Plato himself the difference between Socrates and the Sophists, although he had long felt it, became clear only gradually. Even in the *Protagoras* the teachings of the famous Sophist are overshadowed by his personality. Only when Plato's thought has greatly matured, does he enrich his method by an analysis and refutation of Sophistic doctrine. While the method of Socrates is chiefly a subtle attack upon cherished opinions, the full-grown method of Plato comprises, in addition, a dialectical removal of the theories of the Sophists followed by a positive interpretation of reality.

Thus Plato's method involves three stages, only the first of which is adequately illustrated in the method of Socrates. These stages, which are firstly a criticism of ordinary opinion, secondly a criticism of Sophistic doctrine, and thirdly a positive account of reality, are exhibited in the *Theaetetus*, although the constructive teaching of this dialogue is not pronounced. (a) The question discussed in the *Theaetetus* is as to the nature of knowledge, and at first Theaetetus thinks that knowledge is the different sciences and arts—whatever, in fact, one may learn from Theodorus. Soon, however, Socrates convinces him that he has not explained the point at issue, since in the reply it is taken for granted that we understand what is meant by any

special kind of knowledge, although we are still in the dark about the nature of knowledge in general. When asked for the meaning of a term, those, who are governed by common opinion, are apt to give a number of instances or particulars, to which Plato elsewhere humorously refers as a swarm. "When I ask you, Meno, for one virtue, you present me with a swarm of them, just as though, when I ask you the nature of a bee, to carry on the figure, you tell me there are many kinds of bees, although bees as bees do not differ from one another at all" (*Meno*, 72 A). As he says later in the same dialogue, he is looking for the meaning of the whole, and is expected to understand it when it is frittered away into little pieces. Knowledge in the universal, whole and sound, is what he seeks, the *simile in multis*. Plato aims in this covert way to create the suspicion that casual observation or direct contact with separate objects, as it does not call for any conscious effort of inquiry, is not by itself the final office of thought. Suspicion becomes a deep self-mistrust, in the case of those at least who have any faculty of reflection, and at the same time the very foundations of the universe seem to be shaken. Thus wonder or doubt is the parent of thought, or, as Plato has also put it, Iris is the daughter of Thaumas, and wonder is the beginning of philosophy (*Theaetetus*, 155 D). Roughly this stage in the method of Plato coincides with the work of Socrates, and is abundantly exemplified in the earlier dialogues, although even in the *Charmides* there are hints beyond the reach of Socrates. With less penetration than was possessed by Plato the criticism of common opinion would leave behind it a smarting sense of loss rather than a longing to know, and this

difference, we may surmise, marked him out from Socrates at the very beginning.

(b) Plato's way of dealing with the Sophists, as well, also, as his treatment of their general tenets, are the subject of the three following chapters. Their method, in so far as it is to be distinguished from the results of their thinking, was criticized by Plato under the wide name of "Rhetoric."⁷ The teachers of rhetoric, of whom Gorgias, the Sophist, was the Nestor, professed to impart to young men the ability to make a telling speech upon any topic merely by the study of oratory. This method Plato contrasts with dialectic in point of both style and substance. As to style he contends that the oration is confused, and like the epitaph of Midas, the Phrygian, might be recited either backwards or forwards without any detriment to its meaning; while the dialectician, setting out from clear definition, exhibits the true agreements and differences of things in an orderly and systematic way. But his main charge is that rhetoric is in substance a 'flattery' or 'enchantment,' by means of which the multitude is persuaded of the finality of its present opinions, like the false art of cookery or tiring, which ministers to the mere pleasures of the body, and ignores its health. In the end, therefore, it is inimical to philosophy, being satisfied with probability and seeking to persuade merely, but looking upon the acquisition of truth as without any practical value. But Socrates, bent upon healing, by purge and knife, this almost incurable cancer of the soul, and careless how many may be of a mind different from his own, spends his days in the pursuit of knowledge, as the only safe foundation of a right life. Hence rhetoric,

⁷ This is the chief topic of the *Gorgias*.

on the side of its substance, is the false appearance (*Schein*, as Hegel would say), of which justice is the truth, since justice is, in Plato's thought, the ethical basis of the state.

(c) The third and final form of the dialectical method, reached only when Plato has propounded his theory of ideas and has taken up physical inquiries, which not only the cultured Athenian but even Socrates had looked at askance, still bears traces of its conversational and controversial origin. It becomes at last a colloquy not between persons or opposing systems but ideas. By a process, hinted at in the *Theaetetus* and illustrated at length in the *Parmenides* and *Sophist*, ideas, which seemed to be in their inner nature antagonistic to one another, such as 'being' and 'not being,' 'the same' and 'the other,' were set face to face, and made to come to terms. By means of this splendid and fertile principle, to be referred to below (chap. iv.), Plato is enabled for the first time in the history of thought to reach a conception of the universe which is at once scientific and religious.

CHAPTER II.

PLATO AND PROTAGORAS.

OF Protagoras (born 480 B.C., died 411 or 408 B.C.) it is known that he instructed Euripides,¹ as did also the Sophist Prodicus.² Other famous Sophists are Hippias and Gorgias. As Protagoras had at the time of his death been practising his profession for upwards of forty years (Plato, *Meno*, 91), his public life must have begun about the year 450, five years after the first representation of a play by Euripides.³ At that time Socrates was a young man of twenty, ten years the junior of both Protagoras and Euripides, a longer interval at this epoch of rapid intellectual growth than in most periods of the world's history.⁴

¹ *Aristophanes' Apology* (Browning), l. 364, and Bernhardt, *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur*, II. 2. 399, 413, 414.

² Bernhardt, *Id.* II. 2. 382, 409; Jevons, *History of Greek Literature*, p. 220.

³ Way, *The Tragedies of Euripides in English Verse*, Vol. I., Pref. p. 18.

⁴ Although several passages in Plato (*Charmides*, 163; *Meno*, 96; *Cratylus*, 384; *Protagoras*, 341) indicate that Socrates had attended some of the lectures of Prodicus, he may not have been the Sophist's junior in years. Indeed, according to accepted dates Prodicus was the younger, having been born about 465 B.C., and is even said to have been a disciple of Protagoras. However wide may have been his earlier reputation for making delicate shades of distinction be-

Of Protagoras Plato has in effect said that he was a sincere inquirer into the nature of virtue and truth, sought to improve his followers morally and intellectually, was listened to eagerly by large numbers, was highly respected by all, and was instrumental in opening up a new channel of inquiry. There were fermenting in Athens, however, views subversive of sound government, such as that the basis of society was expediency and not divine justice, and Protagoras, by voicing and in some measure originating these views, unintentionally strengthened the disintegrating forces. His opinions regarding the gods have a similar tendency, and his famous utterance, "Man is the measure of all things," must be construed, in spite of what would have been his indignant protest to the contrary,

tween synouyms, he is consistently regarded by Plato as one who had devoted his time to a superficial culture (*Laches*, 197; *Charmides*, 163; *Protagoras*, 314, 337, 341, 358; *Euthydemus*, 277; *Meno*, 75, 96; *Phaedrus*, 267; *Cratylus*, 384; *Apology*, 19).

While the dates of the birth and death of Hippias are uncertain, he is generally counted as a contemporary of Prodicus. Although his range of knowledge covered physics, astronomy, calculation, geometry and music, he is, as far as Plato is concerned, even a more shadowy form than Prodicus, and is gently satirized for feebleness of reflection gilded by a full rhetorical style (*Protagoras*, 314, 318, 337; *Phaedrus*, 267; *Apology*, 19).

Gorgias arrived at Athens at the head of an embassy in the year 427 B.C., when Socrates was thirty-three years old. He is universally believed to have lived to an extreme age, perhaps more than a century, and to have died some years after the death of Socrates. He was, therefore, in all likelihood, the senior of Socrates, and may have been the senior even of Protagoras. With Protagoras he shares the honour of furnishing Plato with the name of a dialogue, the *Gorgias*, in which Plato treats the person of the aged rhetorician with a deference, to which his speculative powers, as Plato knew, were not entitled (cf. *Meno*, 76; *Apology*, 19; *Symposium*, 198; *Gorgias*; *Phaedrus*, 261, 267; *Philebus*, 58, 59).

as denying the existence of truth, or at least of our ability to attain to it. But, once again, Protagoras must be remembered as a man of unblemished moral character and of high reputation as a thinker and teacher. Though pay was accepted by him for his instruction, an offensive novelty in Athens, it was willingly given, since his pupils were practically allowed to fix the rate. This general judgment requires to be substantiated in detail.

The philosophy of Protagoras may be considered under three heads: (*a*) His idea of the gods, (*b*) his view of knowledge and reality, and (*c*) his theory of the state and morality.

(*a*) **I. The Gods in the philosophy of Protagoras.** The view of Protagoras concerning the gods may be inferred from the two or three passages in Plato, in which his words have been preserved. The myth in the *Protagoras* (320, "Once upon a time there were gods only and no mortal creatures, . . . afterwards man was the only one of the animals who had any gods, because he alone was of their kindred") is a story elaborated with care and earnestness. It cannot have been written simply by way of accommodation to popular ideas, but probably represents either an immature form of Protagoras' theology, or an imperfect grasp of it by Plato, or, what is more likely than either alternative, a combination of the two. A more mature expression of the religious views of Protagoras is to be found in the *Theaetetus*, where the Sophist, insisting that no weight whatsoever can be attached to popular beliefs, holds that the existence of the gods, though not impossible, is incapable of proof. "It is," he says (162 D, E), "an appeal to vulgar prejudice to make the gods the centre of an argument, when their very existence is open to

doubt, and any mention of them in speech or writing should be avoided." The passage in the *Laws* (10. 889 E), in which the views of various 'wise men' are given, to the effect that "the gods exist not by nature (φύσει) but by art (τέχνη) and by the laws of states (νόμοις), which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them," does not refer to the Sophists alone, as Zeller⁵ seems to think, but to philosophers at large, some of the Sophists probably being of the number. Plato may be thinking of later theorizers, called Sophists (σοφιστῶν ἐπικαλουμένων—*Laws*, 10. 908 D), who, as is likely, rushed in with a definite atheistical doctrine, where Protagoras had merely refused to accept the traditional religious

⁵ "The σοφοί," as Zeller calls them (*Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, Vol. II., note on p. 482, Alleyne's translation), are, in his view, the Sophists. But in the first place, since Plato speaks of them as maintaining that fire and water and earth and air exist by nature and chance (φύσει καὶ τύχῃ, *Laws*, 10. 889 A, B), he is clearly referring to a wide range of speculators, including Democritus, who ascribe the origin of all things to some kind of matter or some physical force. And in the second place, he calls them not σοφοί but σοφοὶ ἄνδρες (888 E, 890 A, rightly translated by Jowett 'philosophers' and 'wise men'), as though to guard against the notion that he referred exclusively to the Sophists, who had already been shown by Plato to be a distinct historical school. He had used the name 'Sophist,' σοφιστής, in his dialogue of that name, when analyzing the influence of the Sophistic teaching as a whole upon philosophy (*Sophist*, 216 D, 217 A, 218 C, 233 C, 241 A, 254 A, B, 260 C, 264 D, E, 268 C, D, and many other places, cf. *Laws*, 10. 908 D). In one passage, indeed (*Sophist*, 268 B), Plato expressly asks if the Sophist is to be called wise or Sophistic (σοφὸν ἢ σοφιστικόν). Accordingly the use of such a general appellation as 'wise men' to describe a company of thinkers strengthens the conclusion drawn from the context, that in this passage the Sophists are not exclusively or even conspicuously in Plato's mind, and that Protagoras is not in his mind at all.

faith. In addition to the foregoing direct references his well-known dictum, "Man is the measure of all things," may fairly be taken to exclude the gods as an available standard of truth and right. All that we know positively from Plato of the Sophist's theology is that, though he had broken away from the accepted beliefs, and regarded proof of the existence of the gods as impossible, he, in the absence of positive views of his own, upon occasion rests, if not on popular religious ideas, at least on popular religious feeling.

II. **Plato's Criticism.** At the time when Plato (*Republic*, 2. 373 foll.) found fault with the poets for representing the gods as doing evil and as changeable, he was still too much in sympathy with popular religious conceptions to propose anything more than their reform. But as his speculative idea of the gods as "Gods of Gods"⁶ (*Timaeus*, 41A), and as the soul of the universe (*Laws*, 10. 896B, τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη—"the eldest of all things") grew more clear, his judgment of the established religion was modified in a two-fold way. He ceased to think that a reform of current opinions was possible or desirable, saying with pretended seriousness that, since of the other (*i.e.* the recognized) divinities nothing could be known, the statements of the men of old time must simply be taken on faith (πειστέον, *Timaeus*, 40D). He did not hesitate openly to contrast the gods of popular opinion (οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοί) with the true gods. In the second place, maintaining that in its consciousness of God the mind of man attained its highest expression, he dwelt on the idea that man was the most religious of animals (θεοσεβέστατον αὐτό ἐστι πάντων ζώων ἄνθρωπος, *Laws*, 10. 902B; *Timaeus*

⁶ See Mr. Archer Hind's *Timaeus*, p. 137, note.

41A), and counted his philosophy as the ally of the ancient tradition (τῷ παλαιῷ νομῷ ἐπικούρον, *Laws*, 10. 890D and B).

It is not difficult to see the connection of Plato's religious philosophy with that of Protagoras. Plato recognizes the difference between popular myth and the religious consciousness, out of which the myth springs, and is able to turn away from the one while vindicating the other. Protagoras, seeing no difference between the two, is led to regard the consciousness of God as unreal, or, at least, as of no practical significance. Whether Plato himself understood his relation to Protagoras in this way, he has left behind no direct criticism of his predecessor, unless it be by implication in the striking remark (*Laws*, 4. 716c), "God ought to be to us the measure of all things, and not man, as men commonly say." This substitution of 'God' for 'man' in the widely-known sentence of Protagoras contains in brief compass the whole difference between Protagoras and Plato.

(b) I. **Knowledge and Reality in the Philosophy of Protagoras.** A careful reader of the *Theaetetus* will distinguish two ways in which Plato treats the philosophy of Protagoras: (1) by quotation from recognized sayings and writings; and (2) by reference to doctrines of a school looking to Protagoras as its founder. These two ways of treatment are broadly connected with two distinct criticisms of the saying, "Man is the measure of all things." When Plato takes this statement to mean that each man's opinions are true for him, employing the words 'seeming' (δοκεῖν) and 'opinion' (δόξα), he makes use of either the exact words of Protagoras or of a direct paraphrase. When he attacks the doctrine that 'perception'

(αἴσθησις) is knowledge, and connects it with the 'becoming' (γίγνεσθαι, *Theaetetus*, 157A) of Heraclitus, he has before him the development of the central idea of Protagoras made by later Sophists. On the one side the remarks of Plato are of this character: "He (*i.e.* Protagoras) says that man is the measure of all things, . . . Have you never read that?" (152A); "As Protagoras says" (160 c); "Let us seek to extract the admission from the theory itself" (170A), this last remark introducing a careful consideration of the sayings of Protagoras regarding the value of each man's opinion. On the other side the references of Plato are as follows: "You have given in other words the theory of Protagoras" (152A); "Protagoras and his school" (154B); "Protagoras or somebody else" (154c); "Views which we are ascribing to Protagoras" (155E); "according to the wise," that is, as the context shows, the philosophers from Homer downwards (157B); "those who say" (158E); "the disciples of Protagoras" ['they' in the original] (172 B); "the theory set up on behalf of Protagoras" (179 D); "the disciples of Heraclitus" (179 D). These phrases are consistently used when Plato is examining the doctrine that each man's sensation is for him the sole reality.

At once the important point is made clear that what passes for the sensational philosophy of the Sophists is propounded not by Protagoras but by men calling themselves and called by Plato disciples of Protagoras. At this stage in our discussion we are not concerned with the later Sophistic philosophy, but have to see simply what is the view of Protagoras, and what is Plato's criticism.

The kernel of the philosophy of Protagoras is therefore to be found in the sentence already alluded

to (152 A), "Man is the measure of all things, of things that are (judging) that they are, and of things that are not (judging) that they are not." (*πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.*) The word 'judging,' inserted in this extract, is used by Protagoras himself in a second carefully worded statement, "Of what is I am the judge (*κριτής*) that it is, and of what is not that it is not" (160 c). From these two passages, almost identical in wording, it can be understood that Protagoras in his speculations retained the popular distinction between reality and unreality, although at the same time holding that the existence of real things or the non-existence of unreal things was bound up with the individual's judgment. The blending of these two elements: (a) the fixed distinction between existence and non-existence, and (b) the determination of existence or non-existence by the judgment or opinion of the individual, gives us the unique quality of the metaphysic of Protagoras.

In the two passages just quoted all possible objects of thought or opinion are divided into those which are and those which are not, and of those which are the individual judges that they are, and of those which are not that they are not. Nowhere is it said that the individual concerning things that are judges that they are not, or concerning things that are not judges that they are. In these cases, whether the thing did or did not exist, or whether the individual was or was not a measure, Protagoras would not have decided, since neither alternative would have completely expressed his mind. When, elsewhere (167 A), he grants that some sensations are better than others, as health is better (*ἀμείνων*) than sickness, and that some people

are worse than others (*πονηρὰ ἔξις*), he admits that at least in practical matters the subjective state is not absolute, and that the subject must adjust himself to the object. And the speculative side of the problem, though not dwelt upon by him, must have been met by the same compromise. He thus leaves room for a difference between object of opinion and opinion, between object of perception and perception. Hence such a phrase as "perception of reality" (*αἴσθησις τοῦ ὄντος*, 152 c), instead of the strict equation "perception = reality," is characteristic, putting, as it does, the new wine into the old bottles, carrying forward the accepted distinction between existence and non-existence into the new theory that what seems to be true for the individual is true for him. It belongs to the width, if not the depth, of the thought of Protagoras that he could ignore neither of these elements.

But these elements, in the manner of their blending, occupy places as different as are the foreground and background of a picture. The hostility of Protagoras to current habits of thought is dwelt on by Plato, and fully acknowledged by Protagoras himself. Plato, after having expounded the statement that knowledge is perception, goes on to complete it (157 E) by showing that the recognized distinctions between dreams and waking, madness and sanity, the sensations of animals and those of man, are ignored by Protagoras. The Sophist replies that these distinctions are without value, because they are based on the manner in which words and names are used by the multitude (*οἱ πολλοί*). In customary usage (*συνήθεια*, 168 B), says Protagoras, words have no fixed meaning, and are twisted to suit the occasion. This scorn of current prejudice and lack

of thought, acknowledged by Plato to be in a measure legitimate, is with Protagoras a settled conviction.

In this matter Protagoras was in partial accord with his illustrious contemporaries Euripides and Socrates. Of the indifference of Euripides to public opinion, critics might easily have said—

“Cold hater of his kind

A sea-cave suits him, not the vulgar hearth !”⁷

and of Socrates his accusers maintained that he corrupted the Athenian youth by his innovations (*Apology*, 23 D). In the case of both poet and thinker, critic and accuser tell only half the story. Neither Euripides nor Socrates, it is true, accepted at any time the popular opinion that truth and justice were a matter of authority. But what moved Euripides, not only at the last but all through his strenuous career, was a constructive idea of the gods and human life, and the unparalleled search of Socrates was the search for truth. Underneath their very condemnation of the ideas in vogue lay the belief that the thing condemned had its roots in a reality of which the people at large, though they had no clear knowledge, had a sense. Not after all to prove that the popular notions were utter folly, but to justify this hidden sense, was their final achievement. Hence the Nemesis, which brings the extreme critic of prevailing notions and faiths back, like neighbour Pliable, to the commonplaces

⁷ Browning, *Aristophanes' Apology*, ll. 283-4; compare the words of the hero Hippolytus :

“I have no skill to speak before a throng ;
My tongue is loosed with equals, and those few.
And reason : they that are among the wise
Of none account, to mobs are eloquent.”

Euripides, *Hippolytus*, Way's translation, Vol. I., p. 171, ll. 986-989.

from which he set out, never overtook them. But Protagoras was hardly so fortunate. In his hostility to so-called popular prejudices, he was lacking in insight, and, as an inevitable retribution, he was found to retain, without essential modification, the position of those whom he contemned. This is the second element of his philosophy, what we have called the background of the picture.

This feature he unwittingly retains alongside of the obtrusive theory that each man was the measure of his own reality. Unlike that of Euripides and Socrates, his theory is, therefore, not a reconstruction but a compromise. Of this compromise he may have been dimly conscious, if he ever connected his refusal to inquire into the existence of the gods with his theory of knowledge and reality. He, assailed, as were Socrates and Plato, by political and ethical questions of serious magnitude, and feeling keenly the inadequacy of the old standards, may have thought that speculation on the nature of existence in general was untimely and unprofitable. He may have thought that ulterior questions could wait till more immediate human concerns had been readjusted or recast. Perhaps there was in his mind a chamber, which he found himself unable to unlock. Of the gods and reality he did not say, "They are not, no they are not!" but rather with Sir Bors, "Ask me not, for I may not speak of it!" He may, in point of fact, have accepted the word used by Democritus, the word 'hidden,' 'uncertain,' to describe the nature of this outlying reality. "We must say," asserts Democritus, "either that nothing is true, or that it [the truth] is beyond our ken" (*ἀδελον*, Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, III. 5. 1009b). But apart from these high themes, admit-

ting, as Protagoras thought, of no solution, and in the region of every-day practical thinking and acting, the only fixed standard of reality, which seemed to him to rise out of the general decay of enthusiasms and faiths, was the opinion of the individual. Against the inherited and outworn creeds, to which the people still clung, he set up the free, direct, untrammelled contact of the individual with reality. In such free contact, call it opinion ($\tau\acute{\alpha}$ δοκοῦντα), call it perception ($\tau\acute{\alpha}$ φαινόμενα), there is truth (Arist. *Metaph.* III. 5. 1009 a). So Protagoras, changing the sentence of Democritus to suit himself, may have said that if the immediate perception is not truth, the truth remains concealed.

II. **Plato's Criticism.** Of this doctrine Plato's estimate is at once sympathetic and critical. On the one hand he neither confuses Protagoras with Protagoreans, nor enters the lists against him in behalf of common-sense. On the other hand, he sees in this theory the source of later Sophistic doctrines, and also finds it necessary to analyze common opinion, and to appeal to a feature of it which was overlooked by Protagoras. By referring to dreams, madness and the sensations of animals (157 E, 161 C), Plato first of all makes conspicuous the collision between the theory of Protagoras and common opinion, since, according to common opinion, dreaming and madness are manifestly false, while according to Protagoras they are true. Plato, of course, believes with Protagoras that truth is not a matter of agreement, and that the people have no better proofs for their convictions than probability and conjecture ($\tau\acute{o}$ εἰκός 162 E). Indeed Aristotle assigns to Protagoras the merit of having dismissed the resort to the majority as the means of discovering the truth (*Metaph.* III. 5. 1009b). At the

same time, as Plato means to suggest, even though a belief be merely conjectural, it does not cease to be a factor in public opinion. Arguments, based on the nature of the individual's opinion, must, if they are to be complete and consistent, reckon with belief or probability. In the speech of Protagoras, which comes at this juncture (162 D, 165 E ff.), Plato makes the point that Protagoras unconsciously falls back on the accepted standards. "Some are wiser than others," admits the Sophist; "health is better than sickness," and "sickly (*πονηραί*) sensations" (167 B) should be removed as well from men as from plants. Again, in a passage which is meant as a partial justification of Protagoras, his peculiar phrase, "conjunct view" (*τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν*, 172 B), coupling, as it does, opinion and convention, and thus binding together each man's opinion and the common belief, itself proves that the separation of these two factors of consciousness deprives both of their meaning. Further, as the distinction between the expedient and the just is probably an express part of his thought (172 A), it at once follows that, even according to his own statements, the opinion of the individual, though successful against the traditional conception of the just and sacred, is not equally successful against the conjoint practical wisdom.

Plato, in the next place, deepens his criticism by showing how in the very terms of the proposition that what seems to each man to be true is for him true is concealed the resort to a court outside of the opinion of the individual (170 A). The opinion of the sick man may be that the physician's opinion of the disease is of more value than his own. The opinion of any casual person may be that the theory of Protagoras is

not true. In legislation only those, so it is widely said, who are trained to weigh slight indications, can venture to map out the wisest course. Not every individual, himself being the judge, but the physician, the thinker, or the statesman is a measure. Within the opinion of the individual is embedded the belief in some regulative truth. Hence the theory of Protagoras lies between Scylla and Charybdis. Either the individual's opinion is right or it is wrong, and in neither case is it the standard of reality. If it is right, the individual, by his own confession, is not the measure of all things; if it is wrong, then plainly the question falls.

Gaining the explicit approval of Aristotle (*Metaph.* III. 5. 1010b), Plato puts the same argument in another way, when he introduces the examination of what is future (178 A). In all the practical sciences, arts and experiences—medicine, cookery, music, legislation and gardening—it can be said that the special case is to such a degree an exemplification of a general habit, that the skilled workman can safely make predictions where the ordinary man is at a loss. Here the practical scientific judgment is appealed to, and it alone is by every-day opinion not only admitted but asserted to be the sole measure. Again, therefore, the crux appears. Is every-day opinion right or wrong in submitting itself to the opinion of the experienced? ✓ Whatever be the answer to the question, the theory of Protagoras is by it dismissed.

The net result of Plato's treatment of Protagoras is clear. He says in effect: "You appeal, Portagoras, to common opinion; unto common opinion we shall go," and in it he finds the very prejudices, conjectures, surmises and faiths, which Protagoras had sought to

abolish. The experiences, which Protagoras had thought to be simple, turn out to be complex. Towards this complex material either of two different attitudes may be taken. On the one hand, the underlying convictions may be ignored, and the abstract remainder may be called the measure of reality, a course followed naturally enough by the Protagoreans,⁸ who set up the momentary sense-impression as the sole truth. On the other hand, the attempt may be made to interpret the faith of common-sense, and in that way to show that the existence of a universal reality is compatible with the claims of reason. This was the work of Plato.

(c) **Protagoras and the State.** The view of Protagoras concerning the state is two-fold: (1) as to its origin, and (2) as to its nature.

(1) In the elaborate myth (*Protagoras*, 320 c, foll.), which bears evidence of being a faithful transcript of his words, Protagoras gives a sketch of the historical origin of the state. Human beings, we are told, had at the outset no political sense, and lived in isolation; but, having the arts peculiar to Athene and Hephaistos, they framed a language,⁹ built houses, made clothes, shoes and beds, tilled the soil, and finally, in order to save themselves from the attacks of wild

⁸ Plato's criticism of the Protagoreans is given below in chapter iii.

⁹ A common language implies at least the care and instruction of offspring, and, therefore, according to Aristotle (*Politics*, i. 2. 1252b; i. 11. 1259b; *Ethics*, viii. 12), and even Protagoras himself (*Protagoras*, 325 c), some form of government. But, further, the formation of a common language must have required an intimate and extensive intercourse between the families said to be scattered (Aristotle, *Politics*, i. 1253a). Protagoras does not for a moment suggest that, when families came together for protection, the speech of one was unintelligible to another.

animals,¹⁰ gathered into cities. There, however, they acted with injustice¹¹ towards one another (*ἡδίκουν ἀλλήλους*, 322 B), and, thinking that the danger of being killed by wild beasts was less than the danger of unjust treatment at the hands of their fellow-men, proceeded to disperse once more, their lives thus running the imminent hazard of being, as Hobbes with a similar conception said, "Solitary, poor and short." At this juncture, Zeus, fearing that the human race would utterly perish, sent to them Hermes with the gifts of regard for others and justice (*αἰδώς τε καὶ δίκη*, 322 C), by means of which an orderly political existence was firmly secured.

This tale, if we set aside its religious character, which has already been alluded to (page 19), and ignore its inconsistencies, may be made to read that political unity is necessary, not merely to man's higher

¹⁰ With all their specialized mechanical skill they were unable to forge a weapon to defend themselves against the attacks of wild beasts, since, according to Protagoras, self-defence belongs to the art of war (*πολεμικὴ τέχνη*), which was a part of the missing art of government (*πολιτικὴ τέχνη*).

¹¹ The phrase, "acted with injustice towards one another," admits of several interpretations. (a) It may mean simply that justice was absent, so that the acts of the aborigines, who on this supposition had no sense of justice, and, consequently, no sense of injustice, would by a civilized onlooker be called unjust. (b) These primitive people may have been regarded by Protagoras as accusing one another of unjust behaviour; in which case he would unwittingly be assuming the presence in them of the very virtue which Zeus had not as yet bestowed. Or (c) Protagoras may have meant that there was in their minds a consciousness of justice or general fairness before the gift by Zeus of the art of government. He would then be seeking for the distinction clearly drawn by Aristotle (*Ethics*, v. 5) between justice as general fairness and justice as illegality. But it is almost useless to look for any definite meaning in this vague story.

well-being, but even to his very existence, and that the bond of union between men is justice.

(2) The theory that justice was the foundation-stone of political life, was probably not consistently maintained by Protagoras throughout the course of his speculations. In the *Theaetetus*, in which his riper views as to the basis of society find brief expression (167 C, 172 A), a distinction is drawn between justice or law on one side and expediency on the other. He there contends that the state could not be based on any so-called universal justice, since the only justice which could be conceived was variable and created by men. A thing was just and fair to the state so long as the state continued to think it to be just and fair. But justice varied not only as between one city and another, but, also, for the city itself, with every change in its laws, and laws changed according to the will of the law-makers. Pure caprice and anarchy suggest themselves to the modern critic as the upshot of this doctrine, but no such thought was present to the mind of Protagoras, who recognized that the law, however unwise it may be, is binding on all the citizens of the state whose law it is, so long as it is a law, and, also, that there remains the principle of expediency (τὸ συμφέρον), which for him is essentially social. As it is often difficult to determine the most expedient course, the art of Rhetoric should be cultivated by public men, not to undermine social morality, but, on the contrary, more effectively to commend to the body of the citizens the wisest plan of public and private action. Although Protagoras, in thus championing expediency, argues that the honourable (καλά) and shameful (αἰσχρά), the just (δίκαια) and unjust (ἀδίκαια), that which is and is not sacred (ὅσια καὶ μὴ) are con-

stituted by the special regulations of each city, and are binding only on its citizens, he is far from holding that there is no distinction between justice and injustice, right and wrong. In fact, the main argument of Protagoras in the *Theaetetus* is that the Sophist must exert himself all the more actively to change the worse into the better, because justice and injustice are what the city makes them. When laws are seen to depend on human insight, it is wise that men should deliberate with care. Of course to magnify the office of the rhetorician is to cast suspicion upon the intuitions of the average citizen. The critic of the Sophists, taking his stand upon the sufficiency of current opinion, might argue that they sought to overthrow all morality, and make the worse cause appear the better. But Plato's implied criticism of Protagoras was of a different nature.

In the description given by Protagoras of the beginning of a state there may already be observed the rudiments of a distinction, which was soon to become so prominent a phase of the political ideas of the Sophists, and not of them only, but of many Greek and modern thinkers, the contrast, namely, of the condition of man in a state with his condition before entering a state. As yet the contrast is wholly in favour of the life political, but increase of travel, the growth of maritime trade, the venality of demagogues, who set themselves up as statesmen, and the presence in Athens of an expanding foreign population, who either had lost respect for every city, or, like the Laconizers¹² mentioned by Plato (*Protagoras*, 342 B

¹²In Athens the Laconizers were citizens who openly sympathized with the customs and form of government of her rival and enemy Sparta, chief city of Laconia.

(*Gorgias*, 515 E), were adherents of an order of society and form of government, differing more or less deeply from the order under which they lived,—these influences, of whose dissolvent character Plato was well aware, caused the pendulum to swing in the other direction, and the condition of nature was more and more glowingly depicted¹³ as against what were called the conventions of the city-state. Another considerable factor in this transformation was the theory, so generally entertained amongst the Greeks, that the art of government, now beginning to fall into disrepute, was the only social bond. Thus Protagoras, naïvely ignoring the complex community of interests prevailing in the condition of so-called dispersion and hostility, relies upon explicit political contract or agreement as alone able to hold society together. When, therefore, the method of government was shown to be unworthy of support, the whole social fabric was thought to be shaken to its foundation. This theory, underlying, as we may say, the myth of Protagoras, paved the way for the later advocacy of the condition of nature.

The explicit rejection of 'law' or 'convention' (*νόμος*) in favour of nature (*φύσις*) is put into the mouth not of Protagoras but of Glaucon (*Republic*, 2. 358 E ff.) and of Callicles (*Gorgias*, 481 E). Glaucon, a disciple of Socrates, takes up for the nonce the argument of the Sophist Thrasymachus, and shows what it, in his belief, involves. The state, he says, is intermediate between the best life, in which a man is able to commit injustice without suffering injury in return, and the worst life, in which he suffers injustice without the power to retaliate. Seeing that they had small

¹³ See the arguments of Glaucon and Adeimantus in the second book of the *Republic*.

chance of attaining the best, and were in danger of experiencing the worst, men made covenants or agreements (*συνθήκας*) with one another, by virtue of which each withheld himself from all attempts to secure the best life, on condition that all others did the same. This theory, propounded by Glaucon, may readily be deduced from the sentence of Thrasymachus that "justice is the interest of the stronger" (*τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον*, *Republic*, 1. 338 c). As some men are by nature stronger or abler than others,¹⁴ whosoever is stronger insists that he shall have what he wants; others, to save themselves from harm, fall in with his desire; and the name of justice is given to the working arrangement agreed to by all parties. Not only Thrasymachus (*Republic*, 344 A) but Polus (*Gorgias*, 470 c ff.), therefore, was prepared to consider the tyrant the happiest of men, however far his acts may have been opposed to the ideas of justice embodied in the laws of existing states.

The names of Thrasymachus and Callicles justify the conclusion that the theory of compact was formulated by the later Sophists. Thrasymachus, as is generally believed, was younger than Socrates. The plan of the *Gorgias*, according to which Plato criticizes Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles with diminishing leniency, forbids our ascribing to Gorgias the statements made by Callicles.¹⁵

¹⁴ As Callicles (*Gorgias*, 483 D) uses the words 'stronger' (*τὸν κρείττω*), 'more powerful' (*τὸν δυνατώτερον*) and 'abler' (*τὸν ἀμείνω*) to describe the ruler, it may be concluded that fitness to rule was largely, although not wholly, determined by physical force.

¹⁵ Zeller himself (*Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, II., p. 476) speaks of the distinction between 'nature' and 'law' as a favourite theorem of later Sophistic ethics. An interesting account of Sophistic politics is to be found in Newman's *The Politics of Aristotle*, I., pp. 386-392.

A third reference to the contrast between law and nature is to be found in the *Laws* (10. 889 D), where the conception of the priority of nature is said to be not only widely accepted (*παρὰ πολλοῖς*, 888 E), but also of long standing (*πάλαι*, 890 B). The context shows that the words "of long standing" refer not to supporters of the theory that the state is based on convention, but to earlier cosmological philosophies, on which, according to Plato, the theory of a political contract was founded. The philosophies which say that some element or some combination of elements or the union of atoms with force is the primary reality, and that the human consciousness in all its manifestations is derivative, are indirectly responsible for the notion that the state is a mere artifice or convention. Later Sophists, advocating the inferiority of law, may have appealed in this way to "all the ancients"¹⁶ (Aristotle, *Soph. El.* 12) in support of their doctrine.

Plato's Criticism. (i.) Although Plato, in considering the sophistic conception of the origin of the state, is thinking not of Protagoras but of later Sophists, his position may be at least indicated. He virtually accuses the Sophists of confounding two different meanings of the term *νόμος*, namely, 'law' and 'convention.' He would not have been an enthusiastic follower of Socrates, had he not, quite as completely as the Sophists, rejected the guidance of custom. The *Republic* was written under the conviction that the prevailing forms of government,

¹⁶ It is highly probable that Aristotle in this place has in mind the passage of the *Laws* alluded to in the text, and that the words "all the ancients" (*οἱ ἀρχαῖοι δὲ πάντες*) have, therefore, their natural meaning, and do not, as Zeller thinks (*Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, II., 479, note), refer chiefly to Sophistic rhetoricians.

whether oligarchy, democracy or tyranny, were all less or more defective, and that a clean sweep would have to be made of political social usages, if a true state was to be formed. At the same time Plato, in condemning custom, did not condemn a common social life, and, in admitting the worthlessness of convention, did not admit the worthlessness of law. Men come together in a state, he said, because no one is self-sufficing (*αὐτάρκης*, *Republic*, 2. 369 B, cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, I. 2. 1253 A, 14), and law he regarded as of divine sanction (*Laws*, 1. 624 A). The term 'nature,' which the Sophists had opposed to every form of νόμος, Plato opposes to convention only. So far is he from acceding to the idea that nature is opposed to law that he affirms one to have much the same meaning as the other. He couples 'opinion' (δόξα), 'foresight' (ἐπιμέλεια), mind (νοῦς), and art (τέχνη), with 'law' (νόμος) as qualities of the soul, and concludes that the soul, when thus interpreted, may in a special sense (διαφερόντως) be said to exist 'by nature' (φύσει) (*Laws*, 10. 892 c). The Sophists, accepting from earlier philosophies the distinction between man and nature, involved in the doctrine that nature existed before man, had agreed that what was prior in time was higher in reality. They then apply this argument to the growth of the state. Plato, unwilling to admit that man is separate from nature, or that nature could at any stage cease to be nature, reinterprets the idea of nature by means of the principle that what comes out of nature must in some sense have been in it always. By associating with nature such terms as 'foresight,' 'mind,' and 'art,' all of which imply purpose or design, he means that nature is that towards which things move, as well

as the starting-point of things. He suggests that the point towards which the universe moves, the purpose or design of the universe, was present in the universe at the outset, and originated its movements. The state or law would thus be more natural than nature itself, as they would be fulfilments of nature.

This conception of nature was put simply and directly by Aristotle in his union of nature and the state through the idea of 'end' (τέλος, *Politics*, I. 1. 1252b, 8 ff.). In opposition to the Sophists, who had maintained that nature was of higher validity than law, Aristotle says that nature must be understood as 'end' or 'completion' (ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν). When nature is so defined, the state, as the fulfilment of the individual, is seen to be one of the things which exist by nature (τῶν φύσει ἡ πολις ἐστί) and man is seen to be 'by nature,' that is by destiny, 'a political animal' (φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῶον). As 'completion' is present in the thing at the beginning, and is the final cause of the thing, end and beginning are really one, and the opposition between nature and the state or law disappears.¹⁷

(ii.) In his treatment of justice Protagoras uses the arguments afterwards employed more effectively by Aristotle to prove that virtue is a habit or moral state (ἔξις, *Ethics*, II., chaps. 1-4). Aristotle thinks that the moral state is rightly visited with praise or blame for the reason that it involves deliberate purpose and training, and is not implanted in us by nature (φύσει). Protagoras also said that the virtue of justice was not given by nature (φύσει) but acquired by study (διδακτόν),

¹⁷ *Hellenica*, a collection of Essays edited by Evelyn Abbott, contains a valuable study by Mr. A. C. Bradley, of Aristotle's conception of the state (pp. 181-243).

and that the fact of punishment was proof of the culpable lack of justice in vicious men. In the second place, Aristotle recognizes that, although virtue is acquired by practice, the capacity for virtue is implanted by nature. Protagoras, who neither has at his command Aristotle's valuable conceptions of capacity and realization, nor feels any deep need to harmonize his statements, nevertheless affirms that justice is a quality of which all men are partakers; otherwise the state could not exist (*Protagoras*, 323 A). Plato, too, while maintaining that the existence of the state depends on the possession of justice by all classes of persons in the state, by every child and woman, every slave, freeman and artizan, by ruler and subject (*Republic*, 4. 433 D), yet insists that a special training is required of that class, whose distinctive virtue is prudence in counsel or wisdom (εὐβουλία, σοφία, *Id.* 4. 428 B). Hence in this matter Plato and Aristotle may be said to have completed and simplified the suggestions of Protagoras. The Sophist, as he gradually lost faith in the adequacy of the opinions of the multitude, emphasized more and more pointedly the study of Rhetoric. It is true that Rhetoric is but a feeble instrument for the attainment of political insight in comparison with the arduous course of instruction through which Plato's neophytes had to pass; but in general the views of Plato and Protagoras may be said to be in this regard in harmony. The real divergence between them arises when Plato announces that the union of men in society is only an exemplification of the wider principle, on which the whole universe rests, the principle of measure or harmony (μέτρον, *Timaeus*, 35 B, 37 A, 53 A; *Philebus*, 66 A; *Laws*, 4. 716 C). This is the reason that

Cleinias the Cretan, and Megillus the Lacedaemonian, maintain God to be the author of the laws of their respective states (*Laws*, 1. 624 A). This, too, is the meaning of the story that every ninth year Minos, the Cretan lawgiver, went to converse with his Olympian sire, and made laws in accordance with his sacred words. Protagoras would not have admitted, at least if the *Theaetetus* correctly reports his riper ideas, that "the state comprehends Zeus and Athene as participants in its constitution (*κοινωνοὶ πολιτείας*, *Laws*, 921 c), so that when a citizen defrauds an artisan of the payment due to him, he breaks asunder the links between the state and the gods, its mighty co-partners."¹⁸ To omit the essential connection between the state and the divine or the absolute reality is to leave the way open either to the conclusion that the state has ultimately no foundation in truth, or to the conclusion that the ultimate reality, if it exists at all, cannot be an object of thought. The first of these views was adopted by later Sophists; the second was the doctrine of Protagoras.

Conclusion. The special cast of mind of the greatest of the Sophists ought now to be clear. He sympathized with the growing self-reliance of the Greeks, and their increasing independence of all external authority, whether of the gods or of the state. He did not, however, feel with equal force that an advance, to be real and inevitable, must take with it the reason implicit in common opinion. Chafing against the limits imposed by popular prejudice, he sought to remove them by means of instruction. To have recourse to abstractions, indifferent whether his conclusions did or did not conflict with common-sense

¹⁸ Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, Vol. I., p. 439.

was for him impossible. He paid the opinions of the multitude the compliment of battling with them, and, therefore, of regarding them as not wholly irrational. Swayed alternately by the instinct of revolt, and by the vague feeling that what the many believed could not be entirely false, his philosophy is a strange combination of two unreconciled elements. It is true that he tried to exorcise what seemed to him to be vulgar superstitions, but they "sat and smiled at" him as did the ghost of Banquo at Macbeth. His inability to shake himself free from the ideas he despised constitutes his best claim to be more than a superficial sceptic like Euthydemus or a self-satisfied logician like the nimble Zeno, just as the illusion of the ghost of Banquo was a sign of Macbeth's humanity. He thus becomes an appreciable force in the progress of Greek thought. His truest successor was not called by his name, and did not belong to his school. Socrates was able more consistently to reject public opinion, because he was bent on justifying its faith in truth; and what Socrates worked at, Plato carried out.

CHAPTER III.

PLATO AND THE PROTAGOREANS.

ARISTOTLE, while making no chronological division of the Sophists, has placed them in two broad classes—those whose doubts are genuine and those who argue for the sake of arguing, the first class dealing with thoughts, the others with words only (*Metaphysics*, III. 5. 1009a, and III. 6. 1011b; compare also Plato, *Euthydemus*, 278 B). The Eristics, Euthydemus and Dionysidorus, might well have been in Aristotle's mind as conspicuous examples of the Sophist who strove for victory not for truth. Thrasyarchus, "the Chalcedonian giant," and Polus of Agrigentum, are somewhat of the same temper, and along with them may perhaps be counted "the Protagoreans" of the *Theætetus*. These men cannot with accuracy be called "later Sophists," since the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysidorus were about the same age as Socrates.¹ Indeed, they can only loosely be named Sophists at all, since "the Protagoreans" may have included Aristippus² the Cyrenaic, and Antisthenes³ the Cynic. There may be in the theory of

¹ Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, ii. 424; Plato, *Euthydemus*, 272 B, c.

² Campbell, *Theætetus*, Introd., p. xxx.

³ Campbell, *Id.*, p. 167, note to l. 10.

Protagoras a tendency, as it is styled, to degenerate into such frivolous scepticism as that of the two brothers from Chios, but of this empty disregard of all truth Protagoras is manifestly not the source. In fact, as Aristotle suggests, two bands of doubters, quite distinct in their speculative habits, flourished side by side, those who, like Protagoras and Gorgias, were in the main serious in their efforts to reach a consistent doctrine, and those who, like the two agile Eristics, derided patient intellectual effort of every kind. Where Protagoras raised doubts which it required Plato to settle, the two noble kinsmen would beget in their hearers either a scorn of philosophy (*Euthydemus*, 304 E) or a rapid acquisition of their own superficial dexterity (*Id.* 303 E). Plato observes that the two distinctive marks of Eristic disputation were their magnanimous disregard of all opinion, whether of the many or of the grave and reverend seigniors, and their inability to save their own doctrine in the general overturn of all truth (*Id.* 303 c). While Protagoras would agree with them, indeed, in despising the opinions of the multitude, he differed from them in thinking that there was a real problem.

The Protagoreans, who, as Plato paints them in the *Theaetetus*, only partially correspond to any actual personages, seem to be a mixture of Protagoras and the Eristics. Starting from the doctrine that man is the measure of all things, and using the illustration furnished by Protagoras, of the wind which is cold to him who feels it to be cold, and hot to him who feels it hot, they came to the conclusion that knowledge was sensible perception. They still employ the phrase "perception of reality" (αἴσθησις τοῦ ὄντος, *Theaetetus*, 152 c), in which is embedded a distinction between

objective reality and subjective impressions, but they do not, as did Protagoras, preserve the distinction between better and worse experiences, sickly, and vigorous sensations, the honourable and the evil, the wise and the foolish city (see above, p. 29), distinctions which were found in common opinion. In proportion as faith in accepted beliefs had relaxed, a more exclusive and intensive meaning had been given to sensible perception, until the union of sense and reality in the act of perceiving was lost sight of, and perception almost if not entirely usurped the place of reality. In Plato's own words, sense (*αἴσθησις*) became knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) and appearances (*τὰ φαινόμενα*) became the only existences (*τὰ ὄντα*).

It is possible that the advocates of this view found support in such utterances of previous speculators as this from Empedocles, that "judgment changes with change in conditions," or "counsel springs up for man by virtue of the matter before him" or, again, "as men themselves change, so changes likewise their thought." Parmenides, too, seems to have identified that which has judgment with the bodily organs, and Anaxagoras is credited with the doctrine that "to each man existences are as he supposes them to be" (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, III. 5.1009b; *Psychology*, III. 3.427 A). Putting these opinions alongside of the theory that man is the measure of all things, the Protagoreans concluded that the perception of each individual was for him knowledge.

The extremists (*ἡ ἀκροτάτη δόξα*, Aristotle, *Metaph.* III. 5. 1010a) amongst this body of thinkers were those who, accepting from Heraclitus the theory that everything, both object and subject, is in process of change, inferred that the individual's perceptions were

themselves for ever changing, and that the only standard of knowledge must be the perception of the moment. Cratylus, a follower of Heraclitus, carried this view one stage farther in his declaration that owing to the ceaseless flow of everything one could not get time to say anything, and that to speak at all was to speak falsely. The best which could be done, so he thought, was to point with the finger. He reproached his master for saying that no one could enter the same river twice, when, in point of fact, as all things were in perpetual unrest, no one could enter the river once. Against these followers of Protagoras and Heraclitus Plato directs one of his arguments in the *Theaetetus*.

But another aspect of the theory of Protagoras, when attached to the oracular utterances of the Eristics, gave rise to a different though kindred hypothesis. He had with reservations maintained that to whom a thing seems to be, to him it is. In Plato's defence of him he is made to say that "no one can think what is not," and that "no one can think falsely," since "no one can think otherwise than he feels, and what he feels is always true" (*Theaetetus*, 167 A). In fact, the doctrine of Protagoras contains the corollary that no opinion is false. Euthydemus, again, had in the most emphatic way argued that for all men all things exist in the same way at the same time and always (πάσι πάντα ὁμοίως εἶναι ἅμα καὶ ἀεί, *Cratylus*, 386 D), thus destroying at one blow all difference between truth and error. The intention of Plato throughout the whole of the *Euthydemus* was to exhibit the hero of the dialogue as willing lightly to sacrifice the very possibility of truth, if only he could silence his opponent. Accordingly the disciples of Protagoras, putting two and two together, declared

that nothing can be false either in word or thought (*Euthydemus*, 286 c, d). This view, spreading, took a variety of forms, such as that contradictions or opposites were both at the same time true, or that all things were at the same time both true and false.

Although the advocates of this view trace it directly to Protagoras and Euthydemus, they doubtless found support (Aristotle, *Metaph.* III. 5. 1009a) in the statement of Anaxagoras that "all is mixed with all," for, if all things are mixed in this way, nothing has any distinguishing marks, and truth becomes the same as error. Democritus, too, contributed the assertion, "the full and the void exist alike in every part; the full is being, and the void not-being." If every object is at once both being and not-being, if it can be said of every object that it is and that it is not, contradictory statements are both true, and the opposite of any judgment whatsoever is as valid as the judgment. When the negative of every truth is true, neither truth nor false opinion is possible. This, the second branch of the philosophy of the Protagoreans, is also dealt with by Plato in the *Theaetetus*, although, as Professor Campbell has pointed out, it is not in that dialogue attributed to them expressly.⁴

⁴ Professor Campbell (*The Theaetetus of Plato*, Introd., p. xxix, and note to l. 10, p. 167) is disposed to question whether disciples of Protagoras held the doctrine that false opinion is impossible. He is aware that in the *Euthydemus* (286 c) the theory is ascribed by Plato to the school of Protagoras, but adds that it is generally associated with the name of Antisthenes. Professor Campbell is probably right, if the designation "disciple of Protagoras" be applied only to him who maintains intact the view of his leader, but opinions do not at once gather into a school, and the phrase "disciple of Protagoras" may of necessity have been used by Plato with a comprehensiveness sufficient to include Antisthenes and

Plato's Criticism. Plato criticizes in turn both doctrines of the school of Protagoras: (1) the doctrine that sense is knowledge, and (2) the doctrine that false opinion has no existence.

(1) Sense is knowledge. Plato attacks this view by coupling it with two others: (a) that no single thing exists by itself (*ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν*, *Theaetetus*, 152 D), and (b) the theory which he assigns to all the wise men of antiquity except Parmenides, but especially to Heraclitus, that all is becoming (*γίγνεται πάντα*, *Id.*). There seems to be something impregnable, Plato admits at the very outset, in the notion that each man's feelings are for him real. Aristotle, too, grants that in the province of pure perception, the perception of sweetness, for example, or any other direct sensible quality, there is no possibility of error (*Metaph.* III. 5. 1010b; *Psychology*, III. 3. 427b, 428a, 428b). Plato, however, if he be allowed to call in the assistance of Heraclitus, and particularly Cratylus, will not be afraid to assault the very citadel of the theory.

If a thing cannot exist by itself, argues Plato, it must owe its existence, if existence can rightly be attributed to it, to some other thing, which in its turn has no separate and distinct reality. This relation between one thing and another is said to be some form of activity. Hence the doctrine that a thing has no existence of its own, but exists only as it is connected with something else, is much the same as the doctrine

Aristippus as well as more direct followers of the Sophist. Zeller may be said to confirm this opinion (*Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, II., p. 461, note 2) when he says that the phrase "elenctic God" (*θεὸς ἐλεγκτικός*, *Sophist*, 216 B) is "intended for the Sophists perhaps in conjunction with Megarian and Cynic Eristics."

that everything is in process of change. Applying this two-fold statement to perception, it results (*Id.* 153 E) that colour is not in the object or in the eye, but is a relation between two changing things. Not only will the perception of one individual differ from that of every other, but no single man's perceptions remain the same for two moments of time. By the application of the maxim that all is motion ($\tau\acute{o}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\ \kappa\acute{\iota}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$) to the theory that sense is knowledge, it is shown that no sensation, whether that of colour, sound, hardness or warmth, can be understood to have any existence of its own ($\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\ \kappa\alpha\theta'\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$). The object, which is the agent, and the organ of sense, which is the patient, work in conjunction or else have no reality at all. Such a quality as whiteness or sweetness, being never for two moments the same, and continually passing into that which it is not, cannot be called sweetness any more than its opposite. Since all permanence is rigidly tabooed, all such terms as 'being,' 'existence,' 'it,' 'mine,' 'this,' and 'that,' giving, as they do, a false notion of fixed and secure reality, must be deleted from our vocabulary. Plato thus concludes, in almost the very words of Cratylus, that if the theory of motion, in alliance with the theory of sense, be carried to its logical outcome, all speech is impossible. The fortress of perception is reduced to silence (*Id.* 152-157).

The argument, which Plato has thus outlined in the early pages of the *Theaetetus*, is again in substance traversed, after the theory that each man's opinion is the measure of reality has been disposed of (179 E), but nothing new is added on the negative side except an admission, as it would seem (183 C) that the theory of perception need not be allied with the theory of

change, and might, if the alliance were dropped, escape the criticisms to which it had been subjected. Aristotle, acting on the suggestion of Plato (*Metaph.* III. 5. 1010b; *Psychology*, 3. 427b, 428a, 428b), analyzes sense-perception and the perceptive imagination (*φαντασία*) without any reference to the theory of motion. He has shown that perception is liable to error, whenever the separate sense passes beyond its own peculiar quality. In all cases of the imagination, sickness, for example, mental derangement or pure fancy, error is possible. In the second place, when perception is dealing with an object which is not special to one sense, but common to two or several senses, such as motion or magnitude, error intrudes. And, to cap the climax, if reality be confined to the simple perception, such as sweetness, it must leave out the perception of perception. ✕ But unless the perception of the perception be to some degree included in the perception itself, it is clearly impossible in perceiving to perceive that we perceive. We are not able to say then of what character the perception is, being reduced not to the dumb gesticulation of Cratylus, but to a stony stare. If, on the other hand, this deeper perception, or, as we may term it, consciousness of perception, be present, some such judgment as "this is sweetness," or "sweetness is to me," must be made, and with the introduction of the possibility of judgment comes likewise the possibility of error.

Plato has in substance covered the ground so systematically worked over by Aristotle. Distinguishing between two possible explanations of perception, perception with the organs of sense and perception through the organs of sense, he maintains that all perceptive material passes through the sense organ to one single

central receptacle (ἰδέα, 184D), which may be called the soul (ψυχή). To this conclusion he is forced by an examination of the facts of experience. If the sense of taste were lodged within us in complete separation from the sense of touch, and no passage of communication ran from one to the other, nothing could be common (τὸ κοινόν, 185B) to both. But in point of fact we say of sweetness that it is, and also of hardness that it is. In so saying, we do not mean that there is one existence for sweetness and a totally different existence for hardness, but are thinking of one single existence, which is applicable in the same way to each. Not only is existence (τὸ ἔστί, ἡ οὐσία, τὸ εἶναι, 185C) common to all perceptions of sense, but we perceive it to be common. Now, though a sense may be sole judge in its own province, it has no jurisdiction over the province of another sense. Hence it is not possible for any separate sense to judge that anything is common to it and another sense. Another faculty, not a separate sense-faculty at all, but a faculty standing in the same relation to sight as to hearing or touch, is required in order to account for the perception of a common attribute, and before this ulterior faculty all the separate sense-presentations must be tried. The question whether the various so-called sense-faculties are really faculties of a central organ need not here be raised, although Plato, when he says that the soul perceives through the eyes, ears, etc., plainly suggests an affirmative answer. Let it be not only granted but urged, as Plato would say, that these sense-faculties belong to the soul, it is nevertheless quite a different kind of soul-faculty which perceives the common quality named existence. Nor does this new faculty require the aid of any sense-organ in

reaching this perception. The attribute of existence is the soul's peculiar possession, and the soul in perceiving it puts into exercise its own inherent activity (*αὐτῇ δι' αὐτῆς*). The same result is reached if we consider another fact of our experience. Granting that the soul or, to use Aristotle's term, the sense-judge (it is both sense, *αἴσθησις*, and the referee, *τὸ κρῖνον*), perceives the quality of sweetness through the sense of taste and that of hardness through touch, it does not belong to either faculty to perceive that sweetness is different from hardness.⁵ In order that this every-day comparison may be made, it is not enough to be possessed of simple perceptions; we must have, likewise, the faculty of passing judgment upon them. This faculty must be other than a special sense-faculty, and stand to all sense-faculties in the same way. Likeness (*τὸ ταυτόν*) and difference (*τὸ ἕτερον*, 185c), therefore, as well as existence, are of that class of things (*τὰ κοινά*) which the soul perceives of itself. Had Plato carried his analysis further, and asked whether any sense, even when confined to its own peculiar territory, is able to discern between one impression and the next, without calling into play an activity other than mere sense, he might have made his case against the Protagoreans more

⁵ It would be, in fact, impossible for the faculty of taste, if kept in rigid isolation, to discriminate between sweetness and sourness, two matters of the same sensible nature, unless it be supposed that the simple faculty of taste is able not only to perceive sweetness, but to preserve the impression, after it has ceased to affect the organ, and then bring this stored-up impression into comparison with the perception that is present. The same point might be raised with regard to even two impressions of the same specific sense-quality, such as sweetness; but Plato limits himself to the contrast between two sense-organs.

effective.⁶ But enough has been done to show what theory of knowledge Plato would substitute for the doctrine of sense-perception. The soul or mind reaches knowledge when it grasps the nature of these common elements, being, not-being, the same, the other, which, though associated with perception (*ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται*, 186A), cannot themselves be perceived. These unchanging and universal elements of things are ideas or forms, and a proper disposition of these forms would be a philosophy of first principles. Whether this theory is in the last resort open to the charge that it is an escape from sense⁷ rather than the complete reconciliation of sense and thought, it is at least clear that philosophy, as understood by the Protagoreans, is a deliberate rejection of all the real problems of thought. It seeks a foothold by eliminating everything but the narrow space upon which the individual, conceived as merely perceptive, is for the bare moment able to stand. Its impulse is the removal of the reality which it sets out to account for, and the end of its philosophizing is that philosophy is vain. We are therefore left with the dumb desire to know, a desire which, according to the Protagoreans, is inexplicable and irrational. Now, so far at least as these agile speculators were taken seriously, Plato brings philosophy back to the sober path of belief in itself, and the gradual patient demonstration that this belief is well

⁶ It would have been still nearer the truth had Plato said that every conceivable sensation was an act of consciousness, and that 'mere sense,' understood as sensation without consciousness, is impossible. But such language would, as I think, be out of keeping with Plato's philosophy.

⁷ For the independent faculties or organs of sense Plato rightly substitutes the central faculty of the soul, but the contents of this faculty are still, even for him, lacking in harmony.

founded. The ideas or forms which he enumerates in the *Theaetetus* give free play to all the scientific and philosophical investigations of his time. In their study of Being and Not-being, the heroes of the elder days, Parmenides and 'the steadfast gentry' on the one side and the serried ranks of the 'river folk' under Heraclitus on the other, however profoundly they may disagree, are alike justified in their general task. In the study of 'the One' it is possible to continue the labours of Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Parmenides. In the reconciliation of Being with Not-being, of the One with the Many, Plato is carrying on the work of Empedocles, the Atomists and Anaxagoras. The more recent attempts to make clear the nature of good and evil are put on the same broad rational plane. We might call Plato's theory of ideas the 'Song of the open road,' and say that once more in it wisdom is justified of all her children.

So much at any rate Plato has here accomplished. The edifice, which is in the *Theaetetus* planned, is erected in other dialogues, the *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus* and *Laws*, and in the course of the erection occur considerable changes in the original specifications, particularly in a more radical harmonizing of the world of being with the world of sense and change. But the faith that philosophy is an occupation for the maturest mind is already vindicated in the *Theaetetus*.

(2) Having disposed of the philosophy of sense, Plato is free to deal with the Eristic contention that false opinion does not exist, or that contradictory statements about the same thing are both at the same time true (187B). He had already alluded to this theory (152), and had discussed the doctrine of Pro-

tagoras that to whom appears a thing to him it is (170-179). But Protagoreans, or a Cynic offshoot from the Protagoreans, were utilizing the sayings of Protagoras to prove that error is impossible. A manifest implication of this view is that there is no distinction between chance every-day observations, the *idola* of the market-place as Bacon has named them, and scientific truth. This theory, therefore, like the one which we have just considered, makes against all serious thought.

This doctrine Plato had already permitted to expose its own nakedness in the *Euthydemus*. There he had pointed out that, as according to Euthydemus the opposite of every statement is as true as the statement itself, the Eristic proposition that two contradictions are both true is no more true than its opposite. Hence Euthydemus, in stopping the mouths of all others, had most obligingly stopped his own (303E). Plato further observed that an appearance of truth was gained for the Eristic hypothesis through its setting aside the beliefs which are embedded in public opinion (303c). By means of this arbitrary limitation the argument was deflected from a search for truth to a battle about words. No large human interest was either conserved or damaged, whichever way the fortunes of war inclined. When everything is excluded except frivolous disputation, it is logically absurd to take the question seriously.

But in the *Theaetetus* (187-201) the Eristic argument has a sufficient tincture of the method of Protagoras to permit of its being accorded a graver treatment. Besides, Plato now sees a way by means of positive criticism to enlarge his own view. Apart from elaborate details, his contention is that the mind

of man is a complex thing which cannot be divided into the two mutually exclusive compartments of Knowing and Not-knowing, but must contain in addition an intermediate compartment partaking of the nature of both. By this larger way alone can justice be done to the facts of experience.

The steps taken by Plato are briefly as follows: If we exclude the processes of learning and forgetting, which lie between Knowing and Not-knowing, it is impossible to prove the existence of false opinion. When we must either know or not-know a thing, we cannot confuse two things, both of which we know, or two things, neither of which we know, nor a thing we know with a thing we do not know. Yet it is manifest that false opinion ($\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\eta\varsigma\ \delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$, 187B) must have something to do with knowledge, and something, also, to do with ignorance.

At this juncture Plato thinks it expedient to reintroduce the process of learning and forgetting, which he had for the moment laid to one side, and by so doing makes use of the fact of partial or imperfect knowledge⁸ (191c). This fact he explains by two figures, in one of which he compares the soul to a lump of wax and in the other to an aviary. When he claims that the waxen hearts of some people are hairy, foul, impure, too moist or too hard (194E), he is really seeking to show that some apprehensions of things are a mixture of truth and falsehood. This point he asserts more clearly when, by distinguishing between merely owning birds in an aviary and holding them in

⁸Not that Plato speaks of knowledge as partial. Opinion is the word he uses to describe the middle state of consciousness, which at one and the same time partook of the nature of knowledge and ignorance.

the hands (179B), he argues that possessing knowledge is not so perfect as having knowledge. False opinion might thus be said to be an imperfect form of knowledge. Although Plato does not lay down this doctrine, he has suggested that in false opinion there is a positive element. It would be wrong to say that Plato is contending for degrees of truth or for the partial truth of error, since in his theory the element of sensation did not expand or develop, but had rather to be struck out, if knowledge was to be acquired. At the same time, false opinion has gained a lodgment in the ill-defined region lying between knowledge and ignorance, and Plato is henceforward committed to the doctrine that not-being or falsehood is a kind of reality. If this assertion could be satisfactorily proved instead of being hinted at by interesting comparisons, once more the distinction between imperfect opinion and science would be justified, and philosophy would have again silenced its detractors.

But into what strange company the whirligig of the argument has drawn Plato! At the beginning of the dialogue, the alliance between Heraclitus and a section of the Protagoreans is used to prove the inconsistency of sense and the reality of eternal ideas. Not-being, with all its train, is in the camp of the enemy. Now, however, a change has occurred. The Eristics, an extreme wing of the Sophists, are themselves asserting that not-being is, as its name implies, really non-existent, that falsehood is impossible, and that all opinions are true. In order to disprove this theory, Plato must champion the cause of not-being, and proceed to lay hands on his father, Parmenides, the great representative of the philosophy of being. To prove the reality of not-being is the task which the

Theaetetus suggests, but does not undertake. This coping-stone of Plato's dialectic is raised into its place in the *Sophist*.

CHAPTER IV.

PLATO AND SOPHISTRY.

AT the time when the *Sophist* was written, the views and peculiarities of individual Sophists had largely sunk out of sight, and the concern of Plato was to make clear their contribution to philosophy. Not Protagoras, although he, it is true, happens to be mentioned (232 D), or any other Sophist, but the tribe of Sophists (τὸ φῶλον, 218 C), or, as we may say, the Sophistic spirit,¹ was the object of investigation. It has been thought that in this work the term "Sophist" is for the first time given a bad meaning; but in this statement the opening pages of the dialogue, in which the jest against the Sophist is carried on, are taken too seriously. Although the dramatic form of the dialogue has now for the most part disappeared, and Plato no longer seeks to bring forward characters in costume representing imperfect ideas, he yet intentionally at the outset deals with his subject in a more popular

¹ "We are not to suppose that Plato intended by such a description to depict Protagoras or Gorgias, or even Thrasymachus, who all turn out to be 'very good sort of people when we know them,' and all of them part on good terms with Socrates. But he is speaking of a being as imaginary as the wise man of the Stoics, and whose character varies in different dialogues." Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, 3rd Edition, Vol. IV., p. 286.

way. At the same time the name "Sophist" has in the course of events rightly acquired an unsavoury meaning, since those, who now bear it, repeat words which have lost their significance. With them, as persons, Plato is not engaged. Whatever life yet belongs to the denial of error is found amongst the Cynics, and certain belligerent followers of himself, who worship at the shrine of Parmenides. Yet the contention that error is non-existent was first raised by Sophists, and under every disguise is rightly enough called by the name of Sophistry.

Once more, then, is put the question: Is false opinion possible? although it appears now under the form: Does not-being exist? The Sophists and other theorizers, in denying the existence of false opinion, have denied the existence of not-being, and in so doing have invoked the authority of Parmenides. The Eleatic Stranger, to whom is entrusted the unfilial office of criticizing the conclusions of the Eleatic school, seeks to prove that, in spite of all seeming contradictions, not-being has being. More depends on the issue of the argument than is at first apparent. Here is laid the foundation of the *Timaeus*, which finds reason in the physical universe, and of the *Philebus*, which, anticipating the opening remarks of Aristotle's *Ethics*, looks for the *summum bonum* in actual human life, and of the *Laws*, which with humble contrition acknowledges the existence of reason in the political constitutions of the time. Whatever is final in the philosophy of Plato, his whole desire, however imperfectly fulfilled, to exhibit reason as the spirit of a universe at once visible and intelligible, has its basis in the exhaustive examination, conducted in the *Sophist*, of being, rest, motion, the same and the other.

The aim of the *Sophist* is, in a word, to conceive of the different factors of reality as belonging to a whole and yet as retaining their distinguishing features. If such a view of reality can be shown to be the only intelligible one, the question of being and not-being is settled, as well as the difficulty regarding the existence of false opinion. With reference to being, the chief obstacle has hitherto been a lack of clearness as to its scope. Is it simply one factor in the whole? Or is it the product of all the factors? Or is it both, according to the way in which it is conceived? Again, as to not-being, is it the utter opponent of being, and in that case, as its name would seem to imply, is it an utter nonentity? Or is it only difference or partial opposition, requiring, in fact, the existence of something beyond it, embracing both it and being? The problem may be stated in another way. Can we maintain the truth of the sentence "Not-being is," without laying ourselves open to the retort that it is absurd to call by the name of "Not-being" what is only being in another form? These difficulties are not advanced capriciously by Plato, but are the burden of several existing philosophies, the aim of all of which without exception is to prove either that unity excludes multiplicity, and identity difference, or on the other hand, that multiplicity and difference exclude unity. In any case philosophy, whose watchword had either now for Plato become, or was rapidly becoming, participation, communion, harmony, proportion or measure, would be deprived of its function. But Plato was not only not prepared to admit the defeat of philosophy at the hands of these one-sided schools, but, by virtue of his doctrine of communion, was determined to use their onesidedness to deepen his

conception of reality. By proving the existence of false opinion he would at one and the same time champion the cause of philosophy against Sophistry, and also make a place for Sophistry in the history of philosophy.

Statement of the View that Not-being has no existence. Before Plato can be assured that opposite ideas participate in one another and, therefore, contribute to a diversified whole, he must disprove the contrary hypothesis, and, first of all, as is his custom, he states the view he intends to criticize (*Sophist* 237-241). He quotes, to begin with, the saying of Parmenides, "Never will you show that not-being is,"² and attributes to him the following defence. If not-being is, it must either be something, to which something else can be referred, or it must itself be referred to something; it must be a subject or an attribute. But non-existence cannot be referred to being without contradicting the nature of being, and it is equally absurd to suppose that with regard to not-being, which is not-something or nothing, any intelligible remark can be made at all. Not-being is, therefore, unthinkable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable (ἀδιανόητον ἄρρήτον, ἀφθεγτον, ἄλογον, 238 c). Indeed, the statement just made is an illustration of the impossibility of speaking of not-being rationally, since the phrase not-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) and the terms "unthinkable, etc," all presuppose that to not-being can be ascribed one of the most real of things, namely unity. So much may fairly be put into the mouth of Parmenides. But the nimble Sophist, innocent of the need of consistency, makes a sudden volte-face, when he is

² "This shall never be shown, that the things that are not are."
Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 185.

called an image-maker, and argues that any definition whatsoever of image (εἰδωλον) must imply the reality of the image, and that, although the existence of not-being is proved in this way, it is proved only by an argument which makes not-being wholly identical with being. Accordingly it can still be claimed that it, as the negative of being, has no existence. Thus the Sophist has two strings to his bow: (a) he will prove not-being unthinkable, or (b) he will prove that it has the exact value of being; and with either proof he wins the point that not-being and false opinion do not, as such, exist.

Plato's Refutation. (1) **Criticism of Parmenides** (242). As the Sophist has taken shelter under the aegis of Parmenides, it is necessary to see how far the philosophy of being is able to furnish him with protection. It must be asked, What does Parmenides mean by being, in that strict sense in which it is said by him to exclude the possibility of not-being?³ Plato subjects the conception of being to a close analysis, in the course of which he maintains the following propositions: (1) unity (τὸ ἓν) cannot be applied to being, without introducing an element of difference, if it be no more than the difference of two names. But difference destroys the sameness characteristic of pure being. (2) Parmenides is guilty of a second inconsistency in saying that being is a whole (ὅλον, 244 c), "like unto the fulness of a well-rounded sphere, equally balanced from the centre on every side." According to this description being is a whole having many parts; and yet it is at the same time

³ Burnet's *Early Greek Philosophy*, pp. 183-189, contains a translation of the fragments which remain to us of the philosophy of Parmenides.

said to be indivisible (*ἀμερές*, 245 A). If the theory of Parmenides is to be consistent, it cannot regard pure being as a whole. (3) But a whole is such that there exists between its parts a relation which we may perhaps call dynamic.⁴ By means of this relation each several part acts upon the others and is acted upon by them, and this reciprocity in doing and suffering is what is meant by becoming (*γενέσθαι*, 245 D). The quality of becoming thus belongs exclusively to wholes, and cannot therefore belong to being. (4) Quantity, too, (*ποσόν τι*, 245 D), is a conception inapplicable to being, in the severest sense of the word, since all quantity is a whole of its parts. (5) But the most unkindest cut of all is the argument by which the being of Parmenides, as it is not the whole, is hurled headlong from its place of supreme reality to become one of a number of subordinate elements. To the higher being is given the name existence (*οὐσία*, 245 D); and the secret of the whole dialogue is for a brief moment exposed to view, when it is suggested that there is being (*οὐσία*) above being (*τὸ ὄν*), and that the being, which is supreme, reconciles the lower being with all its opposites.

The point of Plato's criticism of Parmenides lies in this that the more strictly being is conceived, the less and less real it becomes, while the world outside of it, the world of not-being, grows in a corresponding ratio. In the end, to say what being really is, if indeed it is anything at all, will be, as Plato quietly remarks, a matter of endless difficulty. But he passes quickly on to disclose the next act in the tragedy of being.

Plato's Refutation. (2) Materialists and Ideal-

⁴ *δύναμις* is the word used afterwards by Plato (248 c) to describe both action (*τὸ ποιεῖν*) and passion (*τὸ πάσχειν*).

ists (246-249). The conception that opposites are not utter contradictories is brought out more fully in Plato's criticism of two opposing schools of thought, those who believe in nothing but body or matter (*σῶμα*, 246 A), and those who believe that forms alone are real ("the friends of forms," *τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους*, 248 A). Already (242 c) Plato had casually mentioned that many philosophers (Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Empedocles) had insisted upon the existence of at least two principles which were at war with each other. But now two contradictory ideas are to be the battle-cries of two contending hosts. A momentous struggle is to take place between giants and gods, as the upholders of matter and the supporters of ideas are respectively called, the upshot of which will be the rout of both factions and a more complete announcement by Plato of his own theory.

Of the materialists Plato says (246 E) that if in addition to body they could be induced to admit the existence of the soul and of justice and injustice as characteristics of soul, they would be applying the term "existence" to what was incorporeal as well as to body. We might then ask them, what is meant by that existence, which includes both the corporeal and the incorporeal? In answering this question, which no confirmed materialist could understand, Plato again drops a golden hint of his own theory. Being or existence, he says, is faculty, power or possibility (*ὥς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις*, 247 E), whether of acting or of being acted upon. Hence, as we may fairly infer, soul and body are a unity of these two faculties.

Plato now cross-questions the friends of ideas, who separate essence or existence from generation or becoming, and maintain that we participate in genera-

tion with the body and by perception, but in existence by thought (*διὰ λογισμοῦ*). Plato at once sees that the idealists, as we may name them, in using the same term "participation" (*τὸ κοινωνεῖν*, 248 A) to describe our attitude towards the two distinct worlds of existence (*οὐσία*) and generation (*γένεσις*), had, without intending it, brought together what they held to be separate. What is participation? he asks. Is it power? If so, the believers in matter and the believers in form have a common principle. But the reply is made by the idealists that if participation is power, either active or passive, it belongs not to being but wholly to becoming. This answer brings the advocates of ideas into a parlous state, since knowing cannot be otherwise defined than as the active participation of thought in being. To banish all participation from being is likewise to banish motion (*κίνησις*), soul (*ψυχή*), life (*ζωή*), thought (*φρόνησις*), and mind (*νοῦς*). Being is thus left in the dreary solitude, to which the principle of Parmenides had already been consigned. We must think of it, says Plato, as perched upon a pedestal in absolute isolation, eternal and unchangeable, to be gazed at in awed silence. The only way to escape this conclusion is to grant that being participates in mind. Then with mind comes life; with mind and life comes soul, and with these motion. Nothing can prevent the rabble of not-being from invading the sanctuary of being. Here, then, is the alternative: (1) either deny participation entirely, deny all communion of the world of being with the world of motion, or (2) grant that the least measure of participation of being with mind involves necessarily action and passion with all their train. It is impossible to do as "the gods" desired, namely,

to maintain participation as a fact, and yet reject its inevitable consequences. Accordingly, under being (ὄντα) we must include motion as well as that which is moved (κίνησις and τὸ κινούμενον, 249 B), and admit that if there is no motion there is no mind.

But there is another side to the question. It has, so it would seem, just been proved that motion is. But Plato is by no means prepared to abandon his case against the "river-folk," which he had built up in the *Theaetetus*. It is true that the argument in the *Sophist* looks in a different direction, since Plato is here bent upon establishing the existence of motion. But motion is not by any means to dislodge rest. So Plato, keeping the dialectical balance true, says that the absence of rest is quite as fatal to knowledge as the absence of motion. As if rehearsing a well-known argument he merely says that if all things are in motion, mind must be withdrawn from the list of realities (ἐκ τῶν ὄντων), and that he who would thus destroy knowledge, would only stultify himself by seeking to prove anything at all.⁵

A philosopher, feeling the force of the argument for the reality of motion, and also for the reality of rest or fixity (στάσις, 249 C), will be inclined to insist that neither the giants are right, when they set being in motion on all sides (τῶν τε αὖ πανταχῇ τὸ ὄν κινούντων), nor the gods, when they say that the whole is fixed (τὸ πᾶν ἐστηκός). In attempting to define being and the all (τὸ πᾶν), philosophers, instead of siding with the faction contending for fixity (ἀκίνητα) or the faction contending for motion (κεκινημένα), will, like children, beg for *Both at once* (ξυναμφότερα, 249, D).

⁵ It is evident that Plato counts on an acquaintance with the reasoning of the *Theaetetus* (see above p. 49).

Plato's Refutation. (3) The Separatists. Just as the discussion seems to have reached a natural close, another school of thinkers, headed probably by Antisthenes, insists upon being heard; and Plato, who is no friend of hasty conclusions, willingly accedes to their demand. Antisthenes, with a cunning inherited perhaps from the Eleatic Zeno, has astonished the ordinary consciousness by his declaration that it is impossible, at least on a basis of reason, to say that Socrates is good, or indeed that anything is anything else. He grants, with a fatal lapse of logical acuteness, that one may say "man is" and "good is," but the sentence, "man is good" is, according to his theory, an unjustifiable mixing of two separate things. Plato, however, had just been saying that motion and rest must in some way come together, and had therefore been expounding a different principle. Still he cannot be said to have secured himself in the possession of this principle, or even made its meaning quite clear to himself, until he has crossed swords with the redoubtable Cynic.

Plato at once insists upon taking Antisthenes at his word; if there is to be separation, let there be separation. What then? The result is that every theory without exception is destroyed. (1) Those who maintain that all is in motion (252 A) mix existence with motion, and have, therefore, violated the doctrine of absolute isolation. (2) Those who maintain that the all is at rest are in a similar case. (3) Equally absurd is the famous theory of immutable and everlasting forms. (4) If there is no mixing (*σύμμιξις*, 252 B), those who divide the original one into an infinite number of parts, and those who form a whole out of a number of elements are also at fault. (5)

With a fine irony Plato indicates the admirable impartiality of the theory which overthrows itself in overthrowing others. If the upholders of separation had been concerned to maintain their theory, they would have been dumb, for even to say that 'man is' or 'good is' unlawfully mingles existence with man and good. Indeed in any kind of discourse (*λόγον*) such words as 'to be' (*εἶναι*), 'apart' (*χωρίς*), and 'in itself' (*καθ' αὐτό*) must be used as connecting links, so that the theory of separation makes impossible all intelligible discourse, even that discourse by which it seeks to make good its own claims. With all his logical acumen Antisthenes failed to discern that his very password, 'apart' or 'separate' was his Shibboleth, since it implies some sort of collection of independent units, and, therefore, mixes 'the one' with 'the many,' uniting ideas by way of difference.

But this argument has its obverse. If the doctrine of universal separation is self-contradictory in that it virtually asserts the existence of relation while expressly denying all relation, the doctrine of universal communion, in that it wipes out all distinctions, is equally fallacious. If it be absurd to deny that existence can be attributed to rest or motion, it is equally absurd to maintain that existence, rest, and motion are all absolutely identical. In this theory of utter identity it is impossible to account for the difference of names. Since it and the opposing theory of utter separation cancel each other, the way is left clear at last for Plato's own conception.

Plato's Refutation. (4) Outline of his own doctrine. The entire absence of communion and the entire universality of communion having been both shown to be untenable, there remains the alternative that some

ideas communicate with some, and some do not. This position Plato is now able to state and develop, taking as typical forms, being, rest, motion, same and other. If we were to adopt a single word to describe Plato's view, it would be the word 'system.' Dialectic is a system of kinds or classes⁶ (γέννη, 253 B). The word 'system' preserves the differences of the ideas, while at the same time maintaining their unity. The uniting bonds, specially emphasized by Plato in this system, are (a) being (257 E), (b) other or not-being (257 E), and (c) the same (256 A). Motion, for example, is, and must therefore share in being; it is other than rest, and therefore shares in other; it shares in the same, because it is self-identical [literally: "being in relation to itself (πρὸς ἐαυτήν) through its sharing in the same" (διὰ τὴν μέθεξιν ταντοῦ, 256 A)]. Hence difference is, as we may say, an organic element of the system. Without it all the classes would run together into a hopeless mass, which would necessarily elude all definition, as Plato has already shown in his criticism of Parmenides. Further, the whole, which is the necessary union of the parts, is not to be confounded with any single part, and must, therefore, be more than pure being. Plato is not now afraid that this view will lead to the denial of the reality of the whole, since he has already proved that any two classes in communion are different from these classes in separation, even although existence may be applied in some sense to each class. The whole or unity of classes, though distinguished from the class named 'being,' therefore exists, and that, too, in a sense in which no special class can be said to exist. Hence being is after all a

⁶Here the word γένος is the complete equivalent of the word εἶδος. See Campbell's *Sophistes and Politicus of Plato*, p. 144, note to l. 7.

peculiar term, since it must be interpreted in one way when regarded as a special class, and in another way when regarded as the whole. In the second case it can be called absolute ($\tau\hat{\omega}\nu$ ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά 255 D) and in the first case relative ($\tauὰ δὲ$ πρὸς ἄλληλα).

We may depart for a moment from the text of Plato to illustrate his conception of the relation of being, which is over all, to being which is a part. The lower orders of life provide man with food and clothing. But the real relation of man to plants and animals is understood only when all living things are seen to have their meaning in the Supreme Reality, in which all things, animate and inanimate, have their being. In this view the distinction between higher and lower orders of existence is not ignored, but it is subordinated to the conception of the universe as a single intelligible whole.

With a sense of achievement, Plato now calls attention to what has in the process of his splendid exposition justified itself. Not-being, like being, has been undergoing a silent transformation. It has abandoned its policy of seclusion, and become a willing partner of the other classes in the absolute whole. Indeed it has made the idea of a partnership possible. As every class, though partaking of being, is other than being, it follows that not-being necessarily exists ($\text{Ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ ὄν, 256 D}$). It is, therefore, not the opposite or utter negation ($\epsilon\nuαντίον$ τι, 257 B) of being, but only the other ($\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ μόνον, 257 B) or the contrasted existence ($\alpha\nuτίθεσις$, 258 B). Hence without the existence of not-being a system of forms could not be conceived.

Once more, then, patiently and dispassionately Plato has sifted the arguments brought forward against

the possibility of philosophy, and not only vindicated philosophy but enriched it by the process. Under his guidance philosophy entered this long controversy much like the lumps of meat which were thrown into the valley described by Sinbad, and it came forth from the controversy like the same meat bedecked with gems. While it cannot be said that Plato has left nothing for subsequent philosophers to do, he has none the less pointed out a method which has permanent value, and by means of it proved his conclusion that differences are united in the absolute unity, in which even the theories denying its reality are awarded their fitting niche.

What has Plato more to say of this absolute reality? (a) In the remainder of the dialogue he argues that it is a graded whole. At some length he draws out the distinction between things made by God and those made by man, again dividing the things made by God into real objects and shadows in water and polished surfaces, and the things made by man into real articles and images, such as paintings and drawings. Which things are a parable. The philosopher is concerned with being, as it manifests itself in all things, great or small. The Sophist mistakes a mere image or imitation for the reality. Both of them are in a sense concerned with being, but the philosopher is looking at being in its entirety, while the Sophist is looking at some partial and imperfect embodiment of it, which, when compared with the whole, can rightly be defined as not-being.

(b) In the *Timaeus* the principles of the *Sophist* are shown to be the constituent elements of the universe. The universe is a living creature with soul and mind (*Timaeus*, 30 B), and the soul is composed of three elements (35 A): (1) the indivisible or the same, (2) that which becomes, being in connection with

bodies, and is divisible, and (3) essence (οὐσία). The third element seems to be such a unity of the first and second as to establish a harmony (συναρμόττων, 35 B, cf. also 37 A). Here, as in the *Sophist*, the object of Plato, in discussing being and not-being, same and other, is not to connect form or idea with the material world, but to present such a conception of being, in the truest sense of the term, as will inevitably involve the reality of the visible material universe. The world of sense, which had been despised by Parmenides and the "friends of ideas," is now seen to be the world of becoming or motion, which implies being. Hence Plato's aim is to present a conception of existence, which by the fact of its harmonizing opposing principles, exhibits the universe as a whole, whose parts or elements are necessarily related. Such a conception is that of existence (οὐσία) in the *Timaeus*, a conception of which we may broadly say that in it reality is interpreted as the completion of all its elements.⁷

⁷ In another passage of this dialogue (*Timaeus*, 41 D) the soul of man is said to be composed of the same elements as the soul of the universe, namely the same (ταύτόν), the other (θάτερον), and existence (οὐσία). Thus Plato applies his conception of harmony to reason and appetite. Indeed, measure or harmony is the magic conception, which of all antagonistic principles and theories makes "one reconciliation." In the *Philebus* wisdom requires to mix with pleasure in order to result in the well-proportioned life. The watch-word of the whole of the *Timaeus* may be taken to be

" Rough-smooth let globe be
Mixed—man's existence ; "

and the mixture, in the case of both globe and human life, Plato regards as more complete than either element in its isolated purity. Further, not only ought the true political state to preserve the mean (μέσον, *Laws*, vi. 756 E) between monarchy and democracy, but justice itself is defined as the preservation of a proportion (μέτρια, *Laws*, vi. 757 C), which is at once the equality belonging to nature (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἴσον, *Laws*, vi. 757 D), and the judgment of Zeus (Διὸς κρίσις, *Laws*, vi. 757 B).

Supplement.—The conception of completion, which cannot be said to be a prominent aspect of being, as interpreted in the *Sophist*, comes out more clearly in the proof of the existence of the gods (*Laws*, x.). As has been already pointed out (see above, p. 21), Plato sought to justify the religious instincts of Greece against the Sophistic negation of religion, and also incidentally to set aside the popular creeds. He was perhaps not the first to see the problem in this two-fold light. Not to mention the early philosophers, who, while mainly negative as regards the forms of Greek belief, framed a conception of reality which may be called religious,⁸ the Greek dramatists were consciously seeking to reconstruct their religion. In the tragedies of Euripides, the most reflectively critical of the dramatists, this purpose comes out with greatest clearness. In the lines spoken by Heracles, with whom in his tragic solitude the solitary poet has deep sympathy, Euripides both criticizes current mythology and suggests a higher view. Heracles says

“ I neither fancy gods love lawless beds,
Nor that with chains they bind each other's hands
Have I judged worthy faith, at any time ;
Nor shall I be persuaded—one is born
His fellow's master ! Since God stands in need,
If He is really God—of naught at all.
These are the poet's pitiful conceits.”⁹

* It is not advisable to call the early philosophers of Greece materialists. A materialist is, I suppose, one who sets up as the ultimate reality matter in some form, as opposed to and exclusive of mind, the distinction between matter and mind being essential to the theory. But in the naïve systems of the first Greek thinkers this distinction had no place.

⁹ These lines are from Browning's translation of “ the perfect piece,” embodied in his *Aristophanes' Apology*, Ἡρακλῆς Μαινόμενος, ll. 1344-1349. You might suppose that they were taken from the third book of the *Republic* of Plato.

With these lines in our mind it is hardly possible not to see in the *Bacchae* the poet's conception of a pure religion. The theory that the *Bacchae* is a palinode would thus be true at least to the extent that Euripides in his mature thought sympathized with the religious feelings of his countrymen, even though he continued to reject their creeds. Of Plato, too, with some lack of insight it has been said that in his old age he fell back upon popular ideas, when in point of fact he simply illustrates in his intellectual growth the principle of his own philosophy, that a complete interpretation of what is cannot exclude the common consciousness.¹⁰

After having explicitly stated that his object was to defend the ancient opinion that there are gods (*Laws*, x. 890 D) against the theories of many "wise men" of all times, who argue that there are no gods except in the delusions and laws of men (*Id.* x. 889 E), Plato founds his proof of their reality upon the nature of motion. Of motion there are ten kinds, which may for convenience be reduced to two: (1) that which moves other things but not itself, and (2) that which moves itself and others. The second, says Plato, is nobler than the first, and prior to it in time. His point may be put in this way. Suppose the cause of any phenomenon, D, to be C, then, in order to get a complete explanation of D, we must discover the cause of C, namely B, and the cause of B, and so on. But to Plato it was clear that this process was futile, since by it the explanation sought for was being

¹⁰ Hegel, also, because he sought to interpret rather than assail what existed, has been accused of having apotheosized in his *Philosophy of Right* the political constitution of his own time. For a truer view see Bosanquet's *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, chap. x. .

continually postponed. The motion which could in this way only move another, while itself requiring some third thing in order to move it in its turn, was inferior to the motion which in moving others could move itself. When we reach a thing which moves not only another but also itself, the backward process comes of necessity to a starting point, and this happens in the case of the highest kind of motion, namely self-motion (*τό ἐαυτὸ κινεῖν*, *Id.* 896 A). Now soul is motion which can move itself (*τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὐτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν*, *Id.* 896 A). Therefore the cause of no phenomenon can be given without referring in the last resort to soul. It is the first origin and moving power (*τὴν πρῶτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν*, *Id.*) of all that is or has become or will be, and their contraries, and also the cause or source (*αἰτία*) of change and motion in all things. Such a soul is really a god, and there is truth in the old philosopher's remark that all things are full of gods.

But Plato is manifestly anxious that the soul or first cause should not be regarded as an initial unintelligent force, out of all relation to the present world. Hence he immediately supplements his conception of soul as self-moved and self-mover with an account of all the higher qualities which belong to the very nature of soul.¹¹ These qualities are "characters, manners, wishes, reasonings, true opinions, reflections, recollections (*τρόποι δὲ καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνήμαι*, *Id.* 896 C), qualities by virtue of which it regulates and brings to order all the affairs of

¹¹ This is perhaps the foundation for Aristotle's distinction of soul as first actuality of body from reason as a higher actuality or actuality of an actuality.

human life. Further the floor of heaven even more than the drama of life proves the existence of an intelligence, without which the sun and stars "could never have moved with a numerical exactness so wonderful" (*Laws* xii. 967 B). So Plato, recurring to the proof of the existence of the gods, and fearing, as it would seem, that the second factor in the proof had not been made sufficiently prominent, says (*Id.* xii. 966 D), "There are two things which lead men to believe in the gods (περὶ θεῶν εἰς πίστιν). One is the argument about the soul which has already been mentioned, that it is the oldest and most divine of all things; the other was an argument from the order of the motion of the stars, and of all things under the dominion of the mind, which ordered the universe" (ἐγκρατῆς νοῦς τὸ πᾶν διακεκοσμηκώς). It is natural for Plato at this juncture to acknowledge the value of the philosophy of Anaxagoras, who had ventured the conjecture that mind was the orderer of the universe. According to the idea of order, which belongs to the very nature of mind, all the events of the world, past, present or future, must be thought of as fitting together in such a way that past and future are in a manner present. But the conception, according to which future events are present in the sense that they are necessarily contained in an arranging mind, is the conception of final cause. Plato, therefore, conceives of God not as first cause, originating in the remote past a world, in which he has ceased to be concerned, but rather as the ultimate product, as alpha and omega in one. Beginning with the reality of motion, an idea which had been gained only by a toilsome climb in the *Sophist* of the logical Hill Difficulty (*per aspera ad astra*, "winning comes by strife"), Plato has passed

to the higher idea of self-motion, by means of which he is enabled in the *Timaeus* (32 C-34 A) to regard the universe as an animal (shall we say "an organism"?), and now, coupling self-motion with mind, as the principle of order, he attains in substance to the conception of God, not as cause but as final cause.

In this hurried sketch of Plato's proof it is not possible to discuss the difference between it and his earlier views set forth in the *Republic*, or his treatment of good and evil, or his idea that the heavens are a higher revelation of God than human life, points which require to be explained if his conception of the Gods is to be made complete. But in a study of the *Sophistic* philosophy, as it works itself out in Plato's thought, it is perhaps enough to have shown that it helped Plato to reach the conception of existence as a whole transcending all antagonisms, as an organic whole, and as active intelligence.

THEAETETUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.

THEODORUS.

THEAETETUS.

Euclid and Terpsion meet before Euclid's house in Megara, enter the house and the dialogue is read to them by a young slave.

Eu. Have you come from the country just now, 142
Terpsion, or some time ago?

Ter. Some little time ago; and I was looking for you in the agora and wondering that I could not find you.

Eu. I was not inside the city.

Ter. Where were you?

Eu. I was walking towards the harbour, and I came upon Theaetetus who was being carried from the camp at Corinth towards Athens.

Ter. Alive or dead?

Eu. Alive but very weak, for he had been wounded, B
and besides was troubled with the disease which is prevalent in the army.

Ter. The dysentery?

Eu. Yes.

Ter. Well, a brave man has fallen!

Eu. Noble and good, (καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν), and just now I heard some persons highly praising his conduct in the battle.

Ter. Naturally; indeed I should be surprised to hear any other report of his behaviour. But how is it that he did not stay here in Megara? C

Eu. He was eager to get home. Indeed I advised and urged him to stay, but he would not. So I saw him some distance on his way, and, as I returned, I called to mind what Socrates had predicted of him, and was struck with the wonderful way in which this forecast, like many another made by Socrates, had come true. Shortly before his death, as I remember, he met Theaetetus, who was a young man then, and, becoming acquainted with him in the course of a discussion, conceived a strong admiration for his character. When I went to Athens, he repeated to me his
D conversation with Theaetetus, which was well worth hearing, and said then that the youth, if he lived, would surely be famous.

Ter. His words have come true, as you said. But what did they talk about? Can you repeat it?

Eu. No indeed, not off-hand. I made notes of it
143 from memory as soon as I got home, and afterwards at my leisure I wrote it out more fully. Whenever I went to Athens I questioned Socrates about what I had forgotten, and when I came home I filled in the blanks; so that now I have the whole dialogue almost word for word.

Ter. Indeed I have heard you say that before, and have always intended to ask you to show me the dialogue, but have neglected to do so. Besides, as I have just come from the country, I would enjoy a rest.

B *Eu.* And I, too, shall be glad to rest, as I escorted Theaetetus as far as Erineum. Therefore let us in, and, while we rest, my slave will read to us the dialogue.

Ter. A welcome proposal.

Eu. Here, Terpsion, is the manuscript. I wrote the dialogue not exactly as Socrates repeated it to me, but as though he were actually conversing with those with whom he had the discussion, namely Theaetetus and Theodorus the geometrician. I adopted this plan
C in order that I might be able to omit the frequent

repetition of connecting words, such for example as the phrase 'I said' or 'I asked' when Socrates spoke, and the phrase 'He agreed' or 'He did not agree' of him who gave the answer. I have left out all that, and kept only the original conversation.

Ter. That is often done, Euclid.

Eu. Here then, my lad, take the book and read.

[*The young slave reads.*]

So. If I were deeply interested in the people of Cyrene, Theodorus, I would make inquiries about **D** them and their affairs, and would ask you if any of the young men of that place showed any disposition to engage in the study of geometry or any other philosophy; but, since I am really more in love with Athens, I am more eager to know who are inclined to be studious amongst us. I myself do what I can to discover this, and I inquire of everyone who wields an influence over young men. Now not a few of them attend upon you, and rightly, for you have made a diligent study of many things, especially **E** geometry. So, if you have found any one of them to be remarkable, I would much like to hear of him.

Theo. I have indeed, Socrates, met with such a youth in your city, and it will be very pleasant for me to tell and you to hear of his character. If he were beautiful, I would be excessively timid about speaking of him, lest I should be considered as a lover of his. But he is, if you will excuse the comparison, so far from beautiful, that he resembles you in his snub-nose and prominent eyes, though these features are not so marked in him as in you. I may, therefore, speak of him without any hesitation, and, believe **144** me, in all my experience, wide as it has been, I have never met with any young man of whose natural abilities I have formed so high an estimate. He has a rare aptitude for learning, is exceedingly gentle, and brave above all men. I cannot believe that there ever was such a man in the past or that now there

exists his equal. Those who like him are sharp, clever, and of tenacious memory are often sharp-tempered, rush about like unballasted vessels, and are **B** not so much brave as mad; while those who study constantly are often dull and forgetful. But he applies himself to his studies and researches quietly and uninterruptedly, like a softly flowing stream of oil, and works with a determination to succeed, which in one of his age is marvellous.

So. That is good news. Who is the father of the youth?

Theo. I have heard his name, but have forgotten it. **C** See, there is the young man in the midst of some friends of his. They were anointing themselves a while ago in the outer race-course, but now they seem to have finished with that, and are coming this way. Look, and see if you know him.

So. I do not know his name, but I see that he is the son of Euphronius of Sunium. A very distinguished man the father was, and would have answered to your description of his son. He left a large fortune too, I am told.

D *Theo.* Theaetetus is the boy's name, Socrates. The property, you speak of, seems to have been eaten up by his guardians, and yet, Socrates, he is wonderfully liberal.

So. He must be a noble lad. Bid him come here and sit beside me.

Theo. Very well. Theaetetus, come here; Socrates wants you to sit beside him.

So. Do, Theaetetus, for Theodorus says that I look **E** like you, and I want to see what kind of a face I have. Now supposing we each had a lyre, and Theodorus were to judge that they were of the same pitch, should we just accept his opinion, or should we ask if the judge were musical?

Theae. We should find out if he were musical.

So. Should we accept his opinion, if he were musical, and reject it if he were not?

Theae. Yes.

So. Then I think that if anyone says our faces are alike, we ought, if we are interested, to ask if he can **145** draw.

Theae. I think so too.

So. And is Theodorus a painter?

Theae. Not that I know of.

So. Is he not a geometrician?

Theae. That he is, Socrates, indeed.

So. And an astronomer, arithmetician, musician, in short skilled in all the sciences?

Theae. That is my opinion.

So. Then any remark of his, laudatory or otherwise, to the effect that our persons resemble each other in appearance is not really worthy of our attention.

Theae. Probably not.

So. But if he should praise the soul of either of us **B** for its virtue and wisdom, ought not the one, who has heard the praise, eagerly to examine the one who is praised, and should not the one who is examined be eager to reveal himself?

Theae. Certainly, Socrates.

So. Well then, dear Theaetetus, you must reveal yourself, and I must question, for you must know that Theodorus, though he has spoken highly to me of many men, citizens and strangers, has never spoken so highly of anyone as just now of you.

Theae. That is pleasant, Socrates, but he may have been jesting. **C**

So. That is not his way. Do not retract your admission on the plea that he was jesting, for he would then be compelled to take an oath, and no one would accuse him of perjury: so stand boldly by your agreement.

Theae. I suppose I must, if you say so.

So. Then tell me; do you learn from Theodorus any geometry?

Theae. I do.

D So. And anything of astronomy, and harmony, and calculation?

Theae. I desire to.

So. And I do, too, my boy, both from him and from any others who are supposed to know. Yet though I am fairly well at home in most things, I have a slight difficulty which you and the others must discuss with me. Tell me this, is learning becoming wiser about what one knows?

Theae. Surely it is.

So. And in wisdom (*σοφία*) the wise are wise?

Theae. Yes.

E So. Is knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) different from it?

Theae. From what?

So. Wisdom. Or if one knows a thing is he wise in that thing?

Theae. He is.

So. Then are knowledge and wisdom the same?

Theae. Yes.

146 So. Now this is my difficulty. I cannot be clear as to what knowledge really is. Shall we not discuss the question? What do you say? Which of us will open the debate? He who loses in this game of question and answer will sit down, and, as the boys say in their game of ball, be donkey. He who wins will be our king, and may cause us to answer any question which he pleases to put. Why are you silent? I am not rude, am I, Theodorus, in my eagerness for an argument, or too urgent in asking that we should converse together in a friendly and informal way?

B *Theo.* Rude, Socrates? Not in the least. But ask some of the young men to answer you for I am not used to this kind of conversation (*οἰάλεκτος*), and am now too old to change my ways. But the young men would enjoy it, and owing to their youth would be more likely to improve. Why not go on questioning Theaetetus, as you began with him?

So. Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says?
C You would not like, I know, to disobey him. Indeed

it would not be right in such a matter for a young man to dispute the authority of a wise elder. So, speak out well and boldly, and tell us what you think knowledge is.

Theae. Well, Socrates, I shall do what you ask; only when I make mistakes you must set me right.

So. We will do what we can for you.

Theae. Then I think that knowledge is whatever one might learn from Theodorus, such as geometry and the subjects you mentioned a moment ago. The shoemaker's art (τέχνη), and the arts of all the other D workmen, these also, one and all, are knowledge.

So. My friend, you were asked for one simple thing, and you have generously and lavishly given a great variety of things.

Theae. How is that? What do you mean, Socrates?

So. Nothing at all perhaps. Yet I shall try to explain. When you mention cobbling, do you mean anything but a knowledge of the way to make shoes?

Theae. No.

So. And carpentry, is it anything but a knowledge E of the way to make articles of wood?

Theae. Nothing.

So. In each case you emphasize the thing of which the art is the knowledge?

Theae. Yes.

So. But, Theaetetus, that is not the question. We do not want to find out of what each art is the knowledge, or how many arts and sciences there are. We wish not to count the kinds of knowledge but to know what knowledge itself is (αὐτὸ ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν). Do I make my meaning clear?

Theae. Quite.

So. Let me give you an illustration. Suppose any 147 random and familiar thing, such as clay, were in question, and we were asked what it is, would it not be foolish of us to answer that there were several kinds of clay, one of the potter, another of the oven-maker, and another of the brick-maker?

Theae. Probably it would.

So. First of all it would surely be absurd to suppose that our questioner could gather anything from our answer, merely because we added to the word 'clay' **B** the phrase 'of the image-maker or some other workman.' Or do you think that any one understands the name of a thing, when he does not know the thing?

Theae. Certainly not.

So. And no one understands the nature of the science (*ἐπιστήμη*) of shoe-making, if he does not know the nature of science.

Theae. That must follow.

So. So, too, he who knows not the nature of science is ignorant of the science of the cobbler—and the same of every other art.

Theae. I agree.

So. Then if one is asked 'What is knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*)?' it is ridiculous to give in answer the name of any art—for that is to give the object of know- **C** ledge and not what knowledge itself is.

Theae. It seems so.

So. It is, in the second place, absurd to take a long round about road when one may go straight to the point of the question. For example, if asked what clay is, one should say plainly and simply that clay, no matter whose, is earth and water mixed.

Theae. It seems to be easy now, Socrates, after your explanation. Something of the same kind, I venture to say, happened to me in a conversation which took **D** place just now between me and Socrates, your namesake, here.

So. Yes? What was it, Theaetetus?

Theae. It was about the nature of roots. Theodorus was describing them to us and showing that the third root and the fifth root, represented by the sides of squares, had no common measure. He took them up one by one until he reached the seventeenth, when he stopped. It occurred to us, since the number

of the roots appeared to be infinite, to try to bring them all under one denomination. E

So. And did you succeed?

Theae. We think so; but judge for yourself.

So. Well?

Theae. We divided numbers into two kinds. Those whose roots were integers we represented by a quadrilateral, whose sides were equal, and called them square numbers.

So. That was good.

Theae. Each of the intermediate numbers, three, 148 five, and all numbers which have not integral roots, but are the product of unequal factors, we represented by a rectangular figure, one of whose sides was greater than the other, and these we called rectangular numbers.

So. Capital; and what then?

Theae. One kind, those which represent the equal sides of square numbers, we defined as simple length; the other lines, which represent the equal sides of rectangular numbers, we defined as roots, because the two different kinds of lines are not commensurable B except by the squares, of which the sides are the roots. And we did the same with solids.

So. Most excellently said, my boys. Theodorus will not now be liable, I think, to the charge of having given false evidence.

Theae. And yet, Socrates, I could not tell you about knowledge, as I did about lines and roots, though you seem to expect the same kind of answer. So I must repeat once more that Theodorus is guilty.

So. Why is that? If he had praised your running, C and said that he had seen in the race-course no youth so swift as you, and you had afterwards been outstripped by a powerful runner, who was a full grown man, would his praise of you be any the less true?

Theae. No.

So. Well, is knowledge an easy thing to discover by

the method I have just illustrated, or is it very difficult?

Theae. Beyond a doubt it is the most difficult thing of all.

So. Then be resolute; believe what Theodorus says of you, and, as you have succeeded once, do your very best to get a definition (*λόγος*) of knowledge also.

Theae. I would have it now, Socrates, if you could take the will for the deed.

So. Come then, you made a good beginning just now. As you included many numbers under the class (*εἶδος*) of roots, try to do the same for the many kinds of knowledge, and comprehend them under one definition.

E *Theae.* You must know, Socrates, that time and again I have been stimulated by the reports of your questions to make the attempt, but I could never persuade myself that I had said anything to the purpose; nor have I ever heard anyone else giving such an answer as you demand. Yet the longing to give an answer never leaves me.

So. You are not barren or unfruitful, dear Theaetetus, and are suffering the pains of travail.

Theae. I do not know, Socrates; I only say what I have felt.

149 *So.* Then have you never heard, my simple friend, that I am the son of the well-trained and brawny midwife, Phaenarete?

Theae. Yes, I knew that.

So. And have you heard that I practise my mother's art?

Theae. No, never.

So. Well, it is a fact. But do not, friend, betray me, for I am not known to possess the art. Though you have never heard a whisper of that secret, you have surely heard people say, have you not, that I am a very strange man and make it my business to puzzle folk?

Theae. Yes, I have.

B

So. Shall I tell you the reason ?

Theae. Do.

So. If you will consider the rules of the art of midwifery, you will easily see what I mean. No woman is allowed to practise the art, if she is in a condition to bear children ; she must be past the time for bearing them.

Theae. That is true.

So. They say that the reason for this is that Artemis, who presides at child-birth, is a maiden. Those who were wedded and childless she did not suffer to be midwives, since human nature is too weak C to acquire an art, of which it has no experience. So she assigned the duty to those who, solely by reason of age, were childless in honour of their likeness to herself.

Theae. That is probable.

So. At any rate is it not more than probable that women are recognized to be with child by midwives more readily than by anyone else ?

Theae. It is.

So. And besides, cannot midwives by medicines and charms arouse or allay at their pleasure the pangs of travail, or hasten child-birth in those who have hard D labour, or even, if they think it advisable, cause a miscarriage ?

Theae. They can.

So. Have you not noticed, moreover, that they are inveterate matchmakers, since they are all-wise concerning what kind of men and women should marry, in order to have the best children ?

Theae. I must say that I was not aware of that.

So. But they are. They pride themselves more on that than on the discharge of their special office. E Think a moment. Are not sowing and harvesting the same as knowing what soils are adapted to the various kinds of plants and seeds ?

Theae. Yes, they are the same.

So. Is the question changed, my friend, when you consider the begetting of children and the fittest marriages?

Theae. Not likely.

150 *So.* Not at all. Yet the midwives, who are prudent, abstain from matchmaking, fearing lest they should be confounded with those persons, who bring men and women together in a way which is both unskilful and unlawful; yet it is the part of none but true midwives to unite the sexes rightly.

Theae. I accept your explanation.

So. Now all this is an illustration of my profession, though the parallel fails in the following particular. It never happens that women produce at one time real
B children and at other times mere images, which are not real children but closely resemble them. If they did, the highest and most delicate task of the midwives would be to separate the real from the unreal. Do you not think so?

Theae. Yes.

So. My art has the same general characteristics as theirs. Of course I attend men and not women, and I have to do with travail of soul not bodies. But the great and distinctive feature of my art is to obtain, if
C possible, a touch-stone by which to decide whether the product of the young mind be true or false, an image or a reality. Yet here, too, I am like the midwives, in that I beget no wisdom. People cast it up against me that I put questions, which I am too ignorant myself to be able to answer,—and their reproach is true. But I have this excuse, that it is God who compels me to practise my art, and has closed up the womb of my mind. Indeed I am
D far from wise, nor has my mind ever given birth to any truth at all. Yet some of those who come to me are at first quite ignorant, and as our acquaintance grows they, if favoured by God, progress in a way which astonishes themselves and others. It is clear that they have learned nothing from me; wholly of

themselves have they made many notable discoveries ; yet in this I am the instrument in the hands of God. Now a large number of my patients, overlooking my **E** part in effecting this result and despising me, have taken the credit to themselves. Either of their own accord or by the advice of others they have left me sooner than they should, and betaken themselves to evil companionship. By this course they produced abortions, destroyed by evil nurture that which they had been delivered of by me, and reckoned the image and the false of more value than the true ; at last they themselves saw that others were right in looking on them as utter dunces. Such an one was Aristides, the **151** son of Lysimachus, and there are a great many others. If they at any time return to me, and with many promises of amendment beg for a renewal of our acquaintance, my special monitor (*δαίμόνιον*) in the case of some of them forbids my granting the request. Others are suffered by it to be restored to favour, and renew their interrupted education. Now these followers of mine are in much the same condition as women who are with child. Night and day they are filled with pangs of doubt (*ἀπορία*) more severe than the pains of women, and these pangs my art is able to excite or soothe. But, Theaetetus, this is not always what takes place. Some seem to me to be **B** barren and to have no need of my art. These I, guided by the Deity, gently persuade to go to those whose acquaintance, I judge, would be more profitable to them than mine. Many of them I give into the care of Prodicus, and many also to other marvellously wise men (*σοφοί*). I dwell upon this, my dear friend, because I suspect you to be right in thinking that you are in real travail of mind. Put yourself in my hands, therefore, for I am a midwife and the son of a mid- **C** wife, and strive with your accustomed earnestness to answer my questions. And if, after an examination of any of your statements, I conclude that it is a shadow and untrue, I shall take it away and dispose

of it secretly. But you must not be angry with me because of this treatment, as are women over their first born. Why, my fine lad, some are so enraged at me that they are ready in their foolishness to bite me, whenever I take from them any foolish notion that they have. They do not imagine I do this out of kindness, since they are not aware that no god is ill-disposed to men, and that not even I do anything in malice. But I cannot conscientiously connive at error, and obscure the truth. So, Theaetetus, to go back to the beginning again, try to tell me what knowledge is. Never say that you are not able, for, if God wills, and you play the man, you will be able.

Theae. Indeed, Socrates, after such an exhortation **E** it would be unpardonable in anyone not to say what he thinks. It seems to me that he, who knows, perceives what he knows; so my opinion now is that knowledge is nothing but perception (*αἴσθησις*).

So. Bravely spoken, and nobly have you done your duty. Come now, and let us consider whether your view is something real or an empty pretence. Knowledge is perception, you say?

Theae. Yes.

152 *So.* This is surely no trifling matter, for you have likely given, though in other words, the definition of Protagoras. He says that man is the measure of all things (*πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον*), both of the existence of things which exist, and the non-existence of things which exist not (*τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν*). Have you never read that?

Theae. Yes, many a time.

So. Does he not mean that things exist for me as they appear (*φαίνεται*) to me, and for you as they appear to you, since you and I are men?

Theae. So he says, at any rate.

B *So.* As it is highly probable that a wise man does not talk nonsense, let us look for his meaning. Sometimes when the wind is blowing on all alike is not one

of us cold and another not, or one slightly and another exceedingly cold?

Theae. No doubt.

So. In that case shall we say that the wind in itself (*αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτό*) is cold or not cold? Or shall we agree with Protagoras that it is cold to him who is cold and not to him who is not?

Theae. Protagoras seems to be right.

So. Then it is to each as it appears to him?

Theae. Yes.

So. And what appears is perceived?

Theae. Truly.

So. Then in the case of such things as heat and cold *C* appearance (*φαντασία*) and perception are one and the same. Every such thing, I dare say, exists as it is perceived?

Theae. That would seem to be so.

So. And perception of reality (*τοῦ ὄντος*), since it is knowledge, can never be false?

Theae. So it appears.

So. Then charmingly keen-witted was it of Protagoras to hint darkly at these things to us of the common crowd, while telling the truth to his disciples in secret.

Theae. What do you mean by that, Socrates? *D*

So. I shall tell you of a by no means contemptible theory to the effect that nothing exists purely by itself (*αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*), nor can you rightly give anything an exclusive name. If you speak of the large, you suggest the small, if of the heavy, you suggest the light, and so on. Nothing, be it either an attribute (*τινός*), or a kind of thing (*ὁποιουοῦν*), exists alone (*ἑνός*). Moreover, it is inaccurate to speak of existence as the result of motion, collision and combination, since nothing really exists, but everything is always in process of change (*γίγνεται*). On this point *E* the whole array of wise men, except Parmenides, are agreed, Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, also the most famous names in both kinds of poetry, in comedy

Epicharmus, and in tragedy Homer. When Homer says: Ocean and mother Tethys are the parents of the gods, he means that all the gods have sprung from ceaseless movement (*ρόῃς τε καὶ κινήσεως*). Do you not think that this was his view?

Theae. Yes.

153 *So.* Could we contend with this mighty host, whose captain is Homer, without laying ourselves open to ridicule?

Theae. It would be a risk, Socrates.

So. Yes indeed, Theaetetus, since there are good proofs that what appears to be and comes into existence is produced by motion, and what does not exist and perishes is produced by rest. For example, heat and fire, which produce and nourish everything else, are themselves produced by friction, which is motion. Is not that the source of fire?

B *Theae.* Yes.

So. And has not the race (*γένος*) of animals sprung from the same source?

Theae. It has surely.

So. Why, what else? Is not the fashion (*ἔξις*) of the body destroyed by rest and inaction and preserved largely by exercise and movement?

Theae. Certainly.

So. And the soul, is it not taught and preserved and improved by study and practice, which are motions, while through idleness, neglect and inattention it fails to learn, or what it learns it forgets?

Theae. That is true.

So. Is motion not a good, then, for soul and body, and rest the reverse of good?

Theae. Evidently.

So. May I not say further that storms preserve, while stillness and calm and all such states of rest corrupt and destroy? And I am constrained to give this crowning illustration, that so long as the universe
D and the golden chain, as Homer calls the sun, move

onward in their course, all things divine and human manifestly contrive to exist and are preserved; but, if they should stand still, everything would be destroyed, and then would come to pass the saying that the whole world is turned upside down.

Theae. Your explanation, I think, is clear, Socrates.

So. Consider this, my friend, with regard first of all to the sense of sight. What you call whiteness does not exist in your eyes nor as an object outside of them, nor could you assign to it any particular place, **E** for it would then be something fixed and stationary and not continuously generated.

Theae. How is that?

So. Let us apply our former argument, in which we decided that nothing exists as one thing and utterly by itself, and it will appear that white, black, or any other colour is produced when the glance of the eye comes into contact with the proper motion. What we call a colour is neither the eye nor the object, but **154** something which arises between them, and is different with different individuals. Or, would you contend that a colour appears to you as it does to an animal, a dog for instance?

Theae. No indeed, I would not.

So. Then would you hold that two human beings might have the same preceptions? Are you not sure, rather, that not even to yourself does a thing twice appear the same, since both you and it are continually changing?

Theae. Yes, I feel sure of that.

So. Yet if the object, which we touch and compare **B** in size with ourselves, be large or white or hot, it would not, when contrasted with one thing, be different from what it is when contrasted with another, provided that it itself had suffered no change. Or, if it is the faculty, whether of measuring or touch, which is large or white or hot, then, if it were itself unmodified, it would not be changed merely by experiencing and coming into contact with different objects. So, you see, our

want of thought leads us into amazing absurdities, as Protagoras and his school would say.

Theae. What do you mean by that?

C *So.* You will understand what I mean, if I use a simple illustration. If you take six dice, you would say that they, when compared with four, were more by half as many again, and when compared with twelve they were less and only one-half. Could you deny the truth of that?

Theae. No indeed.

So. Well then, if Protagoras or somebody else says to you, O Theaetetus, can a thing possibly become more or greater, unless it be increased? What will you answer?

D *Theae.* If I answer the simple question as I really think, I must say No, but in view of what you have just said and to avoid a contradiction, I must say Yes.

So. Well and divinely spoken, friend! And yet it strikes me that if you say Yes, it will be with you according to the saying of Euripides: 'The tongue will be unrefuted, but the mind not unrefuted.'

Theae. True.

So. If we had been veteran sophists (δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοί), you and I, and had carefully scrutinized all the things of the mind, we would at the very outset have made an abundant trial of our opponents, as they of us; we
E would have come up to the contest warily (σοφιστικῶς), and there would have been a clashing of words with words. But, as it is, we are only private folks whose foremost wish is to behold things as they are (αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά), and to see if our thoughts are consistent or not.

Theae. That is certainly my desire.

So. And mine. Shall we not, then, as we have lots
155 of time, retrace our steps a little, and examine ourselves calmly and earnestly, in order to see what these images in us are? The first of them we shall, I think, decide to be that nothing ever becomes more or less

either in size or number, while it is equal to itself. Is not that so?

Theue. Yes.

So. And the second is that that, to which nothing is added and from which nothing is taken away, is neither increased nor diminished, but is always equal to itself.

Theae. Assuredly.

So. Is there not a third, that nothing, which did not **B** exist before, can now exist, without becoming and having become?

Theae. Agreed.

So. These three postulates, I think, were striving together in our soul when we spoke of the dice, and are present again in the following instance: Suppose that you were shorter than I at the beginning of the year, but taller at the end, not because I had diminished in size, for men of my age do not change, but because you, who are young, had meanwhile grown. **C** It is manifest that I was once what I was not afterwards, although I had not become. For, as to have become is plainly impossible without becoming, I could not have become smaller without losing in size. And there are thousands of similar instances, if indeed we choose to admit them. I see that you follow me, Theaetetus, for you are likely not unacquainted with such puzzles.

Theae. By the gods, Socrates, when I look into them I am smitten with wonder, and truly sometimes my brain reels.

So. So Theodorus made not a bad guess at your **D** disposition, my friend, since the very state of a philosopher is wonder. Indeed the man seems to have been a wise genealogist who said that Iris was the daughter of Thaumas, for wonder is the only beginning of philosophy. Do you begin to understand what is the solution of your difficulty on the views which we are ascribing to Protagoras?

Theae. Not yet.

E So. Will you count it a favour if I examine with you into the secret reasoning, which is held as the truth by him and other celebrated men?

Theae. I will count it a very great favour.

So. Look over the company, so that no profane person may overhear. For there are people who believe in nothing but what they can fasten upon with both hands, contending that action and generation and all the things, which are not seen, do not exist at all.

156 *Theae.* They must be hardened and repulsive creatures.

So. That they are, my boy, utterly illiterate. But it is another much more subtle sect, of whose mysteries I mean to inform you. Their first principle, that upon which our statement depends, is that all is motion ($\tau\acute{o} \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu \kappa\acute{\iota}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$) or that nothing exists except motion. There are two kinds ($\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\eta$) of motion, each unlimited in its range, to act and to suffer or be acted upon. From the strife and union of these two powers **B** ($\delta\upsilon\nu\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\iota\varsigma$) is produced an innumerable brood twofold in its nature, namely the object of sense, and sense, which is always connate and coincident with it, object. The sensible perceptions are called sight hearing, smell, the sense of hot and cold, and also pleasures, pains, desires and fears. These and many others have names, and there are numberless others without names. Correlative with sight are colours of **C** all kinds, sounds with hearing, and with each of the other senses its kindred objects. Has this tale anything to do, Theaetetus, with what has gone before? Do you know?

Theae. Socrates, I do not.

So. Give heed, then, and you shall see the connection. All these things, as we have said, are in movement. Now in the movement of them there are swiftness and slowness. That which is slow moves in one place, and is affected by things close at hand, and **D** so produces, but the things produced by it are swifter,

since their movement is a change of place. Let us suppose that the eye and its corresponding visible object approach and produce whiteness and the concomitant sensation, a result which would not take place if either the eye or the object came into contact with anything else. When the union of these two occurs, sight moving from the eye and meeting whiteness moving from the object, which helps to produce the colour, the eye becomes filled with vision, and now sees, and becomes not vision but seeing eye. The object, in turn, having aided in making the colour, is filled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness but white, be it wood or stone or any object, which chanced to be of this colour. All other sensations, hard, warm and the rest, must be treated in the same way. Not one of them, as we have said already, can be understood as having any existence of itself (*αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*), but all are produced by movement through union each with its proper counterpart. There can be no solid cognition (*νοῆσαι*), as they say, of either the active element or the passive element taken separately (*ἐπὶ ἐνός*); for there is an active element only as it is found in union with the passive, and a passive element only as it is found in union with the active. The uniting and active element, when it comes into contact with another thing, is to be regarded as passive. Accordingly on all these counts, nothing, as we said at the outset, exists as one thing by itself (*ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*), but everything always becomes for some other thing (*τινι γίγνεσθαι*). Being or existence (*τὸ εἶναι*) must be thoroughly eradicated, though we are often, as just now, compelled, it would seem, through custom and ignorance to make use of the term. And yet, according to the wise (*οἱ σοφοί*), we must not permit anyone to use such expressions as 'it' or 'of it' or 'mine' or 'this' or 'that' or any other name which gives fixity, but only to conform to nature and say that things become, are in process of creation, and are being destroyed and changed. Thus, if anyone in an

argument establishes anything, he is easy to refute. Besides, we must speak in this way not only of
 C separate things but of any collection, such as man, stone, any species of animal or any genus (εἶδος). Do these things seem pleasant to you, Theaetetus, and have they a grateful flavour?

Theae. I am sure I do not know, Socrates, for I cannot decide whether you believe what you say or are only making trial of me.

So. You really forget, my friend, that I know nothing and produce nothing of my own, for I am childless. But I wait on you, and therefore seek to charm you by giving you to taste of every philosopher (σφφός), until at last I may have aided in bringing your theory
 D out into the light. When this is done, I shall see whether it is an empty thing or a genuine reality. So, be bold, and persevere, and answer sturdily to what I ask you.

Theae. Well then, put your questions.

So. Tell me again if you are satisfied that nothing is, but all is ever becoming, the good and beautiful as well as all the things which we have just enumerated.

Theae. To speak frankly, when I hear your argument in detail, I think it very reasonable and must accept it.

E *So.* Let us, then, see the theory completed. It remains to speak of dreams and diseases, especially madness with its illusions of sight and hearing and other senses. In all these cases, as you must admit, the position which we have just taken seems to be refuted, since manifestly there arise in ourselves perceptions which are false. Consequently what appears
 158 to each person is far from being real; on the exact contrary not a single appearance is real.

Theae. You speak truly, Socrates.

So. What argument (λόγος), my boy, is left to him who holds that sensible perception is knowledge, and that each one's appearances (τὰ φαινόμενα) are for him real?

Theae. I hesitate to tell you, Socrates, that I do not know what to say, because you reproved me a moment ago for giving this answer. Yet I cannot, indeed, **B** argue that madmen and dreamers think truly, some in supposing that they are gods, and others in dreaming that they have wings and are flying.

So. Do you not perceive that in these cases, especially in dreams and madness, a rejoinder may be made of this nature?

Theae. Of what nature?

So. You have doubtless often heard it asked: What proof would you give, if you were questioned at this moment whether we are sleeping and dreaming all this discussion, or awake and conversing about a waking thought? **C**

Theae. Truly, Socrates, it would be hard to prove it, for sleep and waking are equally real, and one is the counterpart of the other. There is nothing to prevent our supposing that we are now talking together in our sleep. And when in dreams we seem to be telling our dreams, such a state strangely resembles our waking life.

So. It is not hard, you see, to carry on the dispute, when it may be doubted even whether we are asleep or awake. If we divide time about equally between **D** sleep and waking, in each period our souls are maintaining that their present opinions (*δόγματα*) are true. Thus for one half of our days we say that some opinions are true, and for the other half that different opinions are true. Yet we hold fast by both.

Theae. Clearly.

So. Does not the same argument apply to diseases and madness, except only that the time is not divided equally?

Theae. True.

So. And is the truth to be determined by length or shortness of time?

Theae. That would be absurd. **E**

So. Can you by any other way clearly show on which side the truth is?

Theae. I think not.

So. You shall hear, then, what is said about this by those who determine that what seems (τὰ δοκοῦντα) to anyone to be true is true for him. They would put some such question as this to you, "O Theaetetus, can two things entirely different have the same quality (δύναμις)?" Their question, let us understand, is of things not partially but wholly different.

Theae. Things utterly different cannot possibly
159 have a quality or anything else the same.

So. Must we confess that these things are therefore unlike?

Theae. I should say so.

So. Suppose that a thing happened to become like or unlike itself or another thing, shall we say that what is made like becomes the same, and what unlike different?

Theae. We must.

So. We said before, did we not, that the active elements were many and infinite, and likewise the passive elements?

Theae. Yes.

So. And if a thing combines with different things, the products will be different?

B *Theae.* Surely.

So. Let us apply this to you or me or anything, Socrates sick and Socrates well, for example. Shall we say that these are like or unlike?

Theae. Am I to take Socrates sick as one separate whole, and Socrates well as another?

So. You understand exactly: that is what I mean.

Theae. They are unlike doubtless.

So. And different because unlike?

Theae. Necessarily.

So. And will you say the same of Socrates asleep or
C in the other states we mentioned?

Theae. I would.

So. Then would I not be affected by any active element in nature differently in sickness and in health?

Theae. How could it be otherwise?

So. Would not the active element and I, the patient, produce a different result in each case?

Theae. Certainly.

So. The wine I drink when I am in health appears to me sweet and pleasant?

Theae. Yes.

So. It follows from our previous admissions that the active and passive elements, when they unite, D produce sweetness and the sensation of sweetness. The sensation arising from the patient renders the tongue percipient, and sweetness moving in the wine and arising from it meets the healthy tongue, and causes the wine both to be and to appear sweet.

Theae. That is the consequence of what we formerly admitted.

So. But when I am sick, does not the object affect a person who, because unlike, is really different?

Theae. Yes.

So. In that case Socrates and the drinking of the E wine produce a different result, the sensation of bitterness in the tongue and bitterness moving in the wine. The wine becomes not bitterness but bitter, and I become not perception but perceiving.

Theae. Certainly.

So. There is no other thing, from which I shall ever receive the same perception. The perception of different things is different, and makes him, who perceives, of another nature and another man. Nor 160 does the object, which affects me, produce the same result and become the same object, when it comes into contact with another person. When objects produce different results in contact with different subjects, they become of another nature.

Theae. It is true.

So. The object and I will not become what we are independently of each other.

Theae. By no means.

So. I must become percipient of something when I perceive, for it is impossible in perceiving to perceive B nothing. And when the object becomes sweet or bitter or something else, it must do so for some one, since to become sweet and yet sweet for nobody is not possible.

Theae. Assuredly not.

So. We must conclude that the object and I are or become only one for the other. Necessity couples us to each other, but does not couple our joint existence to any other thing or even to ourselves. Each is bound simply to the other. Accordingly when a thing is said to be or become, it must be spoken of as for or of or in regard to something. The argument, C say, or permit anyone else to say, that anything is or becomes wholly of itself (*αὐτὸ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ*).

Theae. No, by no means, Socrates.

So. When anything, which affects me, exists for me and no other person, is it not perceived by me and no other?

Theae. That is evident.

So. Then my sensation is true for me since it is inseparable from my existence. As Protagoras says, I am judge both of the existence of what is for me and the non-existence of what is not.

Theae. That seems to be the case.

D *So.* If I am infallible and sure-footed in my judgments concerning being (*τὰ ὄντα*) and becoming (*τὰ γιγνόμενα*), how can I fail to know that of which I am the percipient (*αἰσθητής*)?

Theae. Not in any way.

So. Right noble, then, was your decision that knowledge was nothing else than perception. Homer and Heraclitus with their crew, who say that all things flow and are in a state of motion, and the all-

wise Protagoras with his view that man is the measure of all things, and Theaetetus, who concludes from these theories that knowledge is sensation, are **E** all of one accord. Is that not true, O Theaetetus? Shall we call this result the young child at whose birth I have assisted? Or what do you say?

Theae. It must be so, Socrates.

So. This, whatever it may be, is the weary product of our labour. And now in honour of its advent we must carry it round the hearth, and consider whether it is a real thing and worth bringing up or only an **161** empty pretence. What do you think? Should your infant conception be fostered, and not laid aside? Will you endure to see it refuted? Will you not bear a deep grudge against anyone, who may carry away your first-born?

Theo. Theaetetus will endure it, Socrates, for he is not at all perverse. But tell me, I adjure you, whether the theory is not true.

So. You are an undoubted lover of inquiry, Theodorus, and an innocent mortal, too, if you think that I am just a bag of arguments, and can at pleasure pull out the proof that these things are not so. But **B** you do not observe what is going forward; none of the arguments comes from me but always from the one who is conversing with me. As for me, I have just the poor ability to take the argument from some one who knows, and receive it fairly. I shall now try to do this with the view of my young friend, without saying anything myself.

Theo. Take your own way, Socrates; it is admirable.

So. Do you know, Theodorus, that there is something which astonishes me in your friend Protagoras?

Theo. What kind of thing?

So. As a rule I am delighted with his way of expressing the view that what appears to each man is real. But I am surprised that he did not in the very preface of his work on Truth announce that a pig or **C**

dog-faced baboon is the measure of all things, or any other more fantastic creature that has perception. He might have begun by saying with a large and generous disdain that while we stood in awe of his wisdom, as though he were a god, he was really not a whit superior in intelligence to a tadpole, not to speak of man. Does that commend itself to you, Theodorus? If sensation be the touchstone of reality, and any one man's feelings (*πάθος*) as good a test as another's, and any one man's judgment as acute as another's in discerning between truth and error, if every one, as we often said, be his own sole and sufficient authority, and his decisions be true and valid, why in the name of justice, my friend, should Protagoras be wise and esteemed; and be bountifully paid to instruct others, while we are ignorant creatures and must betake ourselves to him? Why should Protagoras invent such a distinction, if each one is the measure of his own wisdom? Are we to say that he is seeking merely to amuse? Regarding my own peculiar art I say not how ridiculous it now appears; but does not the whole province of discourse and argument fall under the same censure? If all opinions are true, the attempt to examine and refute the notions of others is a tiresome and stupendous absurdity. Yet is not this the state of things, if the Truth of Protagoras is true, and if he was not secretly laughing at us, when in his book he utters his puzzling oracles?

Theo. Protagoras was my friend, Socrates, as you have just said, so I cannot see him refuted through admissions of mine, nor can I conscientiously resist your view. Take Theaetetus once more; he seems to follow your lead gently.

B So. If you were to go to a gymnasium at Sparta, Theodorus, would you think it fair to watch the naked athletes, some of them ungainly enough, while you refused in your turn to strip off your clothes and show your form?

Theo. Surely, I would, if I could persuade them to

allow me. And, I can, I think, persuade you not to drag a stiff old man into the gymnasium, but to let me be a witness, while you wrestle with some one younger and more supple.

So. What pleases you pleases me, Theodorus, as the folk who speak in proverbs say. Let us therefore **C** return to the wise Theaetetus. Give us first of all, Theaetetus, your opinion concerning what we have just referred to. Do you not share in the amazement at finding yourself at one stroke equalled in point of wisdom to any man or even to a god? Or do you suppose that the Protagorean measure applies only to men and not to gods?

Theae. Why no, not at all, and I am greatly amazed, as you surmise. When you first explained the meaning of the statement that what seems to each one is **D** for him, I gave a willing consent: but now the aspect of things is entirely changed.

So. You are young, my dear boy, and readily believe and yield to popular arguments. For Protagoras, or some one in his behalf, will make reply: 'O excellent good people, youths and old men, you sit in solemn session and appeal to vulgar prejudice in making the gods the centre of your argument, when their very existence is open to doubt, and any mention of them in **E** speech or writing should be avoided. And you merely repeat what the multitude will eagerly accept, when you say that it is horrible for a man to be reckoned no wiser than an ox. This is not of the nature of absolute proof but only conjecture, which if Theodorus or any other geometrician were to use, he would be unworthy of his profession.' Reflect whether you and Theodorus can permit yourselves in a discussion of this nature to **163** use arguments based on probabilities and conjectures.

Theae. We all agree, Socrates, that it would not be just.

So. Do both of you avouch that the argument must be considered in another way?

Theae. Yes, in quite another way.

So. Let us, then, consider whether knowledge and sensation are the same or different. Our whole discussion has tended in this direction, and to this end we have set on foot so many novel inquiries. Do you agree?

Theae. Assuredly.

B *So.* Shall we admit that all which is perceived by sight and hearing is also known? When a barbarian speaks to us who are ignorant of his language, shall we say that we merely hear him, or both hear and understand? And when we look at letters without understanding them, shall we contend that we do not see them, or that we know them because we see them?

Theae. We shall say, Socrates, that we know the very things which we see and hear. We see and know the shape and colour of the letters, and in hearing we
C know high and low sounds; what we are taught by grammarians and interpreters we do not perceive, and do not accordingly know by sight or hearing.

So. Splendid, Theaetetus, and I shall not ungenerously dispute your statement, but shall let it grow. Yet behold another objection coming upon us, and consider how we may repel it.

Theae. What is that?

So. Here is the question. Is it possible for one,
D who has and keeps safe the memory of what he knows, not to know, when he remembers a thing, what it is that he remembers? I seem to be making too long a story. I mean can one, who has learned and remembers a thing, fail of knowing it?

Theae. Surely not, Socrates. That would be monstrous.

So. Am I then a simpleton? Do you not say that seeing is perceiving and sight perception? Reflect a moment.

Theae. I do.

E *So.* Does it not follow that he who sees knows what he has seen?

Theae. Yes.

So. Well. And memory is surely something, is it not?

Theae. Yes.

So. Is it of nothing or something?

Theae. Of something, of course.

So. Of that, namely, which he has learned and perceived?

Theae. No doubt.

So. What one has seen he sometimes remembers?

Theae. He does.

So. Would he forget if he closed his eyes?

Theae. That would be a ridiculous notion, Socrates.

So. Yet it must be so, if we are to retain the original conditions; but if not, presto, the argument disappears. 164

Theae. I shrewdly suspect that you are right, but I do not clearly understand how you reach this conclusion. Will you explain?

So. This is the way. He who sees, we say, knows what he sees, since sight, perception and knowledge were admitted to be the same.

Theae. Right.

So. If he, who sees and knows what he saw, shuts his eyes, he remembers what he does not see?

Theae. Yes.

So. But what he does not see he does not know, if knowing is seeing.

Theae. True.

So. The consequence is that what he has known and now remembers he does not know, because he does not see, and this we said was an absurdity.

Theae. That is most true.

So. It is evident then that if anyone makes knowledge the same as sensation, he reaches an impossibility.

Theae. Beyond a doubt.

So. We must say, therefore, that the two are different.

Theae. That is the inference.

C *So.* Why then, we must go back to the beginning, and ask once more what knowledge is. Yet what are we about to do, Theaetetus?

Theae. Concerning what?

So. Perhaps we are hurrying from the argument like an ignoble cock, who retires from the contest crowing, before he has won the victory.

Theae. How is that?

So. Although styling ourselves philosophers, we have behaved like Eristics, cunning in fence, who in order to win a point in argument are satisfied with mere
D consistency in words.

Theae. I do not yet perceive your meaning.

So. I shall try to be clear. We asked a moment ago whether one, who had learned and remembered, could fail to know. We proved that he, who saw and shut his eyes, remembered, though not seeing, and were forced to conclude that he did not know, and yet at the same time remembered. But this was impossible. Thus we vanquished at one stroke both the Protagorean fable and yours also that knowledge and perception were the same.

E *Theae.* That is plain.

So. The victory would not have been so easy, if the parent of the first fable had been alive to raise a protest; but now upon the poor orphan we are heaping abuse. As those whom Protagoras appointed its guardians, of whom Theodorus here is one, are unwilling to come to the rescue, we must ourselves give it aid in the name of justice.

Theo. Kallias, the son of Hipponicus, and not I,
165 Socrates, was named the guardian of his orphans. But we soon abandoned the subtleties of dialectic, and devoted ourselves to geometry. You will, however, do us a favour, if you will come to its aid.

So. Very well, Theodorus. Behold the nature of my assistance. Any one might be led to admit more glaring contradictions than these, unless he paid attention to the terms which are ordinarily used in

affirmation and denial. Shall I explain this possibility to you or to Theaetetus?

Theo. To us both, but let the younger reply. He will suffer less discomfiture by a fall. B

So. I shall put a most alarming question: Can he who knows fail to know what he knows?

Theo. What shall we reply, Theaetetus?

Theae. Quite impossible, I should say.

So. Not at all, if you make seeing to be knowing. For you fall into a pit, as they say, so soon as your intrepid opponent claps his hand upon one of your eyes, and asks if you can see his cloak with that eye. What will you do with the fatal question? C

Theae. Not with that eye, I shall say, but with the other.

So. Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time.

Theae. That is true in a way.

So. I do not stipulate for the way, he will reply, nor did I ask in what way you know, but only if you can both know and not know. Now you seem to see what you do not see, and you have admitted that seeing is knowing and not seeing is not knowing. From these premises you can draw your own conclusion.

Theae. The conclusion is the opposite of what I had supposed. D

So. Perhaps, my wondrous lad, you would suffer more of such reverses, should any one proceed to ask you if knowledge can be sharp and dim, or strong and feeble, or if we can know near by and not at a distance. And there are a thousand other questions which a light-armed mercenary, who takes pay for his speeches, will hurl at you from his place of ambush, if you maintain that knowledge is sensation. He will assail you with regard to hearing, smell and the other sensations, continuing his onslaught till you are amazed and confounded by his coveted wisdom. You will be utterly entangled by him, taken captive E

and bound hand and foot, nor will you be let out of durance till you have agreed upon a sufficient ransom. In what way will Protagoras, do you think, come to the succour of his own theory? Shall we try to say?

Theae. By all means.

166 *So.* He will probably despise all the words which we have spoken in defence of him, and will join battle with us in this way: Listen to this amiable Socrates. He terrified a boy by the question whether any one can remember and at the same time fail to know, and then, because the frightened lad was not able to see before him and said 'No,' he held up me as a theme for merriment. But you fail to see the fact, my easy-going friend. If in your criticism of some view of mine he, who is asked a question, gives such a reply as I would have given, and is in error, I am **B** refuted as well as he, but if a different reply, he alone is refuted. In the first place, do you think that any one would admit the memory of a past impression to be of the same nature as the past impression ($\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$)? Far from it. Or that he would hesitate to allow that a man could at the same time know and not know a thing? Or, if he should be afraid to make such an admission, that he would ever grant that one who has become changed is the same man as he was? Or, if he wishes to avoid being ensnared by his words, would he confess that a man was one at all and not many **C** and infinite, as is implied in the nature of change? My noble sir, he will continue, come to the point in an honourable way, and rebut, if you can, my doctrine that the sensations of men are essentially unique ($\textit{\textit{\iota}\textit{\delta}\textit{\iota}\textit{\alpha}\textit{\iota}}$), and that, as a consequence, an appearance becomes, or, if you prefer it, is for him alone to whom it appears. When you speak of pigs and dog-faced baboons, you not only soil my writings with swinish phrase, but influence your hearers to behave in the **D** same way. For I insist that the truth is what I have written; each of us is the measure of what is ($\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$

ὄντων) and of what is not. Yet persons differ from one another in a thousand ways because things are and appear different to each. Far am I from maintaining that there is no such thing as wisdom or a wise man; him, on the contrary, I account wise who converts what appears and is evil to any of us into what is and appears good. And do not, I pray you, attack the letter of my argument, but give special **E** attention to its spirit. Bear in mind, as was said before, that the food of the sick man appears to him bitter and is bitter, but of the healthy man the reverse. Neither of these ought to be or can be wiser than the other. The invalid is not ignorant, nor is the sound **167** man wise, because of his opinion (δοξάζειν). The invalid's condition must simply be changed, since health is better than sickness. All education consists in effecting a change from a worse to a better state, and to this end the physician uses medicine and the sophist words. Nevertheless no one has ever caused anyone who thinks (δοξάζειν) falsely to think the truth in the end. Neither is it possible to think of what is not (τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατόν δοξάζσαι); nor can one think otherwise than he feels, and his feelings are always true. But I admit that men who have depraved minds think depraved thoughts. They are **B** influenced by the good to have other thoughts which are called by the ignorant true. But I hold that states of consciousness (φαντάσματα) are merely better or worse, not, as the inexperienced say, more or less true. And as for wise men, my dear Socrates, far be it from me to call them tadpoles; I call them, some physicians of the body, and some husbandmen of plants. Just as husbandmen, when any plant is drooping, remove its sickly sensations by infusing into it sensations which are healthy, vigorous, and also **C** true, so wise and good rhetoricians urge upon cities to find justice in the honourable and not in the evil. For, whatever things seem to each city to be just and noble are really just and noble while the city so judges

of them. But the office of the wise man is to cause the honourable to be substituted for the evil both in the opinion of the citizens and in reality. The sophist, who can give instruction after this method, is wise, and
D deserves to receive large fees from his pupils. Therefore, while some are wiser than others, no one has a false opinion, and you, whether you will or no, must perforce be a measure. In this way my argument maintains its ground. And you may try to refute it by adducing in your turn an argument covering the issue, or you may proceed, if you like, by the method of questioning, a method not to be eschewed by sensible people, but rather to be cultivated. Adopt this course
E by all means, but deal fairly. There is a great absurdity in saying that one has a high regard for virtue, and then behaving unfairly throughout the whole argument. Unfairness arises when you fail to distinguish between arguing to win a victory and arguing in the spirit of dialectic. In one case there is as much obstruction and trifling as possible; in the other the dialectician, making an earnest effort to set his opponent right, will expose only his private errors and those into which he
168 has been misled by his former associates. If you take this course, those who in the dispute raise vexatious questions will blame themselves, not you. They will follow you and court your favour, but will despise themselves and will seek to be completely changed in character by escaping out of their former selves into philosophy. But if you will take the opposite course, as is usually done, quite another fate will befall you, and your pupils, instead of giving themselves to philosophy
B as they get older, will hate the subject. Take my advice, then; seek the real meaning of the theory that all things are in motion and that appearance is existence for both individual (*ιδιώτης*) and city, reconsidering it with a mind not hostile and disputatious, but calm and open. By this means you will find out whether knowledge and sensible perception are the same or not, but not by adopting a second time the current usage of

words and names, which the multitude (*οἱ πολλοί*) **C** contort in all sorts of ways, whenever they fall into controversy with one another. This, Theodorus, is the aid I give to your friend after my poor ability. It is a meagre offering. If he had been alive, he would have come to his own succour in a more splendid way.

Theo. You jest, Socrates; for you have assisted him valiantly.

So. Kindly spoken, friend. Did you observe, let me ask, that Protagoras blamed us in his speech a moment ago for entrusting the conversation to a boy **D** and arguing from the hesitation of the lad adversely against himself? He said that we were playfully humorous, you remember, and urged the solemnity of his theory, and admonished us to deal with it seriously.

Theo. How could I fail to remember, Socrates?

So. Well, and shall we obey him?

Theo. Surely.

So. But do you see that they are all boys here except you? If we are to follow his injunctions, it is you and I who must earnestly address ourselves **E** to the discussion of his theory. We shall in this way escape the accusation that we are jesting with his view in examining it with boys.

Theo. What do you say? Will not Theaetetus follow your lead in the inquiry better than most men with long beards?

So. True, but not better than you, Theodorus. And do not imagine that I am always to shield your departed friend, while you do nothing. Come with **169** us a little way at any rate, my good man, at least until we see whether you are a measure of diagrams, or all are equally conversant with astronomy and the other subjects, in which you have an established reputation.

Theo. It is difficult, Socrates, to escape being involved in an argument, if one is with you. I was

foolish to say just now that you would not be like the Lacedemonians, and would not mercilessly compel me to strip. Indeed, you more nearly resemble Skirrhon or Antaeus, who grapple with every traveller. The
B Lacedemonians order you to strip or go away, but you fasten upon every one who comes near, and will not let him go until he has stripped and wrestled with you.

So. You thoroughly understand my disease, Theodorus. But I am made of better material than even these by-gone terrors of mankind. Many a Hercules, many a Theseus, men of mighty speech, have set upon me and belaboured me well. Yet I have never with-
C drawn from the arena, as I am singularly fascinated by the place. Do not, then, grudge to try a fall with me for your own sake as well as mine.

Theo. I shall no longer resist your entreaty. Work your will with me. You are spinning my destiny, and I must needs endure to be refuted. But I shall leave myself in your hands only in the matter you have proposed.

So. That will do. But we must be on the watch not
D to fall again into a childish form (*εἰδός*) of words and meet with a second reproof.

Theo. I shall do my best.

So. We must go back and tackle the old question. Let us see whether we were right or not in scorning and despising the theory (*λόγος*), that each person is self-sufficient (*αὐτάρκης*) in point of wisdom, although Protagoras acknowledged the distinction between the better and the worse condition, and said that certain men excelled all others, and were wise. Is not this the case?

Theo. Yes.

So. If indeed he had been here and made this
E admission in person, instead of our yielding the point for him, we would have no need to review and confirm the argument. But now, perhaps, some one may object that we are not competent to grant anything in

his behalf. It will be more satisfactory, therefore, if all can be brought to agree on this point, since the issue is far from trifling.

Theo. You speak truly.

So. Let us seek to extract the admission not in any round about way, but directly from the theory (λόγος) itself.

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Theo. How?

So. Thus. Does he not say that what seems (τὸ δοκοῦν) to each person is for him?

Theo. He does.

So. But surely, Protagoras, we are giving voice to the opinion (δόξα) of man, or rather of all men, when we say that everybody considers himself wiser in some respects than others, and in other respects not so wise as they. In times of great danger, in distress of sickness, or on an expedition, or at sea, men turn for safety to their several rulers as to gods, simply because of their superior knowledge. The world is full of men on the lookout for those who can wisely rule their own lives and the lives and actions of others, both men and animals. There are many, besides, who regard themselves as wise teachers and rulers. Does not all this manifestly indicate that in the judgment of men themselves wisdom and ignorance are found amongst them?

B

Theo. Yes, very clearly.

So. And do they not believe wisdom to be true discernment and ignorance false opinion?

Theo. No doubt.

C

So. What then, Protagoras, shall we do with the argument? Shall we say that men have always true opinion, or sometimes true and sometimes false? In either case opinions will be not always true but both true and false. Would you, Theodorus, or would any follower of Protagoras contend that no one considers the opinions of any other person to be ignorant and false?

Theo. I cannot believe it, Socrates.

D *So.* And yet the argument which says that man is the measure of all things has brought us to this pass.

Theo. How is that?

So. Let us grant to Protagoras that some decision of yours, which you make known to me, is a true opinion for you. Yet will it not be in point for the rest of us to ascertain whether it is really true or not? Or are we to suppose that you think truly always? Are there not indeed thousands ready at a moment's warning to bandy opinions with you and contend that you judge and suppose falsely?

E *Theo.* Yes, Socrates, there is, as Homer says, a multitude which no man can number, and they cause me endless trouble.

So. Are we to say, then, that your opinions are true for you and false for all the world besides?

Theo. That seems to be the inevitable issue of the argument.

So. And what of Protagoras himself? If he were to say that man was not a measure, and everybody were to agree with him, as they would, in that case his written truth would be true for no one. And
171 when he says that man is a measure, and we fail to assent, the truth of the theory must be measured by the number of its adherents.

Theo. It must, if existence is to stand or fall with the opinion of the individual.

So. But that is not the most exquisite part of the joke. Since Protagoras holds that everybody's opinions are real, he must acknowledge that those, who differ from him, think truly.

Theo. Certainly.

B *So.* And if he grants the truth of the opinion of those who disagree with him, must he not acknowledge that his own opinion is false?

Theo. He must.

So. But the others do not admit that they are wrong?

Theo. No indeed.

So. And he admits that this opinion of theirs is true, as we may gather from his writings.

Theo. So it appears.

So. Then Protagoras will be the foremost of all to **C** argue, or rather he, by granting that his opponent thinks truly, will himself admit, that no dog or casual human being is a measure of what he does not know. Is this not so?

Theo. Yes.

So. If his view is contested by everybody, his truth will be true neither for himself nor anyone else.

Theo. My friend is meeting with a severe reverse, Socrates.

So. But manifestly no greater than his due, my dear sir. As he is older, he is very likely wiser than we are. And if he could at this juncture poke his head **D** up out of the under-world, he might accuse me of many foolish things and upbraid you for falling in with them, and then vanish underground again *instantly*. But we must even put up with ourselves, such as we are, and say always what we think. So, could anybody ever own the saying that no one is wiser or more ignorant than another?

Theo. I think not.

So. And here the position, which we credited to Protagoras in our defence of him, may find support. **E** For it was then said that many sensations, such as hot, dry, sweet, and others of that nature, really are as they seem to each individual. It was suggested too that, if the opinions of persons could ever be said to be of unequal value, this difference would arise not in regard to sensations but in such cases as sickness and health. Women and children and mere animals cannot, as a rule, cure themselves, owing to their ignorance of what is really salutary. Here, if anywhere, a distinction may be drawn between one man and another.

Theo. I think so.

So. And then in the sphere of politics the honour- **172**
able and shameful, the just and unjust, that which is

and is not sacred, are determined in every case by the special regulations which each city makes for itself. In these matters no one is wiser than another, whether individual or city. But on the other hand it must be allowed that in the matter of expediency (*συμφέροντα*) one counsellor may excel another and one city may be **B** wiser than another. No one will have the hardihood to say that the course which a city decides upon as the most expedient for itself will be unquestionably the most expedient. But where the just and unjust, the sacred and profane, are involved, the disciples of Protagoras will hasten to maintain that these things by their very nature (*φύσις*) can have no essence (*οὐσία*) of their own, but are matters of opinion and agreement (*τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν*) and vary accordingly. And many, who do not altogether hold with Protagoras, promote this philosophy. But the argument is taking a new direction, which may be longer than the **C** original.

Theo. Have we not time, Socrates?

So. We seem to have. Often indeed, friend, at other times, as well as now, have I noticed how likely it is that those, who spend much time in the study of philosophy, will provoke laughter, when they appear at court, and make a speech.

Theo. In what way?

So. Those, who from their youth have frequented law-courts and such places, have received the nurture of slaves, while those, who have been reared in studies **D** like philosophy, are free men.

Theo. Why do you say this?

So. Philosophers have, as you said, time to spare, and conduct their debates with easy leisure, opening up a second fresh discussion, or like ourselves just now a third, if the new subject pleases them better than the old, being indifferent to the number of their words if only they reach existence. But the flowing water of the clepsydra, hurrying the lawyer through his speech, **E** keeps him in a state of agitation, and prevents him

from enlarging as he might desire. His opponent stands beside him, holding him to the law, and by means of a written outline, which they call the affidavit, confines him rigidly to the point at issue. Each is arguing with his fellow-slave before a master, who keeps the case in his hands. The contest is always a personal matter, the result being of the deepest concern to the two who are at strife, since many a time it is a race for life. Accordingly the participants become keen and shrewd, skilled in the use of flattering words and in the art of currying favour. Their souls become dwarfed and grovelling, being deprived by life-long slavery of mental enlargement, uprightness and independence. While yet untried, they were confronted by dangers and fears, and they, unable because of their ill nurture to meet them openly and honestly, fell away to deception, and made false accusations against one another. Becoming in this way utterly stunted, shrivelled, and corrupt, with minds diseased, they have passed from youth to manhood, and have turned out, as they think, clever and wise. This, Theodorus, is a picture of the lawyer. Shall I now proceed to sketch by way of contrast a member of our band? Or shall we pass him by, and return to the argument, in order not to abuse our rightful liberty by too lengthy a digression?

Theo. Give the counter picture by all means, Socrates. You have well said that members of our profession are not the slaves of the argument, but that it must rather obey us, and wait till we see fit to complete it. We are not poets, to be directed and condemned by judge or spectator.

So. We shall describe at your desire the leaders of the chorus; for why should we speak of the crowd who pursue philosophy frivolously? Those who stand foremost in this subject of study have never from their childhood, I ween, known the way to the agora, or where a law-court is, or council chamber, or any other meeting-place of the citizens. The laws

and decrees, whether spoken or written, they neither hear nor see, nor are they present at the taking of the votes. The zeal of partizans for office, their gatherings and banquets and their making merry (κῶμος) with singing girls, do not disturb them even in their dreams. What has been well or badly transacted in the city, or what infamy may attach to anyone from his ancestors either by his father's or mother's side, of this he is as ignorant as he is of the number of drops of
E water in the ocean. Nor is he aware that he knows none of these things, for he does not keep himself aloof from them for the sake of reputation. But in reality it is his body only which remains and abides in the city, while his mind, scorning fame and high descent as dross and vanity, flies everywhere, as Pindar would say, measuring the things under and upon the earth and above the heavens, and inquiring
174 into the nature of each separate thing taken as a whole (πάσαν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου ὅλου), although not descending to anything that is close at hand.

Theo. What do you mean by that, Socrates?

So. It happened one day, Theodorus, to the astronomer Thales that while looking intently upwards he tumbled into a well, and a bright and lively Thracian maid got a jest from the accident, saying that in his eagerness to know what was in heaven he could not see what was around him and under his feet. Now the same joke can be made against all students of philo-
B sophy. They are indeed quite innocent as to what their nearest neighbour is about, and almost whether or not he is a human being: but what man is, and what it behoves him, as distinguished from every other creature, to do or suffer, into all this they make diligent inquiry. Do you understand me now, Theodorus?

Theo. I do; and you speak truly.

So. Therefore, my friend, when he chances to hold a
C public or private conversation with anyone, when he is compelled to enter a law-court, as we said at the beginning, or some such place, and engage in a dis-

cussion concerning the things before his eyes and under his feet, he is a fruitful subject for merriment not only to Thracian maidens but to the whole company, tumbling into pitfalls and getting into all sorts of embarrassments because of his ignorance, and behaving so awkwardly that people look upon him as a kind of booby. If he is shamefully treated, he does not retaliate, as he has no private grudge, and he is regarded as ridiculously insipid because he knows no evil of any one, and is without any appetite for gossip. When others are praised and eulogized, he is only **D** unfeignedly amused, and is for this also counted as a manifest simpleton. When he hears a tyrant or king belauded, it is in his estimation much as if some herdsman, a swine-herd, shepherd, or cow-herd, were praised for his large stock of serviceable beasts: with this difference, that he thinks of a herd of cattle as less treacherous and ungovernable than the animal tended and milked by the tyrant. And as for the ruler he must become even more rude and uncultured than a herdsman, for he is always hard at work and **E** girt in by his stone walls as by the sides of a mountain cavern. When it comes to the ear of the student of philosophy that some one owns a thousand acres or more, this marvellous possession is for him an unconsidered trifle, since he has been wont to view the whole earth. They who sing of pedigree, how that some are noble because they count seven rich ancestors, are to him of dull and narrow sight, being unable in **175** their ignorance to fix their eyes upon the whole of time, or to reflect that everyone has had myriads of forefathers and ancestors, amongst whom are numbered rich and poor, kings and slaves, both barbarians and Greek. When they boast that in their genealogical tree the five and twentieth ancestor was Hercules, the son of Amphytryon, they forget in their petty arithmetic that Amphytryon's five and twentieth **B** ancestor was nobody in particular, and that he in turn had a fiftieth: and our philosopher smiles at their

meagre reckonings, and fatuous absorption in their own vain and foolish selves. In all this, however, he is ridiculed by the multitude, in part because he has a proud bearing, as they think, in part because he is ignorant of what is at his feet, and in matters of detail is always at fault.

Theo. What you say is quite true, Socrates.

So. But his turn is sure to come, my friend. When **C** he lifts the other up, and bids him mount out of questions of private injury into the consideration of justice and injustice, as each is in itself and as they differ between themselves and from all other things, or when they turn from the question whether the rich king is happy to inquire into kingship and human happiness and misery generally, I mean of what nature they are and what manner of man ought to be happy and escape misery, when such questions as **D** these are to the fore, and that small shrewd legal body must give an answer, then it is that we have the other side of the story. For, suspended aloft at such an unusual height and looking into mid-air, he becomes dizzy and dismayed, his want of wit and incoherent babble furnishing forth a jest not to Thracian maidens or any of the uncultured, who fail to appreciate the situation, but to all of a liberal mind. That, Theodorus, is a sketch of the two men; on the one hand of the child **E** of freedom and leisure, I mean the philosopher, who has surely no taint of blame if he is foolish and at a loss, when it falls to him to perform some such servile duty as to pack a trunk, or flavour a sauce, or make a fawning speech; and on the other hand of the man who can do all these services quickly and with despatch, but cannot cast his cloak on his shoulder gracefully, and does not know any music of speech, **176** with which to celebrate in song the true life of the gods and of happy men.

Theo. If, Socrates, you could convince everybody as firmly as you do me, there would be more peace and fewer evils amongst men.

So. Evil cannot be destroyed, Theodorus, for there must always be something to oppose what is good. It can find no place in the home of the gods, but of necessity moves upon the earth and in our mortal frames. We must therefore make haste to flee thither away from here, and if we do this we shall be like God (*ὁμοίως ᾤεω*) as far as we can. And to be like Him is to become just and holy and wise. But, my good friend, it is difficult to persuade the many that these are the true reasons for shunning evil and seeking virtue, and not, as they think, in order to have the appearance of goodness. The notions of the many are as absurd as a grandam's fable. Let us speak the truth; God can never be unjust, but is wholly just, and nothing can be more like Him than the perfectly just man. By this means we distinguish genuine worth from worthlessness and puerility; for to know the nature of God is wisdom and true virtue, and not to know it is sheer ignorance and vice. All other wisdom or ability, whether in politics or in the arts, is common-place and mean. It is far better to oppose the idea that the men, who are unjust, profane or unrighteous in word or deed, are clever in their villany. They glory in their shame and imagine that they hear themselves spoken of not as good-for-nothing encumbrances but as exemplary citizens. They must be told that their worthlessness is in proportion to their false opinion of their value. They are ignorant of what they most of all should know, that the consequence of injustice is not lashes and death, which the wrong-doer sometimes escapes, but a punishment which is inevitable. E

Theo. What is that?

So. Reality (*τὸ ὄν*) contains two patterns (*παράδειγματα*), my friend, one divine and blessed, the other ungodlike and loathsome; those who live unjustly do not see in the extremity of their folly and blindness that they are becoming like the earthly pattern and unlike the divine, and their reward is that their life is 177

in harmony with the corresponding pattern. If we say to them that unless they abandon their unscrupulous ways they, when they die, will not be admitted into the place that is pure of evil, and in this world will be given over to things which are in conformity with their unworthy behaviour, they in their abounding cunning and craft will look on us as giving the counsel of fools.

Theo. That they will, Socrates.

- B** *So.* I know it, my friend. Yet one noteworthy thing befalls them. If they are willing to discuss in private their objection to philosophy, and wait manfully and unflinchingly to see the matter out, then, strange to say, my excellent friend, they lose their satisfaction in themselves, their brilliant rhetoric fades, and they become as a little child. But let us have done with these interruptions or asides, or they will
- C** rush in and overwhelm the main subject. We shall resume our task, if you do not object.

Theo. To me, Socrates, the asides are the most pleasing, since they are more easily followed by one of my age. But, if you wish, let us return to the argument.

- So.* We broke off just about where the promoters of the doctrines that existence is in motion and that what seems to each man is for him the only reality were, as we said, proceeding to insist that the laws,
- D** which any city makes, are for it just, so long as they remain in force. This they affirmed of justice in distinction from the good. Concerning the good no one, they continued, is so bold and venturesome as to insist that what the city enacts as beneficial (*ὠφέλιμα*) is really beneficial all the time that it remains a statute, unless he confines his argument to a question of mere words. But he who disputes about words brings the discussion into ridicule. Do you not assent?

Theo. Yes.

- E** *So.* Let our concern be not for the name but for the thing signified by the name.

Theo. Very good.

So. By whatever name it be known, the beneficial or the good is aimed at by the city in making its laws, and the laws are in fact beneficial just in proportion to the city's knowledge and power. Or is there any other object in legislation?

Theo. None.

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So. Does a city always achieve its aim, or does it make many failures?

Theo. It seems to me that it sometimes fails.

So. Your conclusion will be more generally accepted, if we examine into the nature of the beneficial as a whole. Now the expedient or beneficial refers to future time, for when we make laws we wish them to be beneficial hereafter, that is to say in future.

Theo. Certainly.

B

So. Let us now summon Protagoras or one of his interpreters and set our difficulties before him in this way: Man, according to you, Protagoras, is the measure of all things, white, heavy, light and every other such thing, since of these things he has the criterion (*κριτήριον*) within himself, and in thinking as he feels he thinks what is for himself true and real. Is not that his view?

Theo. It is.

So. Then, Protagoras, we must ask if the individual has in himself the criterion of the future also. Do C things, that are going to be, happen according to his present expectations? Let us take the case of future heat. If some one thinks that he is about to have a fever and to feel the heat of the fever, but the doctor thinks just the opposite, according to whose opinion will the future come to pass? Or will both be right, and heat really happen for the person in question but not for the doctor?

Theo. That would be ridiculous.

So. In the matter of newly made wine, whether its flavour is in time to be sweet or harsh, the husbandman's D opinion (*δόξα*) would have authority over a musician's.

Theo. Why, of course.

So. Of a future harmony or discord the estimate of the musician would be nearer the mark than that of the gymnast, as would be acknowledged by the gymnast when the music was played.

Theo. No doubt.

So. When a feast is toward, and the table is to be furnished with delicacies, the judgment (*κρίσις*) of the cook will rule in preference to the judgment of a mere
E guest. For, observe, our point is whether each one is the best judge for himself concerning a pleasure not now present or past but future and about to be. Would not you, Protagoras, predict what kind of speech would carry conviction to each of us at a court of justice more accurately than any private person?

Theo. Indeed, Socrates, he professed to have no peer in that.

So. Why so he did, good man. Would people have
179 gone to his lectures and given him money, if he had really persuaded them that no one was a prophet to forecast any event, but that anyone was quite able to read the future for himself?

Theo. Evidently not.

So. Does not legislation look to the greatest future advantage? And shall we not all grant that a city in legislating must often come short of its aim?

Theo. No doubt.

So. Then shall we not reasonably say in opposition
B to your teacher that he must allow one man to be wiser than another, and the wiser to be a measure? But it is by no means compulsory upon me who am ignorant to be a measure, although the argument urged in his behoof would have forced me to wear the title.

Theo. In that matter the argument of Protagoras seems to me to be quite at fault, Socrates, and also in considering as authoritative the opinions of those who openly refused to accept his statements.

C *So.* Many other faults can be found with the

doctrine that everyone's opinions are true. But his present feelings (*πάθος*), out of which arise sensations and corresponding opinions, it is not so easy a matter to convict of error; perhaps I am wrong in thinking it to be even possible. These feelings may, indeed, chance to be true, and the view that they are knowledge may be clear and incontestable. Hence Theaetetus in making knowledge identical with sensation may be not so wide of the mark. Let us yield to the injunction of the D champion of Protagoras, and proceed to sound the metal of the doctrine that all existence is in movement, and see if it rings true or not. We are entering upon no trivial conflict, and have a host of opponents.

Theo. Very far from trifling, for the theory has spread throughout Ionia and is valiantly supported by the school of Heraclitus.

So. The more urgent need for inquiry, my dear Theodorus, and for considering their question from the beginning point by point, as they have laid it E down.

Theo. It is very necessary, Socrates. For as to these views which may be traced to Heraclitus, or, as you say, Homer or some one older still, it is as possible to converse with lunatics as with the Ephesians, who claim to be familiar with them. They, in accordance with their scripture, are always in motion; to dwell on any point in the argument, or quietly to speak and answer in their turn, is utterly beyond them. They 180 are, I should rather say, forever on the *qui vive*. If you ask one of them anything, he forthwith plucks from his quiver one of his subtle phrases and lets fly at you, and, if you ask for the meaning of his saying, he will at once smite you with another outlandish novelty. You will make no headway with any of them; nor, indeed, do they agree amongst themselves; they are on the watch against giving to any fixed thing a place either in their argument or in their B minds, because of their idea, as I suppose, that such

a thing would be at rest. With the stationary they are at war, and would, if they could, do away with it altogether.

So. Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen them only in fighting humour, and not been with them when they are disposed to peace, as they are no friends of yours. But when at ease, they probably speak of established principles to their pupils, whom they desire to make like themselves.

Theo. What pupils, my fine sir? These people are **C** not pupils one of another: they spring up spontaneously wherever they happen to catch an inspiration. Each of them believes that no one else knows anything. As I was saying, they will never willingly or unwillingly render you a reason. We must just take the problem (*πρόβλημα*) away from them, and investigate it for ourselves.

So. That is reasonable. And, as for what you call the problem, is it not handed down from of old, hidden **D** away from the many in poetry, that the progenitors of all things are two streams, Oceanus and Tethys, and that nothing stands fast? And has not this secret been in recent times revealed by men wiser than their fathers, whose purpose it is that the very cobbler may hear their wisdom and be enlightened, ceasing from his idle fancies that some things were fixed and that others changed, and learning that all were in movement? And are these teachers not therefore held in worshipful esteem? It had almost slipped my memory, Theodorus, that this theory is opposed by **E** others, who say: 'One thing only is unmoved, and it is named the All,' a view put forward by Melissus, Parmenides, and their disciples, who further urge that all is one and stands fast within itself (*ὡς ἐν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἑστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ*), and has no space in which to move. What, my friend, are we to do with these two hostile forces? For, as we were going softly forward, we have fallen unawares between **181** them, and, if we cannot defend ourselves and escape,

we must pay the penalty. We may liken ourselves to players in the palaestra, who are on a line, and, being seized by parties at each side, are pulled in two ways at once. We must, I think, consider first those whom we encountered at the outset, "the river-folk," and, if they speak to the point, we shall second their efforts to draw us away from their opponents. But if the words of "the steadfast gentry," who advocate the whole, seem to be nearer the truth, we will go over to them, and abandon those who would move the immovable. If neither side has anything authentic to B say, we will be in a ludicrous plight, fancying that we poor creatures could make a suggestion, while at the same time withholding our approval from men of great antiquity and wisdom. Think, Theodorus, before we proceed. Is it wise for us to run so great a risk?

Theo. Anything short of a full investigation of both views could not be endured.

So. We must proceed with the examination, as you are so peremptory. And we must, it seems to me, ask in the first place what they really mean by motion (κίνησις), when they say that all is moved. Let me C explain. Do they say that there is only one kind (εἶδος) of motion or, as I think, two different kinds? And I would like you also to have an opinion. Share the responsibility with me, and let us be worsted, if need be, together. Tell me, when a thing changes its place or turns around in the same place, would you not call this motion?

Theo. I would.

So. Let us suppose this to be one kind (εἶδος) of motion. When, again, a white thing, without changing its place, becomes black through age, or a hard thing D soft, or any such alteration occurs, is the alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) not fitly described as another sort of motion?

Theo. I think so.

So. Without a doubt. I conclude that there are two kinds of motion, alteration and change of place (περιφορά). why
an alt
conside
move me

what is κίνησις and
ἀλλοίωσις

Theo. You are right.

So. With this distinction before us let us present to those, who say that all things are in movement, this question:—Do you hold that everything moves in two ways, changes its place and undergoes alteration, or that some things move in two ways, and others in one way only?

Theo. I do not know, I am sure; but they would answer, I conjecture, that it always moves in both ways.

So. Surely, my friend, otherwise things would both move and stand still, and you could no more say that all things are in motion than that they are at rest.

Theo. That is quite true.

So. If things are in movement, every single thing must move, and that, too, always and with every kind
182 of motion.

Theo. It must.

So. Here is a point to consider. Did they not, in our previous outline of their position, explain the origin (*γένεσις*) of heat and whiteness and every such thing in this way, that each of these in company with a sensation moved between the agent and the patient, and thereupon the patient became percipient but not perception, and the agent became definitely qualified but not quality? The word 'quality' (*ποιότης*) is to you, I dare say, uncouth, and you may not understand it when used in this general sense, so I shall give you
B instances. My meaning is that the active element becomes not heat or whiteness but hot or white. Call to mind what we have already said, that no single thing, either agent or patient, can exist solely by itself, (*αὐτο καθ' αὐτό*) but that each of them exists for the other, and that these two, the sensation and the object of sense, unite to produce on the one hand definitely qualified things and on the other hand percipients.

Theo. I remember this well.

So. Let us pass over the other details, and keep

before us only the main question. Everything moves **C** and flows, as you say. Is not this the chief point?

Theo. Yes.

So. Do not all things move in two distinct ways, by change of place and by alteration?

Theo. They must, if they are to move throughout.

So. We could tell definitely the nature of an object moving and flowing, if it only changed in place without being altered, could we not?

Theo. Easily.

So. But if the quality is not fixed, and the white **D** stream is itself always flowing on, never resting white, but changing and moving into a stream of another colour, can we rightly name the colour of any object?

Theo. By no possible means, Socrates, and it is the same with any quality, if the object always flows and eludes us as we speak.

So. And of sensation what shall we say, of sight or hearing, for example? Is there any stability in **E** sight or hearing?

Theo. None, if all things are in motion.

So. Then we may not speak of seeing any more than of not seeing, or of perceiving, in general, any more than of not perceiving, if everything is changing utterly.

Theo. Not at all.

So. Yet sensible perception is knowledge, so Theaetetus and I affirmed.

Theo. This was said.

So. Then our answer to the question 'What is knowledge?' applied no more to knowledge than to what is not knowledge.

Theo. So it would seem.

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So. This is a fine result of our attempt to justify our answer that knowledge is perception, and to establish its truth by an earnest appeal to the principle of motion. For if all things move, any answer to any question is right. We may say of

anything 'It is so' or 'It is not so,' or rather we should say 'It becomes so;' if we are not to impede the flow of the argument.

Theo. You say truly.

So. Except indeed for my saying 'so' and 'not so.' 'So' and 'not so' are words which we must not use, as **B** there is no movement in them. Indeed the advocates of motion now have, according to their own hypothesis, no language, and must set to work to invent one. They might indeed adopt the phrase 'in no way,' which would be convenient because of its indefiniteness.

Theo. Such a form of speech (*διάλεκτος*) would be most in keeping with their views.

So. Then, Theodorus, we have dismissed your friend, and we do not yet consent that every man is the **C** measure of all things, but only a man of wisdom (*φρόνιμος*). Nor shall we concede that knowledge is sensation, not at any rate on the ground that all things are in motion, unless our friend Theaetetus has at hand some other evidence.

Theo. You have well said, Socrates, and your argument is complete. And now that this matter of Protagoras is settled, I must ask you to abide by the agreement, and release me from answering.

Theae. Not, Theodorus, before Socrates and you have analyzed the doctrine of those who say that **D** everything is fixed, as you proposed.

Theo. Do you, Theaetetus, you stripling, advise your elders to an unjust breach of the agreement? Come, make yourself ready to reply to Socrates during the rest of the colloquy.

Theae. If he desires it, although I would have greatly preferred his taking the course I suggest.

Theo. You invite horsemen to the open plain when you challenge Socrates to an argument. Ask only, and you will hear.

So. But I am afraid, Theodorus, that I cannot obey **E** the orders of Theaetetus.

Theo. How is that?

So. I would be averse to thrusting my rough questions upon any who, like Melissus, hold that the all ($\tauὸ \piᾶν$) is one and steadfast; but it would fill me with peculiar shame to treat in this way Parmenides, their chieftain, who seems in my eyes to be, as Homer would say, "venerable and dread." I met him when he was an old man and I was quite young, and he appeared to me to have a profound and noble mind. 184
 I fear that we may not follow his words, and may fail still more to catch their meaning. But I am especially afraid that our main question concerning the nature of knowledge would be lost sight of in the confusion caused by a host of revellers, who would rush upon us pell-mell, if they were not restrained. Besides we would set on foot a new and boundless topic, which it would be disgraceful to examine hurriedly, and yet a fair treatment would be so lengthy as wholly to obscure our present subject of debate. Neither course can be entertained. We must rather try to deliver Theaetetus of his view of knowledge. B

Theo. Let us do so, if you think it best.

So. Once again, Theaetetus, address yourself to our former inquiry. You answered that knowledge was sensible perception, did you not?

Theae. Yes.

So. If some one were to put this question to you, With what does a man see white and black colours and with what does he hear high and low tones? you would say, I think, with his eyes and ears.

Theae. I should.

So. To handle names and terms freely and without C
 critical minuteness is often a mark of wide culture, and though the opposite is as a rule churlish, it is sometimes, as in the present instance, a necessity. For I must indicate a want of exactness in this very answer. Reflect, is it more correct to say that it is with the eyes ($\acute{o}\phi\theta\alpha\lambda\mu\acute{o}\iota\varsigma$) that we see or through them ($\delta\iota' \acute{o}\phi\theta\alpha\lambda\mu\acute{\omega}\nu$), and that it is with the ears or through them that we hear?

Theae. I think 'through' is better, Socrates.

D *So.* Surely, for it would be a singular thing, my lad, if each of us was, as it were, a wooden horse, and within us were seated many separate senses, since manifestly these senses unite into one nature (*ιδέα*), call it the soul or what you will; and it is with this central form through the organs of sense that we perceive sensible objects.

Theae. I agree with your view; the contrary would indeed be singular.

So. I am precise with you, in order to find out if it is with one and the same part of ourselves that we have various impressions, although at the same time
E through different faculties. Would you, if you were asked, refer all our impressions to the body? But perhaps you would answer better without my interference. Tell me, then, do you assign the faculties, through which you perceive hot and hard and light and sweet, to the body or to something else?

Theae. To the body.

So. And would you be willing to allow that what you perceive through one faculty (*δύναμις*) you cannot
185 perceive through another? You cannot, that is, hear through the eye or see through the ear?

Theae. I grant that readily.

So. If you make a judgment common to the two organs (*ὄργανα*), you cannot perceive it through either of them.

Theae. Certainly not.

So. In the case of sound and colour you may surely decide that they both are.

Theae. Surely.

So. Is not each different (*ἕτερον*) from the other and the same (*ταυτόν*) with itself?

B *Theae.* No doubt.

So. They are two and each is one?

Theae. I grant that also.

So. You would be able to observe whether they are like or unlike each other?

Theae. Probably.

So. Through what do you make these several judgments? For it is not possible either through hearing or sight to get anything common to the two (τὸ κοινόν). Let us take an illustration. Suppose it to be a sensible question to ask whether you judge colours and sounds to be saline or not, you would be able to say what faculty you would use in order to decide, and this faculty would be not sight or hearing C but some other.

Theae. Another of course, the faculty of taste.

So. That is well said. And what faculty will reveal to you the common elements not only of sensible qualities, but of all things, those elements, I mean which you call being (τὸ ἔστί) and not being (τὸ οὐκ ἔστί) and the others, about which we were speaking a moment ago? To what organ will you attribute our perception of each of these?

Theae. You allude to being (οὐσία) and not being (τὸ μὴ εἶναι), likeness (ὁμοιότης) and unlikeness, the same (τὸ ταυτόν) and the other (τὸ ἕτερον), and unity (ἓν) also, and other numbers applicable to things, and you evidently wish to know through what bodily instrument the soul perceives odd (περιττόν) and even (ἄρτιον) and all that is akin to them.

So. You follow me surpassingly well, Theaetetus: that is just what I want.

Theae. Verily, Socrates, I cannot tell what to say, if not that these things unlike sensible objects seem to need no special organ, but that the soul contemplates the common elements (τὰ κοινά) of all things through E itself (δι' αὐτῆς).

So. You are beautiful, Theaetetus, and not ill-favoured, as Theodorus said, for he who says beautiful things, is beautiful and good. And not only are you beautiful but you have done well in delivering me from a long harangue, if you are satisfied that some things the soul contemplates through itself and others through the bodily faculties. For that was

my opinion too, and I was anxious for you to agree with me.

186 *Theae.* I am convinced of the truth of that.

So. On which side would you place being, which is in a unique way associated with all things?

Theae. I would place it amongst those things, which the soul strives to grasp of itself (*καθ' αὐτήν*).

So. And would you place there the like and unlike, the same and the other?

Theae. Yes.

So. And what of the noble and base, good and evil?

Theae. In this case quite specially the soul views the essence (*οὐσία*) of each in relation to its opposite,
B contrasting within itself the past and present with the future.

So. Stay a moment. Does the soul not perceive the hardness of a hard object through the touch, and in the same way the softness of a soft object?

Theae. Yes.

So. But the essence and existence of these, and the opposition of each to the other, and the essence of this opposition, the soul itself judges, bringing them all together and passing them in review.

Theo. Certainly.

So. Men and animals from their very birth perceive
C by nature those feelings (*παθήματα*) which reach the soul through the body; but reflections (*ἀναλογίσματα*) on the essence of these and on their use come to those who have them only after effort and with the lapse of years through education and a wide experience.

Theae. That is very true.

So. Is it possible to gain truth, if we have no hold of being?

Theae. Impossible.

So. If we fall short of the truth of anything, can we be said to know it?

D *Theae.* By no means, Socrates.

So. Then in feelings there is no knowledge but only in reasonings (*συλλογισμοί*) upon them, for in

reasonings it is possible to touch being and truth, but in feelings it is impossible.

Theae. That is evident.

So. Do you call reasonings and feelings the same, when they differ so widely?

Theae. That would hardly be just.

So. What name do you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being warm?

Theae. Perceiving I would call them. I have no **E** other name.

So. Perception then, you say, covers them all?

Theae. It must.

So. And this has no share in truth, because it lays not hold on being.

Theae. None.

So. Then it has no share in knowledge.

Theae. No.

So. Then, Theaetetus, sensible perception and knowledge will never be the same.

Theae. Clearly not, Socrates; indeed it is now quite evident that knowledge and sensation are different.

So. But we entered on our conversation to find out **187** not what knowledge is not, but what it is. Yet we have made some advance, because we no longer look for knowledge in perception but in that employment, whatever it is called, in which the soul purely of itself (αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν) busies itself with existence (τὰ ὄντα).

Theae. That I would call opinion (δοξάζειν), Socrates.

So. You think rightly, my friend. And now turn back to the beginning and, setting aside your prejudices, look if the discussion has not thrown a clearer **B** light upon our path, and once more say what knowledge is.

Theae. I cannot say that it is opinion, Socrates, since opinion is true and false, but it may perhaps be true opinion (ἀληθὴς δόξα). Let this be my reply; and if it like the last turns out incorrect, we shall make a third attempt.

So. It is much better to speak in this determined

way, Theaetetus, than to reply hesitatingly, as you were doing before. For, if we persevere, one of two things **C** will happen. Either we will attain our object, or we will be less apt to fancy that we know what we do not know; and even this would be no slight reward. You say, then, that there are two kinds of opinion, the true and the false, and you define knowledge as true opinion, do you not?

Theae. I do; that is what I now think.

So. Is it worth our while to reopen the question concerning opinion?

Theae. What was the question?

So. One which has often perplexed me, and always leaves me in great doubt, whenever the experience **D** happens to myself or to another, for I cannot satisfactorily say what this affection ($\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma$) is, and how it has arisen.

Theae. To what do you refer?

So. To this false opinion, and I am not yet resolved whether we shall now pass it over, or examine it a second time in another way.

Theae. By all means let there be a discussion, if it is to serve any good purpose. Theodorus and you well said a moment ago that in these matters there was no need for haste.

E *So.* That is a seasonable reminder, and it may be an advantage to retrace our steps; it is better to accomplish little well than much imperfectly.

Theae. No doubt.

So. Then let us to our task. Do we not say that there is false opinion, and that it is natural for some of our opinions to be false and others true?

Theae. We do.

188 *So.* Must we not in regard to each and every thing either know or not know? I omit for the present the intermediate processes of learning and forgetting, as they have nothing to do with the subject in hand.

Theae. Nothing remains for us in that case, Socrates, but either knowing or not knowing a thing.

So. Then must not he, who has an opinion, have an opinion of what he either knows or does not know?

Theae. He must.

So. And if he knows, it is impossible for him not to know, or if he does not know to know? B

Theae. Quite.

So. Then he, who has false opinion, supposes that what he knows is not what it is, but something else which he knows, and knowing both, is ignorant of both?

Theae. That is not possible, Socrates.

So. Then does he regard what he does not know as some other thing which he does not know? Does he who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates take Socrates for Theaetetus or Theaetetus for Socrates?

Theae. That cannot be. C

So. He cannot imagine that what he knows is what he does not know, or what he does not know is what he knows.

Theae. That would be singularly absurd.

So. How then can anyone have a false opinion? For we have mentioned all forms of opinion, either when we know a thing or when we do not know it, and false opinion cannot, it seems, be found amongst them.

Theae. That is very true.

So. Let us look at the question in another way, by passing from knowing and not knowing to being and not being. D

Theae. In what way?

So. We may surmise that he who in connection with some certain thing thinks that which is not (τὰ μὴ ὄντα), will think falsely, however sure his mind may be of other things.

Theae. Quite likely, Socrates.

So. But what if some one puts this question to us, 'Is what you say possible? Can any man think of not-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) either by itself (αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό) or in connection with being?' (περὶ τῶν ὄντων του)

E we shall reply 'Yes, when he in thinking thinks of what is not true.' Do you assent?

Theae. I do.

So. Is this kind of thing to be found anywhere else?

Theae. What kind?

So. Can we see a thing, and at the same time see nothing?

Theae. By no means.

So. He, who sees one thing, sees something which is ($\tau\hat{\omega}\nu$ ὅντων τι). Can you suppose that the one ($\tau\hat{o}$ ἓν) is amongst the things which are not?

Theae. I cannot.

So. Then in seeing one thing he sees what is (ὅν τι).

Theae. Plainly.

189 *So.* He also, who hears anything, in hearing one thing hears what is.

Theae. Yes.

So. And he, who touches a thing, touches something which is, because it is one.

Theae. Again yes.

So. Does not he who thinks think of one thing?

Theae. He must.

So. And in thinking of one thing he thinks of that which is?

Theae. Granted.

So. Then he, who thinks of what is not ($\mu\grave{\eta}$ ὄν), thinks of nothing.

Theae. Evidently.

So. But he, who thinks of nothing, does not think at all.

Theae. That surely is manifest.

B *So.* One cannot think of not-being ($\tau\hat{o}$ $\mu\grave{\eta}$ ὄν) either by itself or in connection with being.

Theae. Clearly not.

So. Then to think falsely is different from thinking of not-being ($\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\mu\grave{\eta}$ ὄντα). //

Theae. Different doubtless.

So. So we have found a second time that there is no such thing in us as false opinion.

Theae. That cannot be denied.

So. Perhaps this so-called false opinion may be accounted for in another way.

Theae. How?

So. We may say that false opinion is a sort of confusion of opinions (*ἄλλοδοξία*), and arises when anyone makes a mistake by substituting in thought one of C two real things for the other. In such a case, although he always thinks of existence, yet, as he exchanges one object for another, he judges amiss, and may consequently be said to think falsely.

Theae. This seems to me to be the correct explanation. When one confounds in thought the noble with the base or the base with the noble, he has truly a false opinion.

So. It is plain, Theaetetus, that your fear of me has gone, and scorn has taken its place.

Theae. How is that?

So. It gives you no concern that I may lay violent hands on this 'truly false' of yours, and ask you if a D thing can be slowly swift or heavily light, or if the nature of anything can accord better with its opposite than with itself. But let this pass, as I wish you not to lose your boldness. False opinion means, as you say, a confusion of two things in thought. Is this satisfactory to you?

Theae. Yes.

So. Do you mean that the mind can put one of two things in the place of the other?

Theae. That is my meaning.

So. In such a case must it not have in thought E (*διάνοια*) either both things or one of them?

Theae. It must.

So. Then the two may be present to the mind at the same time or by turns.

Theae. Very good.

So. Does your view of thought agree with mine?

Theae. What is your view?

So. Thinking (*λόγος*) is the soul's having a dialogue

with itself over its own mental possessions. // I am far from being sure of this. Yet the soul in thinking looks to me as if it were simply conversing (διαλέγεσθαι) with itself, asking itself questions and answering, saying 'Yes' and 'No.' And when it comes to a conclusion, either slowly or by quick intuition, and has decided and solved its doubts, it has, we say, formed an opinion. So, according to me, having an opinion is speaking (λέγειν), and the opinion is the word (λόγος) spoken, not aloud however or to another but to oneself and in silence. // And you, what do you say?

Theae. Your view is mine.

So. Accordingly when we think that one thing is another, we are really, I take it, saying that one thing is another to ourselves.

B *Theae.* Just so.

So. Try to recall whether you ever said to yourself that the noble is undoubtedly base, or the unjust just, or, what gives point to them all, reflect whether you ever attempted to persuade yourself that one thing is surely another. On the contrary you have, I am confident, never ventured to say to yourself even in sleep that odd is even, or any other thing of that kind.

Theae. What you say is true.

C *So.* And do you suppose that any other man, sane or demented, ever really succeeded in persuading himself that an ox must be a horse or that two must be one?

Theae. I cannot think so.

So. If talking to oneself is thinking, then no one, who talks and thinks of two things and has his mind in touch with both, could say and think that one (ἑτερον) is the other (ἑτερον). You must not cavil at my using the word 'other' (ἑτερον) for each of them. I mean simply that no one, so placed, thinks of the base as noble or anything as something else.

Theae. I do not cavil at the phrase, Socrates, and incline to your view.

So. Then, if he thinks of both, he cannot mistake one for the other.

Theae. Agreed.

So. But if he thinks of one only and not of the other, he can never think that the one is the other.

Theae. Probably not, for that would be to make him apprehend what is not in his mind.

So. Then if we think of either both of two things or but one, we cannot possibly be confused about them. He who lays it down that the mental confusion of two **E** things is the essence of false opinion is talking idly. So this account of the existence in us of false opinion is no better than the previous one.

Theae. So it would seem.

So. Yet I doubt, Theaetetus, whether this conclusion will prove to be satisfactory, as it may force us into making many strange admissions.

Theae. What for instance?

So. I shall not say before I have made diligent investigation on all sides; it would be disgraceful, if we should be pressed by only one failure into making the admissions to which I refer. If we find a way to **191** avoid these painful consequences, we may then speak of others as in danger of them, but we ourselves will be beyond the reach of ridicule; but, if we are completely at fault, we must humbly yield ourselves prisoners to the argument to be trodden on by it, if it so desire, as sea-sick people are trodden on by the sailors. Hear my plan for escaping the trouble which besets us.

Theae. I am anxious to hear it.

So. We were, I shall say, wrong in admitting it to be impossible for anyone to be betrayed into thinking that what he does not know is what he knows; for **B** such an error is in a manner quite possible.

Theae. I had a suspicion of this at the time. You mean that I, who know Socrates, and see at a distance some one whom I did not know, may mistake him for Socrates. Is not that a case in point?

So. But we abandoned that position, did we not, because it implied that we, who know, could fail to know what we know?

Theae. We did, it is true.

So. Here is another way which we may try, although I can make no sanguine prediction as to the result of our effort. But we are so hardly bested, that we can pass no argument without turning it on all sides and testing its value. See, then, if there is anything in what I say. Can one ever learn (*μαθεῖν*) what he did not formerly know?

Theae. He surely can.

So. And may this not happen time and again?

Theae. Certainly.

So. Be pleased to imagine for the sake of the argument that there is in the soul of each of us a lump of wax, varying with the person; let it be larger in some souls and smaller in others, sometimes pure, sometimes impure, hard in some cases and in others quite soft, and in some let it be of a medium consistency.

Theae. I understand.

So. We shall say that this block is the gift of Mnemosyne, the mother of the Muses; whenever we see or hear or think of anything, which we wish to remember, let us stamp the perception or thought upon the wax, as if we were making an impression with the seal of a ring. Whatever is imprinted we shall remember and know, so long as the image of it remains; and whatever is obliterated, or cannot be stamped, we shall be said not to know and to forget.

Theae. Be it so.

So. Think whether he, who has knowledge, and is considering something which he sees or hears, may not have a false opinion in this way?

Theae. How?

So. When he supposes that what he knows is sometimes what he knows and sometimes what he does not

know. We were not well advised before in saying that this was impossible.

Theae. What new light have you obtained?

So. We must begin by carefully marking out the boundaries of our subject. In the first place if a person knows two things, and has the stamp of them in his soul, but perceives neither, he cannot mistake one for the other. Nor again can there be confusion if he knows one, but neither knows nor has any imprint of the other. He cannot think what he does not know to be either what he does not know or what he knows. Besides, what he perceives he cannot confound with something else which he perceives, or with something which he does not perceive; nor what he does not perceive with something which he perceives. Once more, it is even more impossible, if I may say so, for him to intermingle two things if he knows and perceives both, and has in memory exact copies of the sensations. He cannot imagine that something which he either knows or perceives, is identical with something which he knows and perceives and reproduces exactly in memory; nor that what he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he neither knows nor perceives; nor what he either does not know or does not perceive is something, which he neither knows nor perceives. All these cases manifestly preclude the possibility of false opinion. There are left, however, one or two cases in which, if anywhere, is to be found this experience. 192

Theae. Tell me what they are, that I may perchance learn something from them, for just now I cannot follow you.

So. He may think that something, which he knows, is either another thing, which he knows and perceives, or else something, which he perceives but does not know. Or again he may think that something, which he knows and perceives, is another thing, which he knows and perceives. B

Theae. Now I am more in the dark than ever.

So. Listen while I repeat. I know both Theodorus and Theaetetus, and bear in mind what manner of persons they are; and sometimes I see them, and sometimes I do not see them, at one time touch them and at another time not touch them, and in the same way I sometimes hear them, or have some other perception of them, and sometimes I do not perceive them. But I none the less remember and have knowledge of you.

E *Theae.* Certainly.

So. Well, I wish you first of all to understand that we may or may not perceive what we know.

Theae. True.

So. And one may often not perceive, and often merely perceive, what he does not know.

Theae. That is true too.

So. See if you understand me now any better.

193 *Socrates* is acquainted with Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither, nor has he any other perception of them. In such a case he could not think that Theaetetus was Theodorus. Is that not evident?

Theae. Yes quite evident.

So. This is the first of the cases I mentioned.

Theae. Yes.

So. The second is that I, being acquainted with only one of you and perceiving neither, could never mistake the one I know for the one whom I do not know.

Theae. Manifestly.

B *So.* And the third case is that I, knowing neither and perceiving neither, could not imagine that one, whom I do not know, is another whom I do not know. And so for all the cases in which I cannot have a false opinion about Theodorus and you, through my knowing both, it may be, or neither or only one. Take for granted that you have passed them all in review, and do the same, if you see your way, with the instances which involve perceiving.

Theae. I see my way.

So. As to the remaining instances, false opinion occurs when I know Theodorus and you, and have the seals of both printed on the block of wax, but **C** see you only vaguely and at a distance. In order to recognize you both I am eager to apply the right mental stamp to the right visual impression, so that the impression may exactly fill its niche; but I may fail in the attempt, fitting, so to speak, the sandal to the wrong foot, by placing the sense impression of one of you in contact with the mental impression of the other. I err pretty much as one may do who, looking into a mirror, fails to see that his right hand corresponds to the left hand of his image. Now when **D** I make such a confusion and transposition, I have a false opinion.

Theae. That is very probable, Socrates. You have given a vivid description of this experience (τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος).

So. Once more, when I know both and perceive only one, but my knowledge is not concordant with the perception—you did not understand me when I spoke of this a moment ago.

Theae. I did not.

So. I meant that if I knew and perceived both of **E** you, and if my knowledge coincided with the perception, I could not possibly suppose one to be the other. Was that not said?

Theae. Yes.

So. But there is left the case just now hinted at, when, so we say, false opinion may occur. I may know and see both, or perceive you by some other sense, and yet fail to assign the seals to the right **194** perception, like a poor bowman, who shoots wide of his mark. In this I am said to be in error.

Theae. And naturally.

So. And whenever a sensation is present to one of the seals but not to the other, if the mind adapts the stamp of the absent sensation to the sensation before it, it judges falsely. In one word, if our doctrine is

sound, there can be no deception or false opinion regarding things which we neither know nor have
B perceived; but amongst the things, which we both know and perceive, opinion twists and coils and becomes true or false, true when the sense impression goes straight and direct to its corresponding type, false when it deflects and goes awry.

Theae. That, Socrates, is splendidly said.

C *So.* But you have not heard it all. Listen a moment longer, and then decide. For it is splendid to think truly, but to be deceived is base.

Theae. True indeed.

So. Let us trace true and false opinion to their source in the block of wax. When the wax in the soul is deep and plentiful and smooth and of the right consistency, the impressions pass through the portals of the senses, and engrave themselves upon the heart (κέαρ) of the soul, as Homer says, in humorous allusion to the resemblance of the soul to wax (κηρός), and the
D result is that the stamped figures are pure and of the right depth and lasting. Those, who have a soul of this kind, are apt to learn, have retentive memories and true opinions; and their impressions, being clear and distinct and speedily disposed without jostle or confusion each in its proper place, are called real (ὄντα), and those who have them are called wise. Do you not like the names?

Theae. Exceedingly.

E *So.* On the other hand, the hearts of some are hairy, as sings the all-wise poet, or foul with mire, and the wax becomes impure or very moist or very hard. Those, whose hearts are moist and soft, learn easily, but are prone to forget, while those, whose hearts are hard, are deficient in the opposite way. The hearts that are hairy, rough, stony and mixed with filth are, equally with the hard hearts, wanting in depth, and have as a consequence indistinct impressions; and likewise in the soft hearts the impressions by reason of their running together become obscure and ill-

defined. But the indistinctness is greater than ever, 195 if to all this is added that the soul is small and the impressions huddled together and confused. In people of this sort false opinion is liable to arise; for, whatever things they see, hear or think of, they cannot quickly allot to their rightful place, but as a rule laboriously proceed to jumble and pervert. They are called ignorant, and are said to think of real things falsely.

Theae. No man ever said a truer word, Socrates. B

So. Shall we conclude then that false opinion is found in us?

Theae. We shall.

So. And true opinion?

Theae. It also.

So. Have we sufficiently proved that there are undoubtedly these two kinds of opinion?

Theae. Infallibly.

So. Ah, Theaetetus, what an awful plague is a man who loves to talk!

Theae. Why, what is the difficulty now?

So. I am sick at heart with my own dulness and C shameless loquacity. In what other way can you describe the habit of one who pulls an argument now this way and now that, too stupid to come to any conclusion and yet too obstinate to desist?

Theae. What is it that discourages you?

So. I am not heart-broken only but at my wits' end. What am I to say, if I am confronted with this question: Are you sure, Socrates, that you have found false opinion neither in the contact of one perception with another, nor of one thought with another, but in the union of thought and percep- D tion? And I shall say 'Why yes,' in the tone of one who is proud of having made a wonderful discovery.

Theae. You have certainly no reason to be ashamed of your proof.

So. Do you then, he will continue, say that it is

impossible to suppose a man, whom we think of but do not see, to be a horse, which we do not see or touch or perceive in any way, but merely think of? That, I shall reply, is my meaning.

Theae. So it is.

E *So.* Well then, he will ask, can anyone imagine that eleven is twelve, when both are merely thought of? Tell me what would be your answer to that.

Theae. I should be disposed to say that we might mistake one for the other, if they were seen or touched, but that there could be no mistake, if they were in thought only.

196 *So.* Is it really your opinion that no one ever set before his mind five and seven—not men or objects of any kind, but the simple (αἰτᾶ) five and seven which, so we said, are not perceived, but only printed on the block of wax, and could not therefore give rise to error—did no man, I say, ever consider these numbers, in order to find out their sum, and conclude that it is eleven, while another man thought that it was twelve? Or would everybody think and say that it is twelve?

B *Theae.* By no means; there are many who would say that the sum is eleven; and, if you take larger numbers, you are more likely to be mistaken, for we are, I presume, speaking of any kind of number.

So. Quite right. Reflect if in this case twelve must not be mistaken for eleven in the lump of wax.

Theae. It seems probable.

So. Are we not back to the beginning of the dispute? He who makes this mistake thinks that something which he knows is another thing which he knows.
C By declaring this to be impossible we get rid of false opinion by a *tour de force* because its existence would to our mind compel us to admit that we could both know and not know the same things at the same time.

Theae. Very true.

So. If we were to define false opinion as the mixing of thought and sensation, we could not explain how anyone could ever be at fault in pure thinking

(ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς διανοήμασιν). But now, either there can be no such thing as false opinion, or it is possible not to know what we know. Which do you prefer?

Theae. I cannot see my way to choose either, Socrates.

So. Yet one or other must be set aside according to **D** our argument. What if we dismiss all sense of shame, and make a desperate effort?

Theae. What are we to do?

So. We must try to explain the word 'to know.'

Theae. Why should that be shameless?

So. You do not, it would seem, understand that from the beginning we were supposed not to know what knowledge is, and that the whole argument has been simply a search for a right interpretation of it.

Theae. I am conscious of that.

So. Is it not disgraceful that we, who do not know what knowledge is, should offer to explain the nature of knowing? Indeed for that matter, Theaetetus, we **E** have been tainted for a long time with an impure method of discussion. Thousands of times we have uttered the words 'knowing' and 'not knowing' 'having science' and 'not having science,' as if we could understand these words so long as we were ignorant of what knowledge is. Observe that even now we made use of the terms 'to be ignorant' and to 'understand,' as though we should be entitled to employ them, even if we were destitute of knowledge.

Theae. But how will you carry on a discourse at all, if you deprive yourself of these phrases?

So. I cannot, while I am myself, but it would be **197** another matter if I were a notorious disputant. If such a man had been present, he would have warned us away from these expressions, and have severely chidden me in particular for my manner of arguing. But since we have only our poor selves, I shall, if you desire it, hazard an account of the nature of knowledge. I think that it may be worth our while.

Theae. Try it by all means. And we will deal

gently with you, if you fail to keep clear of the doubtful words.

So. You have surely heard the usual definition of 'to know'?

Theae. Perhaps; but I do not call it to mind just now.

B So. To know is commonly said to be the same as to have knowledge.

Theae. True.

So. But let us make a trifling change, and say that it means to possess knowledge.

Theae. What is the difference between the two expressions?

So. Perhaps none; yet listen, and help me to examine this notion of mine.

Theae. Gladly, as far as I can.

So. 'Having' is to my mind different from 'possessing.' If a man bought and kept a cloak, but did not wear it, he might fairly be said not to have but to possess it.

Theae. Right.

C So. See if it is not in the same way possible to possess knowledge without having it, as though a man should capture wild birds, pigeons and others, and keep them shut up at home in a pigeon-house, which he has built. He may be said in a certain sense always to have them, in that he possesses them, may he not?

Theae. Yes.

D So. Yet in another sense he has none of them, although all are subject to his control in the enclosure close to his hand, and he may at will take and hold any bird, which he chooses to catch, and then let it go again, doing this as often as he likes.

Theae. That is so.

So. Then, just as we set up in the soul of each man an imaginary lump of wax, so now once more let us construct in every soul an aviary for all kinds of birds, some kinds keeping apart in larger and others

in smaller flocks, and others again flying about at random each by itself.

Theae. Suppose that to be done; and what next? **E**

So. We shall fancy that in childhood this receptacle is empty, and that the birds stand for kinds of knowledge. Whenever anyone acquires any knowledge, and confines it in the cage, he may be said to have learned or found out the subject matter of some science; and this is to know.

Theae. Very good.

So. But when he wishes to recapture and for a **198** time take in hand some particular knowledge, and again to let it go, reflect if there should not be given to such mental acts names different from those used to denote his first possession of the knowledge. You will understand me better by means of an example. Arithmetic you speak of as an art (τέχνη), do you not?

Theae. Yes.

So. Let it be conceived of as the hunt after the sciences (ἐπιστήμαι) of odd and even in general.

Theae. I understand.

So. The arithmetician by means of his art has ready at hand the sciences of number, and he can **B** impart them to others.

Theae. Yes.

So. We say that he who imparts teaches, and that he who receives learns and that he who has the science in his possession in the dove-cote knows.

Theae. Quite so.

So. Give your attention to what follows. Must not the perfect mathematician know all numbers, since in his own soul he has the sciences of all?

Theae. He must.

So. Could he not sum up either pure (αὐτά) **C** numbers or objects?

Theae. Undoubtedly.

So. And this calculation is really a considering how much the sum is to be?

Theae. Just that.

So. Then seemingly he considers as if he did not know what he knows, for we admitted that he knew all numbers. You have doubtless heard of these riddles.

Theae. I have.

So. We shall then say, returning to our illustration, **D** that the hunt for knowledge resembles the pursuit and possession of the pigeons in two ways, in that there is, first, the chase in order to obtain possession and, secondly, the taking and holding in hand what is already possessed. In this way what any one had formerly learned and known he may revise and resume, now taking hold again by his mind of what he long ago had possessed merely, and having it in hand.

Theae. True.

E *So.* This was why I asked what terms should be used to describe the calculations of the arithmetician or the reading of the grammarian. Shall we say that, although he knows, he comes to learn again for himself (*παρ' ἑαυτοῦ*) what he knows.

Theae. That is foolish, Socrates.

So. Or shall we say that they read and reckon up what they do not know, although we have granted that they know all letters and all numbers?

199 *Theae.* That, too, is absurd.

So. We shall say that we are indifferent as to names, and do not care how the words knowing and learning may be abused; but, since we have concluded that possessing knowledge and having knowledge are different, we shall say that no one can fail to possess what he possesses, nor can it ever chance that he does not know what he knows: he may, nevertheless, get a false opinion, for, having a knowledge **B** of something, but not of the special thing in question, of which he is in chase as it flies about, he may by mistake catch some other thing instead of what he wants. If he supposed that eleven was twelve, he would have caught the knowledge of

eleven instead of the knowledge of twelve, capturing, as it were, the ring-dove instead of the pigeon. Is this more to your liking?

Theae. Yes, that is reasonable.

So. But when he gets what he seeks, he makes no mistake, and thinks of what is ($\tau\acute{\alpha}$ ὄντα). In this way both false and true opinion exist, and the difficulties, which before discouraged us, have been **C** removed. I hope that you agree. Do you not?

Theae. Yes.

So. And we have avoided the danger of not knowing what we know, for there is no possibility of our not possessing what we possess, whether we think truly or falsely. But a more formidable difficulty seems to be looming up.

Theae. What is that?

So. How can a transfer between two kinds of **D** knowledge ever be false opinion?

Theae. Explain.

So. Firstly, how can one who has knowledge of anything be ignorant of that very thing, not because of his ignorance but because of his own knowledge? Then, secondly, in his thinking of this as that and of that as this is there not implied the vast absurdity that, though his mind has knowledge, yet it knows nothing, and is ignorant of all? According to that argument ignorance may as easily be the cause of knowledge, and blindness of sight, as knowledge can be the cause of ignorance.

Theae. Perhaps it was not wise of us, Socrates, to **E** say that the birds represent only kinds of knowledge; along with the sciences we ought to have kinds of ignorance flitting about in the soul, and the hunter may at one time get hold of a knowledge and at another time ignorance, having a false opinion, if he captures ignorance, and a true opinion, if he captures a knowledge.

So. It is hard to keep from praising you, Theaetetus; yet be so good as to reconsider your words.

200 Suppose it to be as you say: he who catches a kind of ignorance has a false opinion. Was not that what you said?

Theae. Yes.

So. But he will not think that he has a false opinion?

Theae. Oh no.

So. He will suppose that he has a true opinion, and will be firmly convinced that he has knowledge of that, about which he is in error.

Theae. No doubt.

So. Then he will fancy that he has snared some knowledge and not ignorance.

Theae. Manifestly.

So. So we have gone a long roundabout, and come back to our original difficulty. The famous disputant B will say to us with a touch of humour:—Ha, my good friends, if a man knows both the knowledge and the ignorance, will he think that the one which he knows is the other which he knows. Or if he knows neither, will he think that the one which he does not know is the other which he does not know? Or if he knows one and not the other, will he judge that the one he knows is the one he does not know, or the one he does not know the one he knows? Or will you say to me that besides knowledge and ignorance there are sciences of knowledge and ignorance, imprisoned in some other ridiculous C pigeon-house or imaginary block of wax, and that he, who possesses these, knows, so long as he possesses them, even though he may not have them to hand in his mind? So you will be compelled to travel in a circle, coming back a thousand times on your own steps, and making no advance. What shall we answer to these things, Theaetetus?

Theae. Indeed, Socrates, I have not a word to say.

So. Have not we, think you, received a just rebuke, and has not the argument shown that we were not right in looking for false opinion, until we have

finished with the question of knowledge? We must **D** have a firm grasp of knowledge, before it is even possible to know the nature of false opinion.

Theae. I must perforce agree with you.

So. Once more, then, let us go back to the beginning, and ask 'what is knowledge?' We shall surely not despair yet.

Theae. No, not so long as your strength hold out.

So. Try to propose an answer which will not set us too much at odds with our own selves.

Theae. I have nothing but my former definition to suggest, Socrates. **E**

So. What was that?

Theae. That it is true opinion, which is surely infallible, and all, which follows from it, is noble and good.

So. The leader, who was asked if the river was deep, said 'We shall soon see.' And if we, Theaetetus, proceed with our search, we may trip over the very thing we are looking for, but we shall find nothing by **201** standing still.

Theae. You are right; let us press forward with our inquiry.

So. We need but one glance; a whole profession insists that we are wrong.

Theae. What is the matter, and whom do you mean?

So. I refer to those who are mightiest in wisdom, and are known as lawyers and rhetoricians. For they persuade us by their art, not by teaching us but by causing us to believe whatever they like. Or do you think that there are any teachers so clever as to be able, while a few drops of water are flowing, to impart **B** the full and exact information of a robbery or assault to those who were not eye-witnesses of the crime?

Theae. They could not teach them, but might, I think, persuade them.

So. And do you say that persuading them is causing them to have an opinion?

Theae. Doubtless.

So. When judges are rightly persuaded of that which it is possible really to know only by seeing it, forming on hearsay a true opinion, they have decided without knowledge; yet they have been wisely persuaded, if they have well judged.

Theae. Assuredly.

So. If, my friend, true opinion in courts of law was the same as knowledge, the wisest judge would not have been able without knowledge to decide rightly. It would seem, therefore, that the two are different.

Theae. There just now occurs to me a saying, which I once heard but had forgotten. Some one said that knowledge was true opinion along with definition (λόγος), and that opinion without definition was distinct from knowledge. Things which have no definition are unintelligible, that was his peculiar word, and things which have definition are intelligible (ἐπιστητά).

So. A timely remark. How did he distinguish between things intelligible and things unintelligible? I wish to see if you and I have heard of this from the same source.

Theae. I am not certain that I understand. But I could, I think, recognize the process if I heard it from another.

So. Take a dream in exchange for a dream. I seem to have heard that the primal elements, out of which all persons and things are composed, have no definition. Each element by itself (αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό) is only a name, and cannot be said either to exist or not to exist. To affirm existence (οὐσία) of it or non-existence would by adding something to it destroy its singleness. Neither 'it' nor 'that' nor 'each' nor 'only' nor 'this' nor any such term must be asserted of it; these terms are moveable and applicable everywhere, and are quite different from the things, to which they are joined, while, on the contrary, no statement about the elements or suitable definition of

them, even if such a thing were possible, could be applied to any other thing. Thus these elements cannot be defined; named they can be but that is all. **B** On the other hand that which is compounded from them, and the resulting combination of names, are defined, since the combination of two names is the essence of definition. Thus we have the undefinable and unknown letters or rudiments, which are objects of perception, and the compounds or syllables, which are known and expressed, and are conceived by true opinion. Whenever anyone has a true opinion without definition, his mind may be said to be concerned **C** with it truly, but not to have knowledge. He who cannot give and take the definition of a thing, is in ignorance of it; but, if he can add the definition, he is in the opposite state of mind, having perfect knowledge. Such was the substance of my vision. Was yours the same?

Theae. Exactly.

So. Then you are satisfied to hold that true opinion with definition is knowledge?

Theae. Fully satisfied.

So. Have we to-day, as it were incidentally, obtained what many wise men of long ago have spent their lives in seeking and have not found?

Theae. It seems to me that our present position is a good one.

So. Perhaps it is; for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and right opinion? Yet there is one of our statements, which I am not quite ready to accept.

Theae. Which is that?

So. One that might be looked upon as the most subtle point of all, that the elements are unknown and the compounds ($\tau\acute{o}\ \tau\hat{\omega}\nu\ \sigma\upsilon\lambda\lambda\alpha\beta\hat{\omega}\nu\ \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$) known. **E**

Theae. Is not that true?

So. We shall soon know; for we have as hostages the author's own illustrations.

Theae. What are they?

So. The letters and syllables of words. Do you not think that these were what he had in view?

Theae. I do.

- 203 *So.* Let us make trial of them or rather of ourselves, to see if we learned letters as he did. And first of all have syllables a definition and letters none?

Theae. I suppose so.

So. And so do I. If you were to be asked how 'So,' the first syllable of Socrates, was spelled, what would you answer?

Theae. S and O.

So. That, you would say, is the definition of the syllable?

Theae. I would.

- B *So.* Now give in the same way the definition of S.

Theae. But how can I tell the elements of an element? I might say, Socrates, that S is a consonant, a mere sound like that made by the tongue in hissing; B and most of the letters are neither articulate sounds nor even noises; and of all the letters it is quite right to say that they have no definition. The seven vowels are the most distinct of the letters, having sound but not definition.

So. So far, then, my friend, we have been right in our account of knowledge.

Theae. I think so.

- C *So.* Have we been right in insisting that the letters are unknown and the syllables known?

Theae. That is my belief.

So. Whether are we to say that the syllable is two or more letters, as the case may be, or one single idea (*ἰδέα*) resulting from the union of the letters?

Theae. I think it is all the letters.

So. Look at the two letters S and O, which form the first syllable of my name. Must not he who knows the syllable know both letters?

- D *Theae.* Certainly.

So. He knows S and O?

Theae. Yes.

So. Can he be ignorant of either and yet be acquainted with both?

Theae. That is extremely absurd, Socrates.

So. Still, if he cannot know both without knowing each, he must, if he wishes to know the syllable, verily become acquainted first of all with the letters. So our grand theory has vanished utterly.

Theae. That is surely sudden. E

So. Yes, we were not keeping a close watch upon it. Perhaps we should look upon the syllable as not the letters but a form ($\epsilon\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma$), which, though it sprang out of them, was different from them, and had one single idea ($\iota\delta\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\nu \mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon \acute{\epsilon}\chi\omicron\nu$).

Theae. Very well; that is perhaps nearer the truth.

So. Be careful, and let us not in a cowardly way abandon a great and majestic argument.

Theae. By no means.

So. Let it be, as we now say, that the compound is a single idea ($\iota\delta\acute{\epsilon}\alpha$) resulting from each several combination of harmonious elements, whether they be letters or any other things whatever. 204

Theae. Agreed.

So. This idea can have no parts.

Theae. Why?

So. Because as to that which has parts the whole ($\tau\omicron \delta \omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$) must be all the parts. Or would you prefer to say that the whole, which has arisen from the parts, is a single form ($\epsilon\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma$) differing from all the parts ($\tau\grave{\alpha} \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha \mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta$)?

Theae. I would.

So. And would you say that the all ($\tau\omicron \delta \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$) and the whole were the same or different? B

Theae. I am not clear about that, but, since you wish me to be prompt in answering, will reply at a venture that they are different.

So. Your promptitude, Theaetetus, is admirable, but we must look at your answer to see if it is equally admirable.

Theae. That we must.

So. According to you the all differs from the whole?
Theae. Yes.

So. Is there also a difference between all ($\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$) and the all ($\tau\omicron$ $\pi\hat{\alpha}\nu$)? When we say one, two, three, **C** four, five, six, or twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, do we in all these cases mean the same thing or not?

Theae. The same.

So. That is to say six?

Theae. Just that.

So. Under every variety of phrase[‡] do we not refer to all six ($\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$ $\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\xi\acute{\xi}$)?

Theae. Yes.

So. When we speak of all ($\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$) do we not speak of all ($\pi\hat{\alpha}\nu$) of some one thing?

Theae. We must.

So. And that is the six?

Theae. Nothing else.

D *So.* Thus in every case of number if we ascribe anything to all ($\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$) we ascribe it to the all ($\tau\omicron$ $\pi\hat{\alpha}\nu$) at the same time.

Theae. Evidently.

So. Accordingly we shall say that the number of the acre is the same as the acre, shall we not? [‡]

Theae. Yes.

So. And similarly of the stadium?

Theae. Yes.

So. And the number of the army is the same as the army? In all these cases the total ($\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$) number is the complete reality ($\tau\omicron$ $\delta\nu$ $\pi\hat{\alpha}\nu$)?

Theae. Yes.

E *So.* Must not the number in every instance be the parts?

Theae. It must.

So. Whatever has parts is composed of parts?

Theae. Plainly.

So. As the total number is the all ($\tau\omicron$ $\pi\hat{\alpha}\nu$), it follows that all the parts are the all.[‡]

Theae. That must be granted.

So. Then the whole cannot consist of parts; if it were all the parts, it would be the all.

Theae. That seems to be the case.

So. But is a part a part of anything except the whole?

Theae. Yes, of the all.

So. You are staunch in your resistance, Theaetetus. **205**
But is not the all that from which nothing is missing?

Theae. No doubt.

So. And the whole is surely that which is deprived of nothing. And that which has been deprived of something is neither the all nor the whole. If you take away any part from the all, you at the same time take away the same part from the whole.

Theae. I now see that there is no difference between the all and the whole.

So. Did we not say that, if anything has parts, the whole and the all will be all the parts?

Theae. We did.

So. Returning to our task of a few moments ago we shall say that, if the syllable is not the letters, it cannot have the letters as its parts, or that, if the **B** syllable and letters are the same, the letters must be known equally with the syllable.

Theae. That is right.

So. Was it not to avoid making both knowable that we supposed them to be different?

Theae. Yes.

So. Yet, if letters are not the parts of the syllable, do you know what parts it has?

Theae. I do not. If I granted that it had parts, it would be ludicrous of me to abandon letters and hunt for other parts.

So. It would indeed. So, Theaetetus, according to **C** this argument the syllable would be one indivisible form (*ιδέα*).

Theae. So it would seem.

So. Call to mind our former conclusions, and how we approved of them; we said, did we not, that the

primal elements of things had no definition because each element by itself (*αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*) was uncompounded? Existence could not be predicated of it; 'this' and 'that' and all such terms were foreign to it and inappropriate; and for this cause, we said, each element was indefinable and unknown. Do you remember?

Theae. I remember.

D *So.* Is not this the cause of its being pure and undivided (*μονοειδές τι καὶ ἀμέριστον*) also? I know of no other.

Theae. There is no other.

So. But is not the syllable in the same predicament (*εἶδος*) as the letters, if it is one form (*ἰδέα*) and without parts?

Theae. It surely is.

So. Accordingly, if a syllable is a whole, all of whose letters are its parts, the letters must be as intelligible and definable as the syllable, on the ground that the whole is the same as all its parts.

E *Theae.* Very true.

So. But if the syllable is an indivisible unit, it can no more be expressed or understood than a letter. The same rule applies to both.

Theae. I must agree.

So. We shall, therefore, not sustain the view of him who says that the syllable is known and defined, while the letter is not.

Theae. Not if the argument is trustworthy.

206 *So.* Would you not rather subscribe to the very opposite opinion, when you recall your own experience in learning to read?

Theae. What was that?

So. How that you were always occupied with the task of distinguishing by eye and ear one letter from another, in order that you might not be perplexed by the arrangement of them whether spoken or written?

Theae. Very true.

So. And is not he skilled in music, who is able to

assign any particular note to its own string? Every- **B**
one would grant that notes are the letters of music.

Theae. Certainly.

So. Arguing in regard to elements and compounds in general, and using as proof the conclusions we have drawn from letters and syllables, the matter with which we were most at home, we may say that elements as a class (*γένος*) are much more clearly known than compounds, and are at the same time more necessary to a thorough understanding of a subject. Any one, who says that it is the nature of compounds to be known and of elements not to be known, will be put down as joking or talking nonsense.

Theae. Exactly.

So. Other proofs in confirmation of this might be **C**
given, but we must not in seeking for them forget the subject in hand, the saying, namely, that perfect knowledge is definition conjoined with right opinion.

Theae. We must indeed see to that.

So. What is meant by definition? Three meanings it seems to me to have.

Theae. What are they?

So. The first is the revealing of one's thoughts by **D**
the voice through verbs and names, casting one's opinion upon the stream of speech flowing through the lips, as you would throw a shadow upon water or a mirror. Would you call that definition?

Theae. I would; we say that he, who does this, speaks or defines.

So. And sooner or later every one, not dumb and blind from his birth, can do this; he can show what he thinks about anything. All, who think rightly about a thing, will have a definition also, and nowhere **E**
will there be right opinion outside of knowledge.

Theae. True.

So. Let us not lightly accuse him, who has set forth this view of knowledge, of speaking to no purpose; perhaps he meant only that he, who was

asked what anything was, might reply by naming its
 207 elements.

Theae. Give an instance, Socrates.

So. The hundred parts of a wagon, of which Hesiod speaks. Neither you nor I could name all of them, I am sure, but would be satisfied, if we were asked about a wagon, to answer that it is made up of wheels, axle, box, rails and yoke.

Theae. Yes indeed.

So. Yet we would probably be laughed at, Theaetetus, much as we might be, if, when asked for a grammatical account (λόγος) of your name, we should
 B give merely the syllables, under the impression that a grammarian could do no more. We may have none the less a right opinion of the name. But, as we have already said, it is not possible to have knowledge until along with true opinion of anything we can give a detailed account of its component parts.

Theae. Yes, that has been said.

So. If he who has a right opinion of a wagon is
 C able in addition to tell its essential nature (οὐσία) by describing its hundred parts, he attains to a definition also. He knows the art and science of a wagon, since he has reached the whole by means of an examination of its elements.

Theae. Is that your view, Socrates?

So. Do you not approve, my friend? Do you agree that a definition involves the analysis (διέξοδος) of each thing into its letters, and that a description merely by syllables or any larger parts falls short of
 D definition? Tell me your opinion that we may investigate it.

Theae. I quite agree with that.

So. Do you count that he has knowledge who thinks of a quality as belonging at one time to one thing and at another time to another, or that to the same thing now one quality and again another is assigned?

Theae. Very far from it.

So. Do you not remember that at first both you and others made this mistake when you were learning to read?

Theae. Do you mean that I did not always spell a syllable in the same way, and that I often put letters **E** where they ought not to be?

So. That is my meaning.

Theae. I have not forgotten indeed, nor do I think that they, who make these mistakes, have knowledge.

So. If a beginner in spelling the name Theaetetus thinks that he should put down **TH** and **E**, and in trying to spell Theodorus should put down **T** and **E**, 208 would we say that he knew the first syllable of both your names? -

Theae. We have just said that such an one did not yet know.

So. And there is nothing to hinder his going on in the same way with the second, third and fourth syllables?

Theae. Nothing.

So. Yet he will write in their correct order the letters of the name Theaetetus at least, and will therefore have right opinion.

Theae. Manifestly.

So. Though he has right opinion he will, as we **B** said, fall short of knowledge, will he not?

Theae. Yes.

So. Yet he has definition along with right opinion, since he has written the letters in their proper sequence, and to do this is the essence of definition.

Theae. True.

So. Then, my friend, it is possible for me to have definition in addition to right opinion, and yet come short of knowledge.

Theae. That is the inference.

So. Then we have been cherishing a dream in imagining that we had attained the truest definition of knowledge. And yet let us not condemn ourselves too soon. Perhaps some one may not choose to accept

C our meaning of definition, but may prefer the last (τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος) of the three meanings which we gave just now.

Theae. This is a timely reminder, for one meaning yet remains. The first was the representation (ὥσπερ εἶδωλον) of thought in speech, and the second was the one we have just examined, the apprehension of the whole through its elements. What was the third?

So. One very generally adopted, the describing the thing in question by some features, which distinguish it from everything else.

Theae. Can you give me an illustration of this kind of definition?

D *So.* I use this method when I describe the sun as the brightest of all the bodies which revolve about the earth.

Theae. That is plain.

So. See, now, why I refer to this. You may, as we have just said, take the distinctive features (τὴν διαφοράν) of any particular thing and then, as they say, you have a definition of it, whereas, so long as you touch upon what is common (κοινοῦ τινός) to a number of things, you have a definition merely of this common part (ἢ κοινότης).

E *Theae.* I understand, and think you are right in this third meaning of definition.

So. Whoever in addition to right opinion of any reality has in mind that which distinguishes it from other things, will be said to know that of which he formerly had only an opinion.

Theae. That is what we say.

So. Now that I have got a nearer view of the picture, Theaetetus, I can see nothing in it. So long as it was at a distance, it had an appearance of truth.

Theae. How is that?

209 *So.* I will tell you as well as I can. I have, let us say, a right opinion of you. If I have also a definition of you, I know you, but if not, I have opinion only.

Theae. I see.

So. And the interpretation of your distinguishing feature (*διαφορότης*) is definition.

Theae. Yes.

So. When therefore I have opinion only, I have not grasped in thought any of the characteristics, which distinguish you from others.

Theae. It seems not.

So. I have a comprehension of only those qualities (*τὰ κοινά*), which belong to anyone as much as to yourself.

Theae. That is all.

B

So. Now answer me this. How can I in such a case have an opinion of you rather than of anyone else? For suppose me to understand that Theaetetus is a man with a nose, eyes, mouth and his full complement of members. Can such a knowledge avail me to distinguish Theaetetus from Theodorus or from any uttermost savage?

Theae. How can it?

So. Even if I know that you have not nose and eyes simply but a snub-nose and prominent eyes, I do not even yet think of you rather than of myself or others like me.

Theae. You do not.

So. I do not really think of Theaetetus, until I have stored away in my memory the difference between your snub-nose and all the others I have ever seen, and have a distinct recollection of all your other traits, so that, were I to meet you to-morrow, I should remember you, and have a right opinion of you.

Theae. Very true.

So. Right opinion must cover the differences which D belong to each thing.

Theae. Manifestly.

So. What then is the use of our adding to right opinion definition? If this means that we must bear in mind wherein a thing differs from other things, it richly deserves to be ridiculed.

Theae. How is that?

So. It enjoins upon us to add a right opinion which includes differences to a right opinion which includes differences. Compared with such a circular method the revolutions of the pestle, or the Spartan staff, or **E** any whirligig are a mere trifle. The argument may fittingly be called a blind guide, for to bid us acquire what we already have, in order to learn what we know, is the injunction of one who is in utter darkness.

Theae. Yes; and what were you going to say, when you asked me what was the use of adding definition to right opinion?

So. If we had been told to add definition not to an opinion of difference but to a knowledge of difference, if we wished to obtain knowledge, to what a pretty
210 pass would this finest of all arguments have come!

Theae. It would indeed.

So. Surely; for when asked what knowledge was, it really answered that it was right opinion joined with a knowledge of difference, for it admitted that the definition to be added was the same as knowledge of difference.

Theae. It looks like it.

So. How silly then for us who were seeking for knowledge to be informed that it is right opinion with knowledge either of difference or of anything else. Thus neither sensible perception, nor true
B opinion, nor definition coupled with true opinion, can be knowledge.

Theae. It seems not.

So. Are you still in travail, my dear boy, or have you brought to the light all your thoughts about knowledge?

Theae. Indeed it is through you that I have had anything to say at all.

So. Has not my art declared that nothing is worth cherishing of all that we have said?

Theae. It certainly has.

So. If at any time hereafter you try to accomplish anything, Theaetetus, you will, if successful, have **C** better thoughts because of this examination, while, if you fail, you will be more gentle and lenient with your associates, and wise enough to be aware of your ignorance. My art has power to affect that but no more. Nor do I know anything of what was known by the mighty men of old, or is known by the geniuses of the present day. My mother and I have received our office from God. Only she tends women, while I tend upon men, whosoever are young, noble and fair. **D** But now I must away to the porch of the King Archon to find my accuser Meletus. Early to-morrow morning, Theodorus, let us meet again at this place.

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